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Preface 
‚The Pros and cons of High Prices‛ is the sixth in the Swedish 
Competition Authority’s Pros and Cons series. This volume collects 
the five papers that formed the base of an inspiring and well-
attended conference, which was held in Stockholm on November 9. 
The authors presented their work and senior officials from 
competition authorities around Europe acted as discussants. The 
lively debate and many appreciative comments I heard at the 
conference is testimony of the high professional standard of the 
contributions and of their relevance for competition policy. 
I would like to express my sincere gratitude to all contributing 
authors, to the discussants and to the moderator of the conference, 
Damien Neven. At the Swedish Competition Authority, Niklas 
Strand and Arvid Fredenberg have managed the project and acted as 
editors; they both deserve due credit. Finally many thanks to Bengt 
Kopp and Fariba Gerayeli, who provided invaluable assistance in 
organizing the conference and in producing this conference volume. 
 
Stockholm, November 2007 
Claes Norgren 
Director-General 
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1 Introduction 
Arvid Fredenberg 
Could there be any pros of high prices? The question is as natural as 
the question we got four years ago when we published The Pros and 
Cons of Low Prices – could there be any cons of low prices? These are 
questions competition authorities get from the public from time to 
other. It is a somewhat hard pedagogical task to answer them. The 
answer to both questions is yes, there are indeed pros of high prices 
and cons of low prices. This volume is devoted to exploring the pros 
and cons of high prices. 
In the first contribution, Massimo Motta and Alexandre de Streel 
guide us through the last years’ policy debate regarding the 
treatment of excessive pricing. They call for extreme caution when 
taking action against excessive prices. In view of the different 
suggested methods, they propose a three plus one-condition test that 
has to be fulfilled. The first condition is that there should be high and 
non-transitory entry barriers leading to a super dominant position. 
When talking about a monopoly or a quasi-monopoly some of the 
usual arguments against excessive price action may not apply. The 
second condition reads: the super-dominant position is due to 
current/past exclusive/special rights or to un-condemned past 
exclusionary anticompetitive practices. This excludes cases where 
firms have gained their super-dominant position in a free market via 
innovations or investment. Many of the cases that pass these two 
conditions would be sector regulated industries. Here the authors 
suggest that the sector regulator tackles the excessive prices and 
hence they state a third condition: no sector-specific regulator has 
jurisdiction to solve the matters. Finally, they impose an additional 
condition namely that the competition authority should choose the 
most efficient remedy to solve the anti-competitive excessive price. 
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Motta and de Streel then compare these conditions with the case 
law and find that they fit quite well. They go on by discussing the 
pros and cons of the different indicators that have been used to find 
excessive prices and recommend that ‚antitrust authorities and courts 
should carry out excessive pricing tests according to as many of the methods 
indicated above as possible.‛ 
Nils Wahl gives, in the second contribution, his personal 
reflection on the European case law regarding excessive prices. He 
considers the cases General Motors and British Leyland as dealing with 
the prevention of parallel trade rather than excessive prices. In other 
cases featuring legal monopolies he does not find much guidance on 
how to assess excessive prices; sometimes it is not clear whether the 
court rulings deal with exclusionary high prices or exploitative high 
prices. In United Brands, the court sketched out a method for 
assessing excessive prices, but the Commission decision was 
annulled. His conclusion from the case law is: ‚the Court has not yet 
condemned a particular pricing practice, in a free and unregulated market, 
as amounting to unfairly high and exploitative prices and thus constituting 
an infringement of Article 82.‛ 
Wahl interprets the Commission decision in Scandlines as an 
indication that no price lower than the profit-maximizing monopoly 
price would ever be seen as an excessive price. Since no profit-
maximizing firm would like to charge a price higher than the 
monopoly price, the scope for using the prohibition of exploitative 
excessive prices would be confined to legal monopolies or regulated 
markets. 
Bruce Lyons starts the third contribution with the apparent 
paradox of the exclusion of exploitative abuse. Monopoly pricing is 
the textbook abuse that every economics student learns in the first 
year of study. In other areas of competition law, the policy is 
concerned with attacking price-raising cartels, price-raising mergers 
and exclusionary abuse that lead to consumer exploitation. Yet, most 
competition economists do not want to see action against direct 
exploitation; why is it so? 
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In order to gain an understanding into the issue he discusses four 
topics: measurement, market dynamics, multi-sided markets and 
remedies. The task of measuring costs is inherently tricky and the list 
of problems is very long. Even so, Lyons points to the fact that cost 
measurement is necessary also when it comes to the examination of 
exclusionary abuse and in particular the design of efficient remedies. 
Competition authorities cannot back away from the task of 
measuring costs. 
A newspaper provides benefits for both readers and advertisers 
and the pricing towards these groups can seem unrelated to the 
costs. In these types of multi-sided markets it is important to take 
into account the positive externalities between the groups. If this is 
done properly, Lyons states that: ‚apparently very high prices about 
which some customers complain very loudly may be part of a reasonably 
optimal payments package when all groups of consumers and investment 
incentives are properly taken into account.‛ 
In the end of the contribution, Lyons summarises the main 
reasons why exploitative effects are seldom attacked. Exploitative 
effects are: naturally shorter lived and more dangerous to remedy; 
possibly mainly due to structural entry barriers; harder to prove to 
the standard required by the Court and politically more difficult to 
deal with. 
Timothy Brennan focuses the fourth contribution on the contrast 
between static efficiency and dynamic efficiency. Should we allow 
firms to exploit market power in the short run in order to stimulate 
innovation? He dives into the literature and dissects the arguments 
put forward in favour of a non-interventionist approach. Does 
innovation require monopoly profit? Does innovation require 
monopoly structure? Is innovation promoted by higher prices for 
substitutes? Brennan answers in the negative on all these questions. 
The answer is that we know too little on the relation between market 
power and innovation, hence there is no reason to weaken antitrust 
policy. 
If we want to stimulate innovation, Brennan argues that there are 
other methods than antitrust policy which are better suited to the 
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task. He points to one of the fundamental lessons of 
macroeconomics, namely that addressing N policy objectives 
requires N policy instruments. So if we both want to maximize short-
run economic welfare by acting against anticompetitive practices and 
promote the efficient level of innovation, both objectives cannot be 
reached by competition law only. He concludes by saying: ‚The 
demand for a general rule that ‚dynamic trumps static‛ thus may be little 
more than a rhetorical strategy to make life easier for defendants.‛ 
In the last contribution, Mark Williams asks the question: 
excessive prices – do we care, and how would we know? We are 
more tolerant towards excessive prices as such compared to cartels 
or mergers to monopoly even if the outcome is the same. This 
implies that the way the excessive prices are achieved matters. He 
goes through several good reasons why this is so. 
The main exercise in the remaining of the contribution is to figure 
out what is the correct benchmark to use in excessive pricing cases. 
The starting point is that a price can only be excessive if it allows the 
firm in question to make a profit that is excessive. In order to assess 
if a profit is excessive, Williams put forward five sequential criteria: 
First, excessive profits as given by return on capital "substantially 
higher" than the cost of capital calculated by CAPM. Unfortunately, 
we do not know how much higher. Secondly, the profits remain at 
that level for a "significant" period of time. The time period should 
preferably be so long that all investments are amortised. Thirdly, the 
ex-post recorded profits have been adjusted for ex-ante risk and 
hence attendant survivorship bias. Here, he suggests that ‚a very 
simple way to take this into account is to include the capital investments of 
all investors in the market in the capital base of the winner‛. Fourthly, the 
capital base has been grossed up to include the (risk adjusted) cost of 
intangibles. Fifthly, the recorded profits are over the project reduced 
by the "wage cost of entrepreneurship". 
Taken together, the five contributions shed light on the issue of 
the pros and cons of high prices. Hopefully, this volume contributes 
towards a better understanding of the mechanisms through which 
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high prices have an impact on markets – and towards a more 
effective enforcement of the competition rules. 
14 
2 Excessive Pricing in Competition 
Law: Never say Never?  
Massimo Motta* and Alexandre de Streel** 
2.1 Introduction 
In an article written for the European Competition Law Conference 
in 2003,1 we discussed the treatment of excessive pricing in the 
European Union, commented upon the case-law, and indicated 
which exceptional circumstances might in our view justify resorting 
to excessive pricing actions. We proposed a four-condition test: (1) 
high and non-transitory barriers to entry leading to a monopoly or 
near monopoly; (2) this (near) monopoly being due to current or past 
exclusive or special rights; (3) no effective means to eliminate the 
entry barriers; and (4) no sector regulator being competent to 
regulate the excessive prices. 
Since 2003, our paper has been followed by many others, some 
proposing a more lenient test for the competition authority to 
intervene2 while others suggesting a stricter test of intervention.3 
Excessive pricing has been discussed more and more for at least two 
reasons. The first one is that the European Commission is 
reconsidering its policy on Article 82 of the EC Treaty, and although 
exploitative practices have not been addressed yet in its policy 
                                                     
* European University Institute, Florence and Università di Bologna. 
** Universty of Namur. The authors thank Ph. Choné, D. Neven and the 
participants of the seminar on the Pros and Cons of High Prices for their 
very helpful comments. 
1 See Motta and de Streel (2006). 
2 Among others: Fletcher and Jardine (2007), Paulis (2007), Röller (2007). 
3 Among others: Evans and Padilla (2005). 
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documents, it is well known that the Directorate General for 
Competition plans to deal with them in the future Guidelines on 
Article 82 enforcement.4 The second reason is that dissatisfaction 
with the outcome of the liberalisation process (more particularly 
with the high level of prices in many recently privatised and de-
regulated sectors, as for instance energy),5 which has taken place in 
Europe has led many policy-makers – both at the level of Member 
States and at the EU level – to call for drastic measures of 
intervention, including structural remedies (for instance unbundling 
in energy and telecommunications) and price controls. 
In this paper, we come back to the issue by summarising our 
previous contribution and especially by discussing our policy 
proposal, in the light of recent developments. We limit our analysis 
to excessive prices which directly exploit the consumers where, as 
we show, the conditions for antitrust intervention should be very 
strict. We do not deal with exclusionary excessive prices (which often 
take the form of price squeezing) where the conditions for antitrust 
intervention may be less strict. 
The paper is organised as follows. After these introductory 
remarks, Section 2.2 sets very briefly the legal framework of 
exploitative abuses. Then Section 2.3 proposes a three condition 
screening test to determine the markets that are candidates for 
intervention of excessive pricing actions. Section 2.4 deals with the 
standard of proof for the excessive pricing. Section 2.5 deals with the 
choice of the efficient remedy. Finally, Section 2.6 concludes with 
some recommendations for an efficient dealing of excessive pricing. 
                                                     
4 Lowe (2007). 
5 Communication from the Commission of 10 January 2007, Final Report of 
the Sector inquiry into the European gas and electricity sectors, COM(2006) 
851; van der Woude (2007). 
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2.2 The legal framework 
Article 82(a) of the EC Treaty explicitly prohibits a dominant firm6 
from ‚directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling 
prices or other unfair trading conditions‛. Since most Member States’ 
competition laws are borrowed from the EC Treaty, similar 
provisions exist throughout the EU’s national jurisdictions as well. 
Since in the US the case law excludes the possibility of using 
excessive pricing actions,7 this is an area of antitrust where there is a 
wide divergence between the two sides of the Atlantic. 
Although excessive price actions have been relatively rare, the 
case law of the Court of Justice helps understanding what an 
excessive price is and how it can be proved. 
Since its well-known United Brands case, the Court of Justice 
established that a price is unfair when a dominant firm has 
‚exploited‛ its dominant position so as to set prices significantly 
higher than those which would result from effective competition. 
Hence, a price is excessive and unfair when it is significantly above 
the effective competitive level, or above the economic value of the 
product. This should correspond, in the Court’s view, to the normal 
competitive level. Indeed, in United Brands the Court stated that:  
 
249. It is advisable therefore to ascertain whether the dominant undertaking 
has made use of the opportunities arising out of its dominant position in such a 
way to reap trading benefits which it would not have reaped if there had been 
normal and sufficiently effective competition. 
250. In this case charging a price which is excessive because it has no 
reasonable relation to the economic value of the product would be an abuse. 
                                                     
6 A firm holds a dominant position if it possesses enough market power to 
behave to an appreciable extent independently of the competitors, 
customers and ultimately consumers. Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207, para. 65. 
7 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); United States 
v. Trenton Potteries Co, 273 U.S. 392 (1927); United States v. Aluminium Co. of 
America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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2.3 A screening test to take an excessive price 
action  
In this section, we discuss which markets are candidates for 
intervention of excessive pricing actions. First, we briefly recall the 
pros and cons of using excessive pricing actions within competition 
law. Second, we review the main tests that have been proposed so far 
by different commentators. Third, we identify some exceptional 
circumstances under which it may make sense to resort to 
competition law’s provisions on excessive prices. Fourth, we check 
whether our exceptional circumstances test corresponds to the case-
law and decisional practice in the European Union.  
2.3.1 The Pros and Cons of using excessive pricing 
actions 
There are several well known objections against the application of 
competition law to excessive pricing cases.8 
i. Excessive price actions may undermine the investment 
incentives of new entrants. Indeed, competition law applies 
to sectors where in principle market forces are free to operate. 
Unlike sectors characterised by legal barriers to entry or 
where market failures are such that one cannot assume that 
competition works, competition authorities deal therefore 
with sectors where one can presume that free entry should be 
able to erode over time dominant positions. To some extent, 
prices also play an important role in this process, as they 
convey signals to potential entrants: in particular, high prices 
may indicate that a market is profitable, and trigger entry 
into the industry, thereby reducing the market power of a 
                                                     
8 See also Fletcher and Jardine (2007), O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006: 621-
628), Röller (2007). 
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dominant firm and decreasing prices. Excessive pricing 
actions may therefore have the effect of breaking this process, 
and while in the short run they might be beneficial in that 
they could reduce prices, in a long run perspective they 
would be detrimental because they may impede entry that 
could otherwise take place (the objection is all the more 
important if one considers that excessive price actions are 
unlikely to be repeated over time). Furthermore, this may 
also have the effect of depriving consumers of more variety, 
to the extent that new entrants would supply substitutable 
but different products and services with respect to those of 
the dominant firm. 
ii. Excessive price actions may also undermine the investment 
incentives of the dominant firms. High prices and profits 
should be seen in general as the reward for a firm’s efforts, 
innovations and investments, and firms indeed invest and 
innovate precisely because they are able to appropriate the 
benefits from their risky investments. Hence, however 
beneficial excessive price interventions may be ex post, if a 
competition authority pursued a policy of resorting to 
excessive pricing actions, this policy would have important 
negative effects ex ante, by lowering expected returns, and 
therefore discouraging firms’ investments in all the 
economy.9 This objection is particularly relevant in highly 
dynamic industries where innovation plays a crucial role. 
iii. Another common objection to the use of excessive pricing 
actions by competition authorities is that it is extremely 
difficult to determine whether a price is excessive. This leads 
to unclear criteria for the standard of proof (see section 1.4) 
and therefore, an important legal uncertainty for the firms, 
which may in turn undermine investments incentives.  
                                                     
9 This important conflict between ex ante and ex post approaches has been 
explicitly recognised by the Advocate General Jacobs in his Opinion in Case 
C-7/97, Bronner [1998] ECR I-7791. 
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iv. In addition, price regulation may have a strong ‚political‛ 
dimension, in the sense that politicians, under the pressure of 
consumers/electors, may want to have low prices for basic 
goods or services. They may then require that the 
Administration or the independent antitrust authority 
regulates the prices, although there is no market failure 
justifying such intervention. Some may argue that it is better 
for the antitrust authority to come in because it would create 
less damage to the market mechanisms than the 
Administration which may be less in tune with market 
economics. We disagree and consider that, outside market 
failure, an antitrust authority lacks political legitimacy to 
intervene on the market. 
v. Finally, US law focuses solely on exclusionary abuses (being 
by a dominant company or not) and does not intervene in 
case of mere exploitative abuses. In order to harmonise 
competition policy across jurisdictions, EU law may then 
ignore exploitative abuses. 
 
An additional common objection against excessive price action is 
that it would lead to price regulation, which is difficult to 
implement. Indeed, intervening in an occasional way on the price set 
by a dominant firm does not solve the problem forever (on the 
contrary, to the extent that it may discourage entry, it may even 
exacerbate it and make it permanent). As a result, either the 
competition authority or the Court continues to monitor the industry 
– but in this way it would convert itself into a de facto regulator and 
would have to sacrifice important resources – or would have to 
resign to see its intervention as ineffective, since market conditions 
change over time and the dominant firm would adjust its prices to 
them. Moreover competition authorities – unlike sectoral regulators 
– have no experience and no role in telling firms which prices they 
should charge. However, the objection is not always convincing as 
the finding of an abuse and the choice of remedy should be kept 
separate. Indeed, there are other ways – and often more easily 
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implemented and efficient ways- to deal with an excessive price 
abuse (see section 1.5 on remedy). 
 
On the other hand, there are also arguments in favour of the 
application of excessive pricing cases.10 
i. Exploitative abuse is the most direct violation of the 
consumers’ interest that antitrust policy aims to protect 
and there are some exceptional circumstances where the 
structure of the market and the institutional design would 
lead to an excessive price that could only be remedied by 
competition law. 
ii. With a carefully calibrated policy, it is possible to alleviate 
some of the difficulties mentioned above. In particular, it 
might be possible to avoid that intervention could 
undermine the investment incentives of the new entrants 
and of the dominant companies. 
 
Thus,11 those Pros and Cons imply that an antitrust excessive 
price action presents a high risk of type I (false condemnation) and a 
high risk of type II (false acquittal) errors. At the same time, such 
action presents a relatively high cost of type I error (because the 
market may self-correct and error will lead to dynamic inefficiency: 
low investments and innovation) and a relatively low cost of type II 
errors (allocative inefficiency). Thus, an optimal competition policy 
should provide for strict conditions to determine candidates markets 
for intervention as well as a high standard of proof.12 
                                                     
10 See also Fletcher and Jardine (2007), Lyons (2007). Choné points to us an 
additional argument in favour of excessive price action. In markets where 
there is a risk of excessive entry because of expected very high return (due 
for instance to network effects), it may be efficient for the antitrust authority 
to commit ex ante to regulate price, hence limiting the incentive to enter.  
11 See Evans and Padilla (2005). 
12 Because of the important cost of type I error, in particular in terms of 
deterrence effects, Fletcher and Jardine (2007) suggest (in addition to strict 
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This is even more the case because the resources of the 
competition authorities are limited and are in general more 
efficiently allocated when dealing with exclusionary abuses rather 
than the exploitative abuses.  
2.3.2 The different tests proposed so far 
Several commentators have recently proposed conditions for an 
antitrust authority to take anti-competitive price actions. 
The strictest test has been proposed by Evans and Padilla 
(2005:119) who suggest that three conditions should be met for the 
antitrust authority to intervene (1) the firm enjoys a (near) monopoly 
position in the market, which is not the result of past investments or 
innovations and which is protected by insurmountable legal barriers 
to entry; (2) the prices charged by the firm widely exceed its average 
total costs; and (3) there is a risk that those prices may prevent the 
emergence of new goods and services in adjacent markets. 
O'Donoghue and Padilla (2006: 638) suggest a slightly less 
restrictive three-condition test. For them, intervention should be 
restricted to industries: (1) protected by high barriers to entry; (2) 
where one firm enjoys considerable market power; and (3) where 
investment and innovation play a relatively minor role. 
Röller (2007) proposes a five-condition test: (1) there are 
significant entry barriers, (2) the market is unlikely to self-correct, (3) 
the dominant position was due to exclusionary abuse or government 
actions, (4) there is no regulator or there is a regulatory failure, and 
(5) no (structural) remedy is available. 
Along the same vein although more nuanced, Fletcher and 
Jardine (2007) suggest a policy approach which would (1) limit 
intervention when there is no possibility of successful new entry 
                                                                                                                           
rule for intervention and high burden of proof) to limit available remedies 
by excluding the possibility of fines and private damages in case of 
excessive price actions. 
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within a reasonable period and commit to no intervening during the 
patent period, (2) consider carefully the pricing and competition in 
the other markets of the dominant firm’s portfolio and the effect of 
any ex post intervention on ex ante investment incentives, (3) seek 
alternative structural remedies to price regulation and, in any case, 
exclude fines and privates damages. 
Paulis (2007) proposes the least restrictive test arguing that there 
is only one reasonable criterion to identify markets that could be 
candidates for interventions against excessive prices: the presence of 
very high and long lasting barriers to entry and expansion. 
2.3.3 A three condition screening test for using 
excessive pricing actions 
Because of the high risk and cost of type I error, we believe that 
extreme caution should be exercised in the use of excessive pricing 
actions. Yet, there may be some very exceptional circumstances 
where such actions may be justified. Those exceptional 
circumstances may be captured in a three condition screening test: 
the two first conditions relate respectively to the level and the origin 
of the market power of the investigated firm whereas the third one 
relates to institutional design of the sector. 
Condition 1: High and non-transitory entry barriers leading to a super 
dominant position 
To start with, consider that most of the arguments made above 
follow from the assumption that a sector subject not to regulation but 
to general competition law is a sector where market forces are free to 
operate and one expects the competitive process to work more or less 
well. Yet, there may be sectors where, for different reasons, this may 
not be the case.  
This leads us to the first necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
using excessive pricing actions in competition law, that is, the 
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presence of high and non-transitory barriers to entry. Given the 
objections against excessive price actions, the threshold for 
intervention should be higher than a mere dominant position and 
close to a super dominant position where the undertaking should 
have very important market share.13 In this case, we would have a 
monopolist (or quasi-monopolist) whose position is not likely to be 
challenged by entrants. Since one cannot expect market forces to 
operate normally, some of the objections against excessive price 
actions may therefore not apply. 
In this context, a particular question is whether excessive prices 
actions could be taken in case of joint or collective dominance. 
Lately, there has been a temptation to use such actions to deal with 
cases where firms are engaging in tacit collusion. We feel this is not 
appropriate because it would add two instances where the risk and 
cost of type I errors are particularly high. Indeed, it is very difficult 
for an antitrust authority to discriminate between collusive and non 
collusive outcomes when there is no agreement or facilitating 
practices, and it is very difficult to discriminate between competitive 
and excessive prices. Thus when the market structure is 
unsatisfactory and leads to presumed excessive prices, the 
government may want to set up a regulator to change the market 
structure or permanently regulate the prices, but the antitrust 
authority should always refrain given the high risk of costly errors. 
                                                     
13 The super dominance concept has been explicitly recognised by in Point 
136 of the Opinion of the Advocate General Fenelly in Joined Cases C-
385/96P and C-396/96P Compagnie Maritime Belge [2000] ECR I-1365. The 
Court itself has never recognised the concept but refers several times to 
quasi or near monopoly: in Compagnie Maritime Belge; Case C-333/94P Tetra 
Pak II [1996] ECR I-5951, para 28-31; Case T-228/97 Irish Sugar [1999 ECR II-
2969, para 185  
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Condition 2: The super-dominant position is due to current/past 
exclusive/ special rights or to un-condemned past exclusionary 
anticompetitive practices 
Another important objection to the use of excessive price actions 
moved from the consideration that high prices and profits should be 
seen as the reward for firms’ risky investments and innovations (and, 
which is the same, that it is the expectation of charging high prices 
and earning high profits which push firms to invest and innovate). 
Therefore, dominant firms should be treated in a different way 
according to the source of its market power and whether such power 
is due to their effort, business acumen, and risky investments, or is 
instead due to current or past protection and legal barriers or un-
condemned past exclusionary anticompetitive practices.14 In our 
opinion, therefore, the second necessary (but not sufficient) condition for 
using excessive pricing actions in competition law, is that the 
dominant position is due to current or past exclusive or special rights or 
un-condemned past exclusionary anticompetitive practices. 
Our second condition eliminates all those possible cases where 
entry barriers are high and non-transitory (that is, the first condition 
fulfils), but where the persistence of a monopoly situation is the 
result of innovations or investments made in the past. It is no 
mystery that the existence of large endogenous sunk costs, switching 
costs, and network effects might allow a firm to enjoy a dominant 
position over time.15 However, our second condition states that we 
should treat differently a firm which enjoys such a position because 
of risky investments made in the past or because of legal protection 
or un-condemned past exclusionary anticompetitive practices. 
In the former case, which may well be the case of industries 
characterised by network effects, it is likely that the dominant firm is 
                                                     
14 Along the same line, Vickers (2005) arguing that the appropriate public 
policy towards firms with actual or potential market power depends on the 
cause of market power, and Röller (2007). 
15 See for a discussion chapter 2 of Motta (2004). 
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the winner of a competition for the market, where there has been an 
earlier phase of the market characterised by low prices and a battle to 
win the market, followed by a phase where the market has tilted in 
favour of a firm, which then enjoys a dominant position. In such a 
case, high prices in the later phase of the market are part of the 
normal competitive process, and it is indeed what moved rivals to 
fight for the market in the earlier phases of it. Intervening with an 
excessive price action does not seem to be justified. 16  
In the latter case where the dominant firm has been sheltered 
from competition, it would be impossible to argue that high prices 
are the reward for past investments or efforts, and there would 
accordingly be the conditions for an excessive pricing action. 
This second condition is divided in two alternative tests. Under 
the first limb of the test, the super-dominance should be caused by 
current or past legal barriers and access in the market has not been 
granted in a fair and non discriminatory way. Those barriers may be 
due to the scarcity of indispensable resources (like spectrum for 
mobile telephony services), to natural monopoly characteristics, or –
more critically- to lobbying efforts to get legal protection and create 
an economically unjustified rent.  
In this context, a particular and difficult case is whether an 
excessive price action may be taken in case of an Intellectual 
Property Rights. In most cases, IPR laws protect worthy investments 
made by a firm, which in exchange enjoys a monopoly over the 
product or process for a certain length of time. Allowing excessive 
price action would undermine the very object of those IPR. Thus, we 
think with Fletcher and Jardine (2007) that any good or service 
                                                     
16 Paulis (2007) proposes a much more lenient condition. He argues that 
antitrust excessive pricing actions should be possible in case of legal but 
also natural monopolies. It is only when determining whether the price is 
excessive that the authority should then take into account the investment 
risks. For us, given the many objections against excessive prices actions, the 
condition should be stricter. 
26 
protected by Intellectual Property Rights should in principle not be 
subject to an excessive prices action. 
The problem of course is when the antitrust authority thinks that 
the IPR is not justified because there is no investment to protect. 
Even in those exceptional cases, we think that allowing an excessive 
price action is not appropriate given the high risk and cost of type I 
error (but an exclusionary abuse action may be appropriate because 
it carries lower risk and cost of type I error). At the minimum, we 
think that if the antitrust authority intervenes, it should prove, in 
addition to the excessive price, that the allocation of the IPR was 
manifestly unjustified. 
Under the second limb of the test, the super-dominance should 
be caused by un-condemned past exclusionary practices. Those may 
be due to the fact that company did not had a dominant position 
when doing its anticompetitive practices (hence under EU law, the 
antitrust authorities could not intervene) or that antitrust authority 
commit a type II errors and did not intervene where it should have 
done. Röller (2007) speaks of ‚gap cases‛ and ‚mistake cases‛17 
respectively. However, analyzing whether the super-dominance was 
due to past exclusionary abuses should remain exceptional as it is 
extremely difficult to do. 
Condition 3: No sector-specific regulator has jurisdiction to solve the 
matters 
The two necessary conditions that we have identified so far 
(presence of high and non-transitory barriers; current/past exercise of 
special/exclusive rights or un-condemned past exclusionary 
anticompetitive practices) often apply to industries where there is a 
sectoral regulator. When this is the case, it is the regulator, rather 
                                                     
17 See also Paulis (2007) noting that ‚the fact that the EU statute does not 
prohibit the acquisition of dominance through unilateral abusive behaviour 
justifies a higher protection (than under US law) against direct exploitation 
of consumers by dominant firms.‛ 
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than the competition authority, which should be best placed for an 
intervention if competition does not work properly.  
Nevertheless, in some cases there may be conflicts between the 
regulator and the competition authority, with the former being 
satisfied that prices are the ‘right’ ones and the latter arguing that 
they are too high. It would be difficult to say a priori who is right and 
who is not: the sectoral regulator may admittedly suffered a bias 
from a regulatory capture, but it may also have a longer-run 
perspective and see relatively high and stable prices as necessary to 
stimulate investments.  
Such conflicts do occur, and are resolved in different ways across 
jurisdictions. For instance, in the US the prevailing view – after a 
more interventionist approach during the Seventies and the Eighties 
when Courts tended to show scepticism about the possibility that 
sectoral regulators would be able to constrain abusive antitrust 
practices on regulated firms – seems now to be that there is no 
additional role for antitrust intervention in industries where there is 
a sectoral regulator.18 
The situation in Europe is very different because the competition 
law has a constitutional value that sector-specific regulation does not 
have and because the Commission may be tempted to use antitrust 
action to discipline and harmonise the actions of the national 
regulators.19 Thus to decide how the conflict should be resolved, two 
views are opposed.20 
Some argue that there is a need for a clear division of 
competences between antitrust and sectoral authorities to avoid 
                                                     
18 See Verizon v. Trinko 540 U.S. 398 (2004) and the discussion in Kovacic 
(2007), 
19 The Commission has recently taken two decisions against 
telecommunication incumbents for anti-competitive price squeeze, although 
those incumbents were partly regulated by national regulators: Commission 
Decision of 21 May 2003, Case 37.451 Deutsche Telekom, O.J. [2003] L263/9; 
Commission Decision of 4 July 2007, Case 38.784,Telefonica. 
20 On this issue, see Geradin (2004). 
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multiple layers of intervention against dominant firms. Following 
that view, the Commission or the national competition authority 
should not take an antitrust case when the national regulator has 
decided to intervene or not to intervene. That does not mean that 
antitrust law may be violated by sectoral regulator. Indeed if it were 
the case, the Commission may open an infringement procedure 
against the Member State of the national regulator for violating EU 
competition law. Moreover, the exploited consumers, or national 
competition authority when permitted by national procedural laws, 
may appeal to the national regulator’s decision before a national 
Court. 
Others argue that competition between antitrust authorities and 
sector regulators may be good. Moreover, infringement procedures 
are relatively long (three to four years) and there is a need for 
efficient way to ensure that antitrust law is respected.21 Following 
that view, the Commission should intervene directly against the 
regulated dominant firm (provided the latter enjoys some margin of 
discretion within the regulatory limits imposed by the national 
regulator). However, this view is not fully convincing because when 
there is a disagreement between a competition authority and a 
sectoral regulator, one of the involved party has always an incentive 
to bring the matter before a Court. Thus, an antitrust decision will 
only delay the matter before it goes to the Court.  
Thus we submit that in case of exploitative abuses (but not 
necessarily in case of exclusionary abuses), antitrust authority should 
abstain when a sectoral regulator has jurisdiction to act. At the 
minimum, we think that if the antitrust authority intervenes, it 
should prove, in addition to the excessive price, that the decision of 
the sectoral regulator was manifestly wrong.  
                                                     
21 Along those lines, Paulis (2007), Röller (2007). 
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Thus our third condition to take an antitrust excessive price would be 
that there is no sectoral regulator having the jurisdiction to solve the 
matter.22  
Comparison with the tests proposed so far 
Thus the test we propose is less strict than the one of Evans and 
Padilla (2005) as we do not require that the excessive prices prevent 
the emergence of a new product or service. To us, this condition 
would be extremely difficult to implement and its restrictive role is 
not justified. 
On the other hand, our proposed test is stricter than the one 
advocated by Paulis (2007) which focus only high and long lasting 
entry barriers and expansion. To us, this ‚qualified dominance‛ test 
is not sufficiently limitative given the importance of the risk and the 
cost of type I error as well as the scarce resources of the competition 
authorities that are often better allocated to exclusionary abuses. 
Thus we are close to the test proposed by Röller (2007) or 
Fletcher and Jardine (2007) with one notable difference however. We 
think that if a sector regulator has the competence to intervene, there 
should be no antitrust intervention that would increase the 
regulatory burden on the dominant firms. 
                                                     
22 We take the existence of a sector regulator as exogenous. We think that 
the criteria to decide whether a regulator should be set up may be inspired 
by those that the Commission used to decide whether regulation is justified 
in the electronic communications sector: (1) high and non-transitory entry 
barriers, which may be of a structural, legal or regulatory nature, (2) no 
competition dynamic behind those barriers, (3) no efficiency of antitrust 
remedies to solve the market failures identified with the first two criteria: 
Article 2 of the Commission Recommendation of 13 November 2007 on 
relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications 
sector susceptible to ex ante regulation. 
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2.3.4 The proposed screening test and the case law 
It is worth asking to what extent our proposed screening test above 
fits with the existing EU practice on excessive prices. The answer can 
only be preliminary because the practice so far is very rare but, at 
this stage, our test describes well the characteristics of the markets in 
which the Commission and the Community Courts have adopted 
excessive price actions,  
Up to now, the Commission has only adopted six formal 
decisions as it does not want to behave a price regulator.23 Most of 
those decisions related to exclusionary abuse. General Motors and 
British Leyland,24 dealing with the price of motor vehicle certificate, 
are about preventing parallel imports and intra-brand competition. 
United Brands, dealing with the price of bananas in several European 
countries, is about discriminatory pricing.25 Deutsche Post, dealing 
with the price of some international mail, is about preventing re-mail 
companies to enter the market.26 Thus few Decisions (Port of 
                                                     
23 Vth Commission Report on Competition Policy (1975), para. 76; XXIVth 
Commission Report on Competition Policy (1994), para. 207: ‚(...) the existence 
of a dominant position is not in itself against the rules of competition. 
Consumers can suffer from a dominant company exploiting this position, 
the most likely way being through prices higher than would be found if the 
market were subject to effective competition. The Commission in its decision-
making practice does not normally control or condemn the high level of prices as 
such. Rather it examines the behaviour of the dominant company designed 
to preserve its dominance, usually directly against competitors or new 
entrants who would normally bring about effective competition and the 
price level associated with it‛ (emphasis supplied); XXVIIth Commission 
Report on Competition Policy (1997), para. 77. 
24 Commission Decision of 19 December 1974, General Motors, O.J. [1975] 
L29/14; Commission Decision of 2 July 1984, British Leyland, O.J. [1984] 
L207/11. 
25 Commission Decision of 17 December 1975, Chiquita, O.J. [1976] L95/1. 
26 Commission Decision of 25 July 2001, Deutsche Post II, O.J. [2001] L331/40. 
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Helsinborg)27 are about pure exploitative pricing. All those 6 
Commission Decisions, except United Brands, relate to the existence 
of legal monopoly. 
The Commission opened also several cases in the 
telecommunication sector.28 They did not lead to formal decisions 
because the case was passed to the national telecom regulator when 
it had jurisdiction to act or otherwise settled between the 
Commission and the dominant operator. 
The Court has decided about fifteen cases, more than the 
Commission because of the preliminary question from national 
Courts. Again, most of the cases related to exclusionary abuses and 
few cases (Ahmeed Saeed, Tournier (SACEM I), Lucazeau (SACEM II), 
Centre d’insémination de la Crespelle)29 are about pure exploitative 
prices. In all those cases, except United Brands, the dominant 
company enjoyed a legal monopoly or an IPR. More crucially, in all 
cases of pure exploitative abuses, the dominant company enjoyed a 
legal monopoly and there was no competence sector regulator. 
Thus as Community judge Wahl (2007) observes: ‚the 
prohibition against excessively high prices has its primary scope of 
application in situations of legal monopolies or regulated markets. In 
free markets it may principally be used when the pricing strategy 
focuses on something other than exploiting its customers on that 
particular product, for example by trying to prevent parallel 
imports‛.  
                                                     
27 Commission Decision of 23 July 2004, Case 36.570 Sundbusserne v. Port of 
Helsingborg, and Commission Decision of 23 July 2004, Case 36.568 
Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg. 
28 For a description of those cases, see our previous paper Motta and de 
Streel (2007:105-108). 
29 Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803; Case C-323/93 Centre 
d’insémination de la Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077; Case 395/87 Tournier 
(SACEM I) [1989] ECR 2521; Cases 110, 241 & 242/88 Lucazeau  (SACEM II) 
[1989] ECR 2811. 
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Interestingly, in other jurisdictions as well the same criteria have 
more or less explicitly been followed. In the Harmony v. Mittal South 
African case, the Tribunal took into account both the fact that Mittal’s 
quasi-monopolistic position was not contestable (unlikely that entry 
would have occurred by exercising a constraint on Mittal’s pricing 
policy) and that it had not been contested in the past (of recent 
privatisation, Mittal Steel South Africa is the new name of Iscor, the 
public monopoly in flat steel which has dominated South Africa for a 
very long time).30  
2.4 The standard of proof for the excessive pricing 
2.4.1 Different possible tests to prove an excessive 
price 
The next question is to understand how to recognise and prove an 
‘excessive’ price in practice. To this effect, the Court has indicated 
that several methodologies may be used. In United Brands, the Court 
held that: 
 
251. This excess could, inter alia, be determined objectively if it were 
possible for it to be calculated by making a comparison between the selling 
price of the product in question and its costs of production, which would 
disclose the amount of the profit margin (...). 
252. The questions therefore to be determined are whether the difference 
between the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, 
and, if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, whether a price has 
                                                     
30 For a discussion, see Roberts (2007), who also argues that market size 
characteristics matter when assessing the likelihood that entry may 
discipline a dominant incumbent. In a small and isolated country, it may be 
unlikely that new entry occurs in sectors characterised by large sunk costs. 
Similar remarks have been made in the past by Fingleton (2006), referring to 
Ireland. 
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been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to competing 
products. (<) 
253. Other ways may be devised – and economic theorists have not failed to 
think up several - of selecting the rules for determining whether the price of a 
product is unfair (emphasis supplied).  
 
And indeed over time, the Court of Justice (and the European 
Commission) have made use of different methods to determine 
whether a price is excessive.31 
A first method is based upon a comparison between costs of 
production and prices.32 The idea is that there should exist a threshold 
price which guarantees a sufficient margin with respect to costs, and 
that above such a threshold the price charged by a dominant firm 
would be excessive.  
Of course, there are several difficulties with this approach. First, 
a competitive price is not only determined by supply-side factors (in 
particular the cost of production), but also by demand side factors 
(demand elasticity, willingness and ability to pay,<).33 
Second, the threshold price and the ‘reasonable’ margin over 
costs would be to a large extent arbitrary, and it is not clear how it 
should be fixed. Although the Court may have indicated in 
particular cases that a certain margin was reasonable and another 
was not, this should not be taken as a rule which holds across 
sectors. For instance, in sectors where fixed costs are very important 
relative to variable costs of production, one could not apply the same 
threshold margins as in sectors where the burden of costs falls upon 
variable ones. 
                                                     
31 For a detailed account of those methods, see Williams (2007). 
32 This method was followed, for instance, in , Case 298/83 CICCE [1985] 
ECR 1105, paras. 24-25; Joined Cases 110, 241 & 242/88 Lucazeau/SACEM 
(SACEM II) [1989] ECR 2811; and Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed [1989] ECR 803. 
33 This point has been explicitly recognised by the Commission in the recent 
Port of Helsingborg Decision, point 185. 
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Third, the calculation of the relevant costs is often problematic, 
for several reasons. (i) There are often divergences between 
accounting costs and economic costs because firms normally record 
cost in a way that is most useful for financial and tax purposes. (ii) 
Risk should be taken into account, hence an ex post high profit may 
in fact corresponds to a normal ex-ante return. (iii) When the 
dominant firm is a multi-product or multi-market firm, an additional 
difficulty lies in the allocation of common costs among the different 
products.34 (iv) When the dominant firm is operating in a two or 
multi-sided market, the competition authority should consider the 
system price on all markets and not the price of a single market. In 
those markets, the side that conveys the most positive externalities 
on the others will naturally be ‚subsidised‛ by the other sides, who 
may then (wrongly) appear to pay an excessive prices.35 
Fourth, in some cases it is not even the actual costs of the 
dominant firm, but the costs of a hypothetical efficient firm which 
should be considered. In the SACEM cases,36 the Court of Justice 
considered that the production costs to be taken into account are 
those of an efficient firm, and not necessarily those of the 
investigated firm which may have inflated production costs because 
of its dominant position (X-inefficiency). Indeed, the Court stated 
that a firm may not justify its unfair price with high production costs 
because the possibility may not be ruled out that it is precisely the 
lack of competition on the market in question that accounts for the 
high costs. 
                                                     
34 In Ahmeed Saaed at Point 43, the Court of Justice provides that a 
competition authority may rely on the accounting methodology (in 
particular regarding the apportioning of common costs) used in sector 
regulation to determine whether a price is excessive.  
35 See for a discussion: Wright (2004) 
36 Joined Cases 110, 241 & 242/88 Lucazeau/SACEM (SACEM II) [1989] ECR 
2811, para. 29. Based on empirical research, Röller (2007) argues that in the 
European airlines industry, the prices are excessive although the price-cost 
margins are ‚normal‛ because the costs (particularly the wages) are 
excessive.  
35 
Thus assessing production costs is a difficult exercise even for 
sectoral regulators which have a deep knowledge of the industry, let 
alone for Competition Authorities or Courts which have a much 
more imperfect knowledge of the sector. Moreover unlike predatory 
pricing cases, where there is at least a substantial convergence on 
which particular cost measures should be taken into account when 
carrying out price/cost tests,37 neither the doctrine nor the case law 
offer much guidance on the relevant cost measures to be analysed.  
A second method to prove excessive pricing is based upon a 
comparison between prices charged by the dominant firm in different 
markets.38 Suppose for instance that it was established that the firm 
sets a price in market A which is well above the price it sets for the 
same (or comparable) product and service in market B, and that in 
the latter market the firm is profitable. Then this can be considered as 
proof of unfair pricing. Furthermore, it could even be considered as a 
discriminatory abuse, prohibited under Article 82(c) of the EC 
Treaty. 
Note that under this method de facto discriminatory pricing and 
unfair pricing coincide, something that economists would find it 
difficult to approve of. We know there are several reasons why firms 
might want to set different prices in different markets (production or 
distribution costs as well as consumer demands or market structures, 
may differ), and that there is little justification from the point of view 
of economic efficiency to establish that price discrimination by a 
dominant firm might be per se prohibited. Economic theory39 
suggests that even if price discrimination was done by a 
                                                     
37 (1) Price below average variable costs or (2) price below average total cost 
but above average variable cost with evidence of an exclusionary plan are 
considered as predatory: Case C-62/86 Akzo [1991] ECR I-3359, para 71 and 
Case C-333/94P Tetra Pak II [1996] ECR I-5951, para 44. 
38 This method was followed, for instance, in , Case 26-75 General Motors 
[1975] ECR 1367 and Case 226/84 British Leyland [1986] ECR 3263, para. 28. 
39 See the discussion in Chapter 6 of Motta (2004) and Swedish Competition 
Authority (2005). 
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monopolistic firm, it would not necessarily be welfare detrimental, 
as price discrimination might increase sales and allow for 
consumption by people who would not otherwise buy the product. 
Also, it may be an efficient way to recover fixed costs of investments 
and innovations. Furthermore, in a market where the dominant firm 
is facing competition (that is, when it does not have monopolistic or 
quasi-monopolistic power), prohibiting price discrimination would 
amount to chill competition. 
A third method to prove excessive pricing, the so-called 
benchmarking, consists of a comparison between the prices charged by 
the dominant firm and those charged by other firms, either (i) in the same 
market, or (ii) in other market. 
The variant (i) in this method involves comparing the price 
charged by the dominant firm and those charged by competitors in 
the same relevant market.40  This test involves some difficulties. 
Firstly, the very fact that in the same relevant market there are other 
firms offering the same product or service suggests that entry in the 
market is possible, and that competitive forces may possible erode 
the dominant position over time. Secondly, the fact that the 
dominant firm can command a higher price than the rivals for 
products which belong to the same relevant market may simply be 
the effect of a higher perceived quality of the dominant firm’s 
product. To the extent that this superior quality is the result of past 
innovations and investments, particular caution should be made to 
avoid penalising a firm for having innovated and invested. 
The variant (ii) of this method involves comparing the price 
charged by the dominant firm in the relevant market with prices 
arising in other markets which operate in competitive conditions.41 
This method has been used by the Commission to compare prices 
among different EU countries and boost the internal market with 
                                                     
40 This method was used in , Case 24/67 Parke, Davis [1968] ECR 55, Case 
53/87 Renault 53/87 [1988]  
41 This method was used in Case 78/70 Deutsche Grammophon, [1971] ECR 
487; Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479. 
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antitrust actions. Here, as well, caution should be used in order to 
avoid that unduly inferences are taken from the fact that one is 
comparing markets that operate under very different conditions of 
costs and demands. 
A fourth method consists of concentrating on the profits of the 
dominant firm and comparing such profit either with (i) a normal 
competitive profit or (ii) the profits of other firms.42 
The variant (i) considers a product’s price excessive when the 
firm’s return on capital for that product is greater that its weighted 
average cost of capital (WACC). However this approach, which has 
been used by some national competition authorities,43 is fraught with 
conceptual difficulties (accounting profit reflect economic profit only 
in very specific, and often unrealistic, assumptions) and practical 
difficulties (vulnerability to accounting complications). 
The variant (ii) compares the profit rates of the dominant firm to 
the profits obtained by similar companies in other geographic 
markets.44 The practical application of such approach is also very 
difficult as it is almost impossible to find a relevant comparator.  
2.4.2 A proposed standard of proof rule: the 
convergence of indicators 
Since excessive pricing actions should be taken only in exceptional 
circumstances and since all the methods to prove a case have some 
weaknesses, it is recommendable that antitrust authorities and courts 
should carry out excessive pricing tests according to as many of the 
methods indicated above as possible. In other words, the authorities 
should look for robust evidence that prices are indeed excessive. 
                                                     
42 See OXERA (2003). 
43 For a description of those cases, O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006:629-631). 
44 This approach has been considered by the Commission in the Port of 
Helsingborg Decision but was not followed because of the insuperable 
difficulties in establishing valid benchmarks (see Point 156). 
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They should not limit themselves to a mere comparison between 
prices or prices and costs, but should instead complement it with a 
deep investigation of the market and of the reasons why prices may 
diverge or be considerably above the competitive level. In any case, 
authorities should drop the case if different tests provide different 
results or if the price does not deviate significantly from the different 
used benchmarks.45 
2.4.3 The proposed standard of proof rule and the 
case-law 
The recent practice in the EU is in line with this recommendation. In 
the recent Port of Helsingborg Decisions,46 the Commission rejected a 
complaint of excessive price arguing that a mere cost-plus approach 
was not sufficient to prove an excessive price. In this case, the ferry-
operations fees charged by the Port of Helsingborg to the 
complainant were above their costs, but were not unfair when 
compared with the fees charges by the Port to other users than the 
complainant (there was no discrimination) or when compared to fees 
charged by other similar Ports. The Commission also considered that 
some demand-side elements (like the premium that customers 
would be ready to pay for the unique service offered by the 
Helsingborg port) should be taken into account when proving an 
excessive price.  
Similarly in the UK, the Competition Appeal Tribunal endorsed 
the Office of Fair Trading Napp Pharmaceutical Decision because it 
resorted to a number of tests (which can be reconduced to the 
                                                     
45 Also Paulis (2007) arguing that only very large deviations from 
competitive conditions may be indicative of abusive pricing and 
O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006:619). 
46 Commission Decision of 23 July 2004, Case 36.570 Sundbusserne v. Port of 
Helsingborg, and Commission Decision of 23 July 2004, Case 36.568 
Scandlines Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg. 
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general methods indicated above) to prove that the pharmaceutical 
company had engaged in excessive pricing.47 Conversely in 
Attheraces, the Court of Appeal overturned a judgment of the 
Chancery Division that proved an excessive price on a mere cost-
plus basis and that did not take into account the value of the good to 
the buyer.48 In Veraldi/Alitalia, the Italian Autorità Garante della 
Concorrenza e del Mercato also resorts to different methods, but to 
arrive at the conclusion that there was insufficient evidence that 
Alitalia had charged excessive prices on the route between Milano 
and Lamezia Terme. 
Finally, there is an important legal point to clarify. Some 
commentators (including Commission officials and Community 
judge)49 argue that that Court of Justice imposed in United Brands 
(Point 252 mentioned above) a cumulative two-stage test to prove an 
excessive price: (1) the price should be above the cost, and (2) this 
price-cost margin should be either excessive in itself or by 
comparison to competitors’ products. This is also the approach 
followed by the Commission in its Port of Helsingborg Decision. Thus 
those commentators disagree with the view that we, among others,50 
defended in our 2006 paper. For us, the test imposed by the Court is 
not necessarily cumulative and both parts of the test aimed to prove 
the same thing: that a price is above its competitive level. 
To clarify our view, we think that the Court is extremely 
pragmatic in its standard of proof. It requires a price-cost analysis 
                                                     
47 Competition Appeal Tribunal Decision of 15 January 2002, Case 1001-
1/1/01 Napp v. DGFT 
48 Court of Appeal Decision of 5 February 2007, Case A3/2006/0126 
Attheraces Limited v. The British Horseracing Board Limited. 
49 Esteva Mosso et al. (2006:399), O’Donoghue and Padilla (2006:611), Wahl 
(2007). 
50 Like Gal (2004). 
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when it is feasible and otherwise requires other indicators.51 Thus the 
Court does not impose price-cost analysis in all cases, but more 
pragmatically suggest relying to several different indicators to prove 
excessive prices. As mentioned by Green (2006: 90), ‚the more 
comparable which, in a given case, are used the more likely it is that 
the Courts will, on appeal, accept any inferences which are drawn 
from comparisons that the prices under review are abusive.‛  
2.5 The choice of the most efficient remedy 
The last issue to address when dealing with excessive prices is the 
choice of the best remedy. Often, excessive price abuse is associated 
with price regulation remedy. However, the two questions should be 
kept separate as other remedies exist. More critically, price 
regulation is not always the most efficient remedy to deal with 
excessive prices. On the one hand, price regulation may highly 
distort investment incentives and is difficult to implement. On the 
other hand, excessive price reflect more a problem in the structure of 
the market than in the behaviour of the firm, hence the appropriate 
remedy should change the market structure for the future and not 
punish the firm for the past. Thus, the choice for the best remedy (or 
the most proportionate remedy according to the European 
competition law),52 will always depend on the cause of the excessive 
pricing. Thus it is only as a last resort remedy, that price regulation 
should be imposed. 
If the excessive price is due to a combination of strong past 
market power and consumer inertia (as it is often the case in newly 
                                                     
51 At Point 253 of United Brands, the Court explicitly recognised that, to 
prove an excessive price, there are other ways than price-cost comparison. 
In SACEM II and Bodson, the Court recognised that a price cost comparison 
would be impossible given the nature of the product. 
52 Article 7 of the Council Regulation 1/2003. 
41 
liberalised sectors), the best remedy may be to encourage consumers 
switching towards less expensive offers of new entrants, providing 
them with more comparable information. 
If the excessive price is due to important strategic entry barriers, 
the best remedy would be to remove and prohibit such entry 
barriers. For instance, price may be excessive and competition may 
not work because of important artificial switching costs created by a 
dominant firm (think for instance of frequent-flyer programmes 
which helped incumbent airlines at the beginning of liberalisation, or 
of the large fees required by the Italian banks to close bank accounts). 
In such cases, a competition authority may want to solve the 
problem at its roots by asking for the removal of artificial switching 
costs (opening the frequent-flyer programme to entrants, scrapping 
fees for closing bank accounts). Similarly, excessive prices may be 
due to externalities caused by particular price structures (for 
instance, in the mobile telecommunication sector, high termination 
rates may be due to the externality imposed by receivers on callers). 
In such case, the appropriate remedy is partly applying a receiver-
pays principle.53 Note that those cases are more about exclusionary 
abuses than exploitative abuses.  
If the excessive price is due to important structural entry barriers, 
the competition authority should try to remove the entry barrier. 
When the barrier is of legal nature, the authority should use its 
advocacy power and persuade governments to remove those legal 
barriers and effectively liberalise the sector. When the barrier is of 
economic nature, the competition authority may impose vertical 
restructuring, by separating the key stages of production at which 
scale economies are the most important. 
                                                     
53 Arguably, though, such interventions may take time and may not 
necessarily be a substitute, but rather a complement to excessive pricing 
actions, in the sense that the latter may provide a credible threat that a 
competition authority may use in order to persuade industry and 
government to accept or enforce the necessary changes.  
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2.6 Which Guidelines for excessive pricing? 
The European Commission will soon propose guidelines for Article 
82 EC, including excessive prices. Those guidelines will not only 
guide the practice of DG-Competition but also, and more 
importantly because they have less experience and are often less 
prepared, the practice of the Member States’ National Competition 
Authorities and possibly the National Courts’ judges. 
It is important that in those guidelines, the Commission commits 
itself to limit the use of its broad legal power and make explicit that 
excessive pricing actions should be an option of last resort for 
antitrust authorities,54 and that they should be used only when other 
routes fail. Hopefully, the guidelines will deal with three issues: a 
test to screen the markets that are candidates for intervention of 
excessive pricing actions (to provide safe harbour for the firms), the 
standard of proof of such actions, and the proportionate and most 
efficient remedy to impose.  
The screening test should contain three cumulative conditions. 
The first condition is the existence of high and non-transitory 
barriers. It tells us that it is only ‚super-dominant‛ or ‚quasi-
monopolistic‛ firms which should be the object of excessive price 
actions. A dominant firm which has, say, 50-60% of the market, is a 
firm which does have competitors and therefore operates in a market 
where entry is possible (since it has occurred). In our view, 
guidelines should explicitly exclude the use of Article 82(a) EC to 
firms which have, say, less than 80% of the market. 
The second condition suggests to limit action in those sectors 
where the quasi-monopolistic position has been achieved through 
                                                     
54 The Director General of DG Competition noted recently that : ‚There was 
a strong consensus on relatively limited conditions under which Article 82 
could be used for exploitative conduct (<) There was equally a recognition 
on both the EU and US side that sectoral regulation can sometimes be 
quicker and more effective than long, drawn-out antitrust investigations‛: 
Lowe (2007). 
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special and exclusive rights or to un-condemned past exclusionary 
anticompetitive practices rather than market competition. 
Accordingly, firms should be reassured that whenever they derive 
their position from risky investments, they will not be deprived of 
the benefits of their investments. 
The third condition is that there is no sectoral regulator having 
the jurisdiction to solve the matters. Indeed when a regulator has 
jurisdiction, it should intervene and if it fails to do so, the 
Commission or the national competition authority should not 
condemn the dominant firm but open an infringement procedure 
against its Member State. 
Then with regard to the standard of proof, the competition 
authority should rely on a convergence of indicators to show 
excessive prices, complemented by a deep investigation of the 
market structure and the reasons why prices may be above their 
competitive level. 
Finally, the antitrust authority should choose the most efficient 
means to solve the excessive price problem and relate remedy to the 
cause of market power. Thus it should address demand side 
problems and activate competition in the market, and only rely on 
price regulation on a last resort. 
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3 Exploitative high prices and 
European competition law – a 
personal reflection
1
 
Nils Wahl 
3.1 Introduction 
Article 82 of the EC Treaty applies according to its wording both to 
exclusionary abuse and exploitative abuse. In fact, given its wording, 
it would seem as if it is primarily concerned with exploitative abuse. 
On the other hand, it is clear from case law and Commission 
decisional practice, that the enforcement policy up until today has 
had its focus on exclusionary abuse.2 However, with the 2004 reform 
of the competition rules it would seem fair to envisage a more 
extensive national application of the Community competition rules, 
which in turn could lead to an increase in the application of Article 
82 to exploitative abuses. For example, and given the theme of this 
conference, it could not be ruled out that national enforcement 
agencies would increase their efforts to strike down on what they 
consider to be exploitative high prices. If doing so it is clear that they 
are under an obligation to respect the interpretation of Article 82 
given by the Court of Justice. From that point of view there is an 
evident need of understanding what the Court of Justice has said, 
under what circumstances and for what reasons. This contribution 
                                                     
1 Nils Wahl, judge at the Court of First Instance, Luxembourg. Views 
expressed are – as indicated in the title – personal. I am indebted to John 
Davies, Chief Economist, Competition Commission, UK, and Professor Sten 
Nyberg, Stockholm University, for useful comments on earlier drafts. 
2 The EC Law of Competition, second ed. (Faull & Nikpay eds.), Oxford 
2007, p. 398. 
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therefore seeks to analyse case law generally considered to lay the 
foundation for the Community rules on exploitative high prices in 
contravention of Article 82. 
3.2 Different forms of actions before the Court of 
Justice 
The Community legal system is built on a division of competencies 
between the Court of Justice (and the Court of First Instance) on the 
one hand and national courts on the other. Case law concerning 
exploitatively high prices reflects this division of competencies. 
According to Article 220, EC Treaty, the Court of Justice 
interprets and applies the Community legal rules. The Court fulfils 
its tasks principally (and of interest here) by means of two different 
forms of action. Under Article 234, EC Treaty procedure the Court of 
Justice has the competence to interpret the Treaty as well as to 
interpret and rule on the validity of for example Commission 
decisions. Thus, national courts which are seized with a question of 
interpretation of the Treaty or the interpretation or validity of a 
Community act have a right and sometimes an obligation to ask the 
Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling. After the Court of Justice 
has given its interpretation, it is for the national court to apply that 
interpretation to the facts of the case. More practically, this means 
that the Court of Justice's interpretation might be more or less well 
connected to the actual facts of a case. Seen from the point of view of 
being able to pronounce principles of law – without thereby 
necessarily having to be certain of that particular principle's 
application to the case at hand – the preliminary reference system is 
well designed.3 It also implies that national courts on occasion have 
to supplement a particular principle with a more concrete content. 
                                                     
3 See for just one example of this; judgment of 19 November 1991 in case C-
6/90 and C-9/90 Francovich and Others v. Italy [1991] ECR I-05357, and 
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The other form of action is the so called direct action under 
Article 230, EC Treaty. According to this, natural and legal persons 
have the right to challenge a decision addressed to them or a 
decision, which although in the form of a regulation or a decision 
addressed to another person, is of direct and individual concern to 
them. When dealing with such cases the community courts shall 
review the legality of the act in question. It is thus not a review of the 
suitability of the underlying policy choices as such, but only a review 
of the legality of the act. Although this does not imply a superficial 
review, it should be recalled that when it comes to complex matters 
of economic policy the Community courts review is limited to 
verifying that no manifest errors of assessment have been 
committed, thus basically leaving the question of policy to the 
Commission.4 Only as concerns fines do the Community courts have 
unlimited jurisdiction.5 
Some of the cases discussed below are preliminary references 
and some others are direct actions. As concerns those cases that are 
preliminary references it follows from what has been said that the 
Court of Justice need not be concerned with questions of fact and 
whether these are proven or not. This is of course not to say that the 
Court is indifferent to the facts, but simply that the assessment of the 
facts is the responsibility of the refereeing national court. Obviously 
this will have an impact on the reasoning of the Court. On the other 
hand and when it comes to direct actions, the Community courts are 
of course much more concerned with facts in order to be able to rule 
on the validity, while not necessarily interfering with the policy 
                                                                                                                           
judgement of 9 November 1995 in case  C-479/93 Francovich v. Italy [1995] 
ECR I-03843. 
4 Judgment of 11 July 1985 in case 42/84 Remia e.a. v. Commission [1985] ECR 
2545, p. 34, judgment of 17 November 1987 in cases 142/84 and 156/84 BAT 
and Reynolds v. Commission [1987] ECR 4487, p. 62, and judgment of 2 
October 2003 in case C-194/99 Thyssen Stahl v. Commission [2003] ECR I-
10821, p. 78. 
5 Article 229, EC Treaty, and Article 31, Council regulation 1/2003. 
50 
choices made by the Institution in question. However, the 
interpretation of the Treaty is the exclusive competence of the Court 
of Justice. 
Although it could not be said that a statement by the Court of 
Justice is more important than another based upon under which 
form of action the statement is made, it would seem imperative to 
have an understanding of the limitations of each form of action. It 
would likewise seem important to briefly recapitulate the situation 
as concerns the burden of proof and standard of proof in the 
Community competition law. Here it should be recalled that it is for 
the one claiming an infringement of Articles 81 and 82 to prove to the 
requisite legal standard that an infringement has been committed, 
while it is for the one claiming an exemption to prove the existence 
of that. It is also often assumed that recital 5 of Regulation 1/2003 
also covers situations as concerns Article 82 in the sense that the one 
claiming that a particular behaviour was objectively justified has to 
prove that, thus it would not be for the other party to prove the 
absence of any objective justification.6 
3.3  The prohibition against unfairly high prices 
Article 82 prohibits abuse of a dominant position. Consequently, the 
fact that you are dominant is not in itself in contravention to Article 
82. According to Article 82 (2) (a) an abuse may consist of directly or 
indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair 
trading conditions. A price can in principle be unfairly high or 
unfairly low. Unfairly low prices, which are often referred to as 
predatory prices, will not be dealt with further in this article but only 
unfairly high prices. An unfairly high price may have the effect of 
excluding competitors from the market, or it may have the effect of 
exploiting the customers of the dominant company. Only unfairly 
                                                     
6 The EC Law of Competition, second ed. (Faull & Nikpay eds.), p. 95. 
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high or excessive prices exploiting the customers of the dominant 
undertaking will be dealt with in this article. 
When looking at the prohibition against unfair prices, here 
referred to as excessively high prices, it has to be kept in mind that 
prices generally fluctuate in a market depending on the degree of 
competition in that particular market. Obviously, the competitive 
price, i.e. the price often referred to as the basis for any comparison of 
excessively high prices, cannot be expected to be found in all 
markets. Depending on the competitive situation in the market the 
price will be higher than the competitive price up until the monopoly 
price in those situations where we are looking at a legal or de facto 
monopoly. Normally, one would expect a higher price the more 
concentrated the market. In fact it would seem to me that one should 
expect the monopoly price in all those situations where we are looking 
at a monopoly. The monopoly price is here described as the price at 
which the monopolist (or the dominant firm) earns the most. For any 
higher price than the monopoly price, the monopolist would loose 
sales in excess of what he would gain by the price increase.  
Considering the potentially substantial difference between the 
competitive price and the monopoly price, and the fact that there are 
no economic reasons for a monopolist or any dominant firm to 
charge a higher price than the monopoly price, one would expect 
that the prohibition against excessively high prices in Article 82 
would refer to prices in excess of the competitive price but less than, 
or equal to the monopoly price. However, if the prohibition would 
catch also monopoly prices it would seem clear that Article 82 would 
be concerned not only with abuse of a dominant position, but also 
with the fact of someone being in a dominant position as such. If it is 
logical and expected from an economic point of view that the market 
conditions, that is the competitive conditions, have an influence over 
the market price it would seem natural to expect a monopolist to 
charge the monopoly price. Interfering with such a pricing policy 
would be tantamount to interfere with dominance as such. So then, 
when is a price excessively high? 
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3.4 Case law concerning unfairly high prices 
3.4.1 Introduction 
A presentation of case law concerning excessive prices could of 
course be structured in many different ways and perhaps the most 
obvious one would be to start with the leading case in this area, 
United Brands v. Commission7. However, since one of the ideas of this 
submission is to focus on under which circumstances statements 
have been made, case law will be presented mainly with regard to 
factors which in my view have had an influence on the outcome of 
the case. 
3.4.2 Excessive pricing and other policy goals of the 
Community 
In two cases from 1975 and 1986 respectively, two car producers 
General Motors8 and British Leyland,9 were accused of having 
abused their dominant position when it came to the pricing of 
technical inspections and issuing of certificates of conformity. In both 
cases the car manufacturers held a legal monopoly on the issuing of 
certificates of conformity and according to the Commission the two 
companies had abused their dominant position by charging 
excessive prices. The Court of Justice, to which the decisions by the 
Commission were appealed, held that it was an abuse to impose a  
 
                                                     
7 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in Case 27/76 United Brands Company 
v.Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
8 Judgment of 13 November 1975 in case 26/75 General Motors v. Commission 
[1975] ECR 1367. 
9 Judgment of 11 November 1986 in case 226/84 British Leyland v. Commission 
[1986] ECR 1347. 
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price which is excessive in relation to the economic value of the service provided, and 
which has the effect of curbing parallel imports by neutralizing the possibly more 
favourable level of prices applying in other sales areas in the Community, or by leading 
to unfair trade in the sense of Article 8[2] (2) (a). 
 
By similar reasoning the Court also condemned the prices 
charged in the British Leyland case as "clearly disproportionate to the 
economic value of the service provided and that that practice constituted an 
abuse by BL of the monopoly it held by virtue of the British rules". In both 
cases the Court of Justice clearly stated that it would be an abuse of a 
dominant position to charge a price which was disproportionate to 
the economic value of the product or service. Respectfully, it is 
however submitted that a reference to the economic value of a 
service or product is not self-explanatory. In essence, the economic 
value of something would rather seem to be decided by the market. 
Only if one would connect the economic value to something else, 
such as the cost of production, etc., could it be said that we are 
looking at a method of calculating excessive prices. However, given 
the different cost structures within different industries (as concerns 
for example different forms of intellectual property) it would seem 
that a reference to costs (no matter how they are defined) is not self-
explanatory either. 
In the two cases it would seem clear that the car manufacturers 
charged a price in excess of the monopoly price as defined above. 
The reason for charging such a high price was, as explained in the 
judgments, an interest in making parallel importation into Great 
Britain more difficult, something that would partition the Common 
Market and be contrary to Article 28 (ex Article 30, EC Treaty). In my 
view it would seem clear that the Court's references to excessive 
prices are best explained with reference to these two facts. First of all 
it was clear that the car producers had legal monopolies as to the 
issuing of certificates of conformity. Normally, such a situation 
should have led to the charging of the monopoly price, but in these 
cases the manufacturers charged a price in excess of that, for the 
simple reason that they were not interested in selling certificates. The 
manufacturers' preoccupation would thus have seemed to be 
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motivated by the possibilities of preventing parallel trade in cars. In 
view of this it is hardly surprising that the Court of Justice upheld 
the Commission's decisions, but it is submitted that these two cases 
may not be taken as proof that the Court has interfered in a free 
market where the dominant actor charges excessively high prices. In 
fact, and as discussed above, a statement that it is an abuse to charge 
prices which are excessive as compared to the economic value is in 
itself not self-explanatory. 
3.4.3 Excessive prices and preliminary rulings 
It is not only in relation to direct actions that the Court of Justice has 
made statements concerning excessively high prices. In fact, 
statements concerning excessive prices would seem to be more 
frequent when it comes to preliminary rulings. In these cases the 
companies accused of having abused their dominant position by 
charging excessively high prices have often had a legal monopoly 
and the statements by the Court of Justice concerning the abuse are 
often of a declaratory nature. That statements are of a declaratory 
nature is of course not to say that the statement should not be 
considered important, since the declaratory nature follows from the 
procedure as such. Having said this, it is however clear that there is 
no actual finding of an abuse by the Court of Justice, but the question 
is more often than not referred to the national court responsible for 
finding out the facts of the case. 
In the preliminary reference Bodson/Pompes funèbres des regions 
libérées10 from 1988 the Court of Justice had to deal with a legal 
monopoly allegedly charging excessively high prices for funeral 
services. Even though the Court of Justice did not possess any 
information that would give it the possibility to rule explicitly on the 
question, the Court stated that whether a price was excessively high 
could be judged by a comparison between the prices charged where 
                                                     
10 Judgment of 4 May 1988 in Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479. 
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there was a legal monopoly, or an exclusive right, and prices charged 
elsewhere. From the statements of the Court, or for that matter from 
the facts of the case, it is not clear to what extent the case deals with 
exploitative high prices or exclusionary high prices. In accordance 
with the two previous cases, which were direct actions under Article 
230, also this case concerned a situation in which the dominant 
undertaking had a legal monopoly or an exclusive right. 
In another demand for a preliminary reference, Ahmed Saeed 
Flugreisen11 from 1989, the Court of Justice had to deal with what was 
called excessively high prices for air fares. The Court made some 
references to excessively high or excessively low prices, i.e. 
exploitatively unfair pricing or exclusionary unfair pricing12, but 
these references do not seem to add very much to the concept of 
exploitative high prices or the method to be used for assessing 
excessively high prices. 
In the preliminary reference of Merci Convenzionali Porto di 
Genova13 from 1991, the Court of Justice had to assess the pricing 
practices of a dock-working company having an exclusive right to 
dock-work in the harbour of Genoa. The case is interesting mainly 
because the Court of Justice is fairly explicit as to what it considers to 
be prohibited pricing policies. On the other hand, the case is not clear 
since it does not concern the dominant undertaking as such but 
rather the Member State which was suspected of having infringed 
Article 86 (formerly Article 90). Even though the case dealt with the 
responsibility of the member states not to distort competition it is 
interesting to note that the Court of Justice in paragraph 19 classifies 
demands for payment for services which have not been requested, 
the charging of disproportionate prices, the refusal to have recourse 
                                                     
11 Judgment of 11 April 1989 in Case 66/86 Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen [1989] ECR 
I-803. 
12 Ibid., p. 42. 
13 Judgment of 10 December 1991 in Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali porto 
di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889. 
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to modern technology, which involves an increase in the cost of the 
operations, and finally price reductions to certain consumers while at 
the same time offsetting such reductions by increasing the charges to 
other consumers, as an abuse of a dominant position. Even though 
such practices would seem more commonplace in situations of legal 
monopolies they could also be practiced by dominant firms not 
protected by a legal monopoly. 
Although not explicitly referring to unfair, or excessively high, 
prices in its reasoning it would seem clear that that is what the Court 
of Justice, at least in part, is referring to. Even so the statements by 
the Court are not that clear or unequivocal to give an indication to 
the precise methods to be used to assess whether a certain pricing 
strategy is prohibited or not. 
Generally, when speaking about excessively high prices, the 
Court of Justice normally makes reference to the alleged economic 
value of a certain product or service, so also in the preliminary 
reference Crespelle14 from 1994. In this case insemination centres with 
exclusive rights to carry on business within a certain geographical 
area were accused of having charged "exorbitant prices".15 According 
to the Court of Justice it would be an abuse of a dominant position if 
a company which holds an administrative monopoly charges fees for 
its services which are disproportionate to the economic value of the 
service provided.16 Interestingly enough the Court of Justice also 
stated that it was not an abuse of a dominant position to charge an 
extra fee to users who requested semen from production centres in 
other member states, provided that those costs were actually 
incurred by the insemination centres in meeting the requests of those 
users.17 It is noteworthy that while making reference to the economic 
                                                     
14 Judgment of 5 October 1994 in Case C-323/93 Centre d'insémination de la 
Crespelle [1994] ECR I-5077. 
15 Ibid., p. 19. 
16 Ibid., p. 25. 
17 Ibid., p. 27. 
57 
value of the products in question the Court of Justice also makes 
sweeping references to the costs of production. In fact, it would seem 
that if one were to compare prices in order to establish excessively 
high prices such a comparison would be less accurate if not taking 
into account costs. 
This far in the presentation (with full knowledge that I this far 
have left out the most famous case, United Brands from 1978), there is 
really not much in the Court's case law to explain the concept of 
excessively high prices and how these should be calculated. 
However, two of the often considered more clear examples of 
excessively high exploitative prices are the preliminary references of 
SACEM18 and Tournier19, both decided on the same day in 1989. 
The SACEM and Tournier cases dealt with the allegedly excessive 
prices charged by performing rights societies. In these two cases the 
Court of Justice stated that in order to find out whether or not prices 
were excessively high it was possible to make a comparison with 
similar prices in other member states. If the prices charged in one 
state were appreciably higher than those charged in other member 
states and where a comparison of the fee levels has been made on a 
consistent basis, that difference must be regarded as indicative of an 
abuse of a dominant position as the Court of Justice explained in 
paragraph 38 of Tournier and paragraph 24 of SACEM. Having 
established such a difference it would be for the undertaking in 
question to justify the difference by reference to objective 
dissimilarities between the two situations. 
A comparison of prices with other markets or other operators is 
of course something that could indicate unfair prices, or at least 
different prices. The problem would, however, seem to be making 
sure that the comparison is made on a consistent basis. To a certain 
extent different prices might reflect different costs of production or 
other differences. 
                                                     
18 Judgment of 13 July 1989 in joined Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 
Lucazeau (SACEM) [1989] ECR 2811. 
19 Judgment of 13 July 1989 in Case 395/87 Tournier [1989] ECR 2521. 
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In a preliminary reference from 2000, Deutsche Post,20 the task of 
making comparisons was far simpler than would normally seem to 
be the case. The public undertaking Deutsche Post, having a legal 
monopoly for distributing mail in Germany, had noticed what it 
considered was large amounts of so called re-mailing. In order to 
curb this re-mailing Deutsche Post charged the re-mailed post the 
full tariff for internal mail in Germany, which meant that the 
companies in question not only had to pay the international tariff 
applicable in the country from which the mail was sent but also the 
internal tariff in Germany. Considering that the conduct by Deutsche 
Post actually had the effect that the companies had to pay twice for 
the same service (without being able to deduct the first fee) the Court 
of Justice had no problems qualifying this as an abuse of a dominant 
position. Although not making explicit reference to a comparison it 
would seem evident that the Court of Justice compared the prices for 
ordinary internal mail with the situation in the case, thereby finding 
excessive prices. Once again it may be noted that the Court took into 
account the costs for delivering the mail as compared to the extra 
fee.21 
Besides the cases now analyzed there are also other cases in 
which the Court of Justice refers to unfair prices and concludes that 
excessive prices are contrary to Article 82. One such example is a 
preliminary ruling from 1997 GT-Link22 in which case the Court of 
                                                     
20 Judgment of 10 February 2000 in joined Cases C-147/97 and C-148/97 
Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-825. 
21 It should be noted that the English version of the relevant passage (point 
58) is not very accurate. In French it is stated: Dès lors, l'exercice du droit, par 
une telle entité, de réclamer le montant intégral des taxes intérieures, sans tenir 
compte de la compensation entre les frais relatifs à l'acheminement et à la 
distribution d'envois déposés en grande quantité auprès des services postaux d'un 
État membre autre que celui dans lequel sont domiciliés tant les expéditeurs que les 
destinataires de ces envois et les frais terminaux payés par lesdits services, peut être 
considéré comme un abus de position dominante au sens de l'article 86 du traité. 
22 Judgment of 17 July 1997 in Case C-242/95 GT-Link [1997] ECR I-4449. 
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Justice simply concludes that it has previously stated that unfair 
prices for the purposes of Article 82 means prices which are 
excessive because they have no reasonable relation to the economic 
value of the goods or services supplied.23  
3.4.4 United Brands 
As follows from the presentation this far there are no clear examples 
of the Court of Justice condemning excessive prices in a free and 
unregulated market. In addition, there does not seem to be any 
preferred method of assessing whether a price is excessive or not. 
Comparisons with costs or prices charged elsewhere by other 
companies would seem hard to implement in practice. However, in 
the well-known direct action of United Brands v. Commission24 the 
Court explained how to assess whether a price is excessive or not. 
The Court's statements are not limited to situations of legal 
monopolies; in fact they were given in a situation where there was 
no legal monopoly or exclusive rights. 
In a decision the Commission had found that United Brands had 
abused its dominant position by imposing unfair prices for the sale 
of Chiquita Bananas to its customers in the Belgo-Luxembourg 
Economic Union, Denmark, the Netherlands, Ireland and Germany. 
According to the Court it would be an abuse of a dominant position 
if United Brands charged a price which was excessive because it had 
"no reasonable relation to the economic value of the product".25 This excess 
could, inter alia, be determined objectively according to the Court of 
Justice if it was possible for the price to be calculated by making a 
comparison between the selling price of the product in question and 
its cost of production, which would disclose the amount of the profit 
                                                     
23 Ibid., p. 39. 
24 Judgment of 14 February 1978 in Case 27/76 United Brands 
Company/Commission [1978] ECR 207. 
25 Ibid., p. 250. 
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margin. According to the Court of Justice, the questions to be 
determined were, therefore, whether the difference between the costs 
actually incurred and the price actually charged is excessive, and, if 
the answer to that question is in the affirmative, whether a price has 
been imposed which is either unfair in itself or when compared to 
competing products. 
Having stated in which way to determine whether or not a price 
charged is excessive the Court of Justice added that other ways of 
finding out the same thing could also be devised.26 However, as it 
turned out the Commission had not proved the factual points in its 
decision, and thus the decision was annulled. Even though the 
Commission decision was annulled the United Brands case is 
generally considered to be the most explicit reasoning by the Court 
of Justice when it comes to excessively high prices. Obviously, there 
are different ways of interpreting the statements by the Court, but it 
would seem clear that the Commission interprets the statements as 
including a two stage test.27 
The first thing to analyze would seem to be to what extent the 
price charged for a product has any reasonable relation to its 
economic value. The excess could be determined by making a 
comparison between the selling price and the cost of production. It is 
not clear here what ratio between the cost of production and the 
selling price that would be considered as excessive. After finding 
such an excess (whatever it might be) it remains to be decided to 
what extent the price is unfair, either in itself or when compared to 
competing products. Thus the finding that the price bears no relation 
to the cost of production is only the first step when analyzing 
whether a price is excessive. 
As concerns the subsequent step, i.e. after having found 
disproportion between the cost of production and the selling price, 
there would seem to be two ways of fulfilling this. The first option 
                                                     
26 Ibid., p. 250-253. 
27 Commission decision of 23 July 2004 in COMP/A.36.568/D3 Scandlines 
Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg. 
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would be that the price is "unfair in itself", and the other that the 
price is unfair when "compared to other competing products". The 
second of these two options is admittedly vague but nevertheless it 
indicates what should be compared, namely competing products. As 
for the first option, it is not clear to what extent the analysis should 
focus exclusively on the cost side or whether also the demand for the 
product should be taken into account. 
In its decision in Scandlines28 from 2004, the Commission stated 
that when deciding the economic value of a particular product or 
service, i.e. investigating to what extent the price was unfair in itself, 
also other non-cost related factors, notably the demand for the 
service, had to be taken into account. The statement of the 
Commission concerning the demand side deserves to be quoted in 
full. 
 
The demand-side is relevant mainly because customers are notably willing to pay more 
for something specific attached to the product/service that they consider valuable. This 
specific feature does not necessarily imply higher production costs for the provider. 
However it is valuable for the customer and also for the provider, and thereby increases 
the economic value of the product/service. 
 
As a consequence, even if it were to be assumed that there is a positive difference 
between the price and the production costs exceeding what Scandlines claims as being a 
reasonable margin (whatever that may be), the conclusion should not necessarily be 
drawn that the price is unfair, provided that this price has a reasonable relation to the 
economic value of the product/service supplied. The assessment of the reasonable 
relation between the price and the economic value of the product/service must also take 
into account the relative weight of non-cost related factors. 
 
As would appear evident from the Scandlines decision the 
Commission seems reluctant to strike down on what might be 
perceived as unfair prices. Indeed, if the reasoning of the 
Commission is correct it would seem practically impossible to strike 
down on a price which is not higher than the monopoly price. The 
                                                     
28 Commission decision of 23 July 2004 in COMP/A.36.568/D3 Scandlines 
Sverige AB v. Port of Helsingborg. 
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monopoly price, i.e. the highest price that a dominant company 
would be able to charge without loosing sales in excess of revenues 
generated by the high price, would seem to reflect the prevailing 
attitude of the customers, thus being a good indication of the value 
which customers attribute to the service or product. 
3.5 Conclusions 
There can be no doubt that Article 82 prohibits excessive exploitative 
prices. Case law from the Court of Justice is explicit in the sense that 
some pricing strategies might constitute an abuse of a dominant 
position. At the same time it is equally clear that the Court has not 
yet condemned a particular pricing practice, in a free and 
unregulated market, as amounting to unfairly high and exploitative 
prices and thus constituting an infringement of Article 82. 
Admittedly, the Court of Justice has not ruled out that prices might 
be banned for being exploitative high, but there is no case law in 
which the Court has actually found a particular price being 
exploitative high. 
As regards case law it would seem fair to say that the Court does 
not always separate between excessively high exclusionary and 
excessively high exploitative prices. 29 Furthermore, the Court does 
not seem to separate between situations where the dominant 
position is the result of a legal monopoly or for that matter an 
exclusive right and situations where the market it more or less free. 
One can of course only speculate on the reasons for this, but one 
explanation could be that when it comes to preliminary references 
the Court only answered the questions put to it, and for direct 
actions the facts of the case are (of course) determinative for the 
outcome. 
Notwithstanding subsequent case law it would seem clear that it 
is primarily in United Brands that the Court actually sketched out  
                                                     
29 Cf. judgment of 4 May 1988 in Case 30/87 Bodson [1988] ECR 2479. 
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which method that might be used for assessing whether a price is 
excessively high. References in other case law concerning costs, 30 
comparison with the prices of competitors or prices elsewhere,31 
whether the customer has asked for the particular service32 etc, 
would all seem rather difficult to apply in practice. 
As for the method discussed in United Brands it is submitted that 
it involves two steps. First a disproportion between the price charged 
and the costs of production need to be established. Even though a 
regulatory authority may have some margin of discretion when it 
comes to designating which costs that would be relevant, this 
analysis has to be followed by an assessment as to whether the price 
is "unfair in itself" or unfair when "compared to other competing 
products". For the second possibility it is clear that the comparison 
has to be made on a consistent basis,33 which in itself is a limitation 
given that there might not be that many competing products – after 
all, the investigation concerns a dominant undertaking. However, 
the difficulties now sketched out would seem minor as compared to 
an assessment of whether a price is unfair in itself. If one would – as 
the Commission in Scandlines – take into account also other non-cost 
related factors, it would seem less likely that monopoly pricing or 
any price less than that would be considered excessive. Assuming 
that the primary objective of the pricing strategy of any firm (on a 
free market) is to extract the maximum from its customers, it is 
                                                     
30 Cf. judgment of 5 October 1994 in Case C-323/93 Centre d'insémination de la 
Crespelle  [1994] ECR I-5077, and judgment of 10 February 2000 in joined 
Cases C-147/97 and C-148/97 Deutsche Post [2000] ECR I-825. 
31 Cf. judgment of 13 July 1989 in joined Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 
Lucazeau (SACEM) [1989] ECR 2811 and judgment of 13 July 1989 in Case 
395/87 Tournier [1989] ECR 2521. 
32 Cf. judgment of 10 December 1991 in Case C-179/90 Merci convenzionali 
porto di Genova [1991] ECR I-5889. 
33 Judgment of 13 July 1989 in joined Cases 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88 
Lucazeau (SACEM) [1989] ECR 2811, p. 38. 
64 
respectfully submitted that I fail to see that any price would be 
excessive in itself. 
Given what has been stated previously, it would seem as the 
prohibition against excessively high exploitative prices has its 
primary scope of application in situations of legal monopolies or 
regulated markets.34 In free markets it may principally be used when 
the pricing strategy focuses on something other than exploiting its 
customers on that particular product, for example by trying to 
prevent parallel imports. 
                                                     
34 Cf. in this respect the Commission Notice on the application of the competition 
rules to access agreements in the telecommunications sector – framework, relevant 
market and principles, [1998] OJ C 265, p. 97 and 105-109. 
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4 The Paradox of the Exclusion of 
Exploitative Abuse
1
  
 Bruce Lyons  
4.1 Introduction 
European Commissioner Neelie Kroes kicked off the current major 
review of Article 82 by saying: ‘it is sound for our enforcement policy 
to give priority to so-called exclusionary abuses, since exclusion is 
often at the basis of later exploitation of customers’.2 This is a common 
position to hear in policy circles, but it is inherently paradoxical. If 
exclusionary abuses are bad because they ultimately exploit consumers, why 
should the policy emphasis not be on directly exploitative abuses? The 
answer has direct relevance for the current Article 82 review: should 
exploitative abuses be integrated alongside exclusion in the 
emerging guidelines?3 
This may seem like an esoteric debate, but this translates into 
fundamental guidance for business, as well as competition 
                                                     
1 The support of the Economic and Social Research Council is gratefully 
acknowledged. I also thank numerous colleagues at UEA’s Centre for 
Competition Policy for discussions that helped these ideas unfold. 
2 ‘Preliminary Thoughts on Policy Review of Article 82’ *emphasis in 
original] Speech at the Fordham Corporate Law Institute, New York, 23rd 
September 2005. 
3 A quite separate historical paradox is that, despite the conventional 
wisdom, the drafters of Article 82 originally intended it to relate to 
exploitative abuses and not exclusionary abuses. Akman (2007) examines 
the travaux préparatoires (preparatory documents) of Article 82EC and 
finds that it is not based on ‘ordoliberal’ foundations. The drafters were 
mainly concerned with increasing ‘efficiency’ and intended to protect the 
customers, not competitors, of dominant undertakings.  
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practitioners, as to what is and is not lawful behaviour for businesses 
that dominate their markets. I begin by clarifying what is at issue. 
There are two ways in which a dominant firm might abuse its market 
position. First, it might directly harm its customers; for example, by 
raising prices or limiting its effort to lower costs or develop new or 
better products. This is known as an exploitative abuse. Second, it 
might adopt strategies that exclude rivals from making an effective 
challenge to its dominant position; for example, by predatory 
pricing, product bundling, exclusive contracts or refusal to supply. 
Collectively, these are known as exclusionary abuse. 
The formal EC law covers both types of abuse, and provides little 
guidance on whether exploitation or exclusion should be the greater 
concern.4 The case law, however, has greatly emphasised 
exclusionary effects, with exploitative effects appearing to be little 
more than a sideshow.5 It is in this context that DG Comp’s opening, 
and so far only, major public contribution to the review of Article 82 
has been the much discussed staff paper on exclusionary abuses.6 
There has been no public commitment as to the next stage of review, 
but it is likely that the working paper will be developed into a set of 
guidelines.  
Exploitation of consumers is the textbook abuse by a monopolist 
or dominant firm. Because consumers cannot easily switch to an 
alternative source of supply, the dominant firm can raise price to 
enhance profits. Consumers lose out by having to pay more and buy 
less, and there is a consequent distortion in the allocation of 
resources. All economics students learn this in their first year of 
study, and it is a major justification for competition policy. High 
                                                     
4 Article 82 of the EC Treaty prohibits the abuse of a dominant position, and 
highlights: ‘unfair’ pricing or trading conditions; ‘limiting’ production or 
technical development; ‘applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent 
transactions’; and ‘supplementary obligations’ in contracts. 
5 See e.g. Whish ‘Competition Law’ (2004) ch.5. 
6 See also the discussion of appropriate economic principles by the EAGCP, 
published on the DG Comp website. 
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prices are the most direct form of abuse, and are the most frequent in 
antitrust cases.  
In principle, product quality, service levels and product range 
may also be abused by a dominant firm. It is difficult to measure 
these in order to compare them with an appropriate benchmark, but 
the same, to a lesser extent, can be said of high prices. However, 
there is a more fundamental problem with trying to appraise non-
price exploitation. The current level of our understanding is that it is 
not always clear even in which direction the abuse will take place. 
For example, consider the provision of quality. In general, a 
dominant firm considers the marginal revenue to be gained from 
spending on a quality enhancing investment, whereas total welfare is 
maximised by comparing marginal benefit to consumers to the extra 
costs. The product, while the marginal revenue calculation 
emphasises only the higher price that can be extracted from existing 
consumers and any marginal consumers that might be won or lost as 
a consequence. Although there are some reasons to expect any bias 
to be towards suboptimal quality, it can be shown that the actual 
balance is highly sensitive to the nature of ‘quality’, as well as the 
price at which quality is compared.7 In principle, then, the 
monopolist might try to save costs by providing a suboptimal 
quality, but there is no overwhelming economic theory equivalent to 
the expectation of high prices. In the murky world of exploitative 
effects, this is probably sufficient to justify the overwhelming 
emphasis on price exploitation. This is the focus of the remainder of 
this paper. 
                                                     
7 At higher prices charged by a monopolist, the customer base is more likely 
to be those who value quality and so this tends to push up the monopolist’s 
choice of quality – so one distortion (high prices) can counterbalance 
another (lower quality). 
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4.2 The Paradox 
Despite the textbook monopoly abuse being high prices, most 
competition economists (and probably also most competition 
lawyers) have a profound distaste for the direct control of 
exploitative abuse under Article 82. It conjures images of detailed 
interventions throughout the economy, when most would argue that 
regulation should be reserved for cases of genuine natural monopoly 
(e.g. those parts of privatised utilities which cannot be structured 
competitively due to network economies). The latter require specific, 
well informed regulators, and these cannot be put in place for all 
corners of the economy in which a firm may be dominant. Far better, 
the argument goes, to concentrate on maximising the chances for the 
competitive process to throw up a new competitor; hence, the focus 
on exclusionary abuse.  
Before assessing whether this should be the end of the story, we 
take a step back to recall the DG Comp review of exclusionary 
abuses. The main thrust has been that the key test should be ultimate 
consumer effects, and not protecting rivals per se. This was 
anticipated by Ms Kroes in her Fordham speech: ‘First, it is 
competition, and not competitors, that is to be protected. Second, 
ultimately the aim is to avoid consumer harm. I like aggressive 
competition – including by dominant companies – and I don’t care if 
it may hurt competitors – as long as it ultimately benefits 
consumers.’ Many of the details of the subsequent Commission 
working paper8 have been criticised, particularly for not achieving 
this aim, but this main thrust on consumer effects has received 
almost universal acclaim. 
The Commissioner’s views are shared by most competition 
economists.9 For example, on the purpose of Article 82 being to 
                                                     
8 DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the 
Treaty to exclusionary abuses; public consultation, December 2005. 
9 E.g. see the EAGCP report, op cit. This is not to deny some significant 
disagreements over consumer versus total welfare as the appropriate 
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protect consumers against harm, an eminent panel of academic 
economists recently wrote: ‘An economic approach to Article 82 
focuses on improved consumer welfare. In so doing, it avoids 
confusing the protection of competition with the protection of 
competitors and it stresses that the ultimate yardstick of competition 
policy is in the satisfaction of consumer needs. Competition is a 
process that forces firms to be responsive to consumers needs with 
respect to price, quality, variety, etc.; over time it also acts as a 
selection mechanism, with more efficient firms replacing less 
efficient ones.’ *EAGCP, 2005, p.2+  
So, we have a strong consensus that an exclusionary practice, 
whereby a dominant firm hurts rivals, is only an abuse when the 
consequence is that consumers are expected to be harmed.10 
There is also a strong consensus that Article 82 should be 
interpreted exclusively in relation to exclusionary effects. For 
example, the same panel wrote: ‘whenever possible, competition is to 
be preferred to detailed regulation as the best mechanism to avoid 
inefficiencies and foster productivity and growth; this calls for a 
‘non-dirigiste’ approach to competition policy that focuses in most 
cases on entry barriers; in the context of Article 82, it is then natural 
to focus on competitive harm that arises from exclusionary 
strategies. Possible exceptions concern some natural monopoly 
industries which may require ongoing supervision of access prices 
and conditions by regulatory agencies.’ *EAGCP, p.3+ The 
implication is that any regulation of exploitative effects should be 
through these specialist agencies, and not through Article 82.  
                                                                                                                           
standard. This particular dispute has been surprisingly silent in the debate, 
though it does not make a fundamental difference to the line of argument in 
this paper. 
10 This is also in line with the modern treatment of mergers, as exemplified 
by the revised merger regulation moving away from the ‘dominance test’ in 
favour of the ‘significant impediment to effective competition’ test. The 
latter is usually interpreted as protecting consumer benefits. 
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The US Supreme Court agrees: ‘The mere possession of 
monopoly power, and the concomitant charging of monopoly prices, 
is not only not unlawful, it is an important element of the free market 
system’ *540 U.S. Verizon-Trinko, 2004, p.407]. 
So, we can summarise on exclusionary abuse: while hurting one 
or more rivals is necessary for an exclusionary abuse, it is not 
sufficient – to be an abuse, exclusion also requires an expectation of 
eventual consumer harm (i.e. exploitation). And on exploitative 
abuse: many eminent economists and lawyers say that Article 82 
should not deal with such abuses. 
This results in our paradox: it is good to prohibit only those 
exclusionary practices which can be expected to result (indirectly) in an 
exploitative abuse…but at the same time it is bad to prohibit directly 
exploitative practices! 
4.3 The Hazards of Identifying and Remedying 
Exploitation 
I do not propose to challenge the first part of the paradox – that 
exclusionary practices should be seen as abusive only when they 
harm consumers. Indeed, I see that as a key achievement of the 
economic approach to competition policy. However, the distaste for 
prosecuting direct exploitation requires deeper analysis to 
understand why this position is held and what its limitations are. I 
group the analysis around: measurement; market dynamics; multi-
sided markets; and remedies. 
4.3.1 Measurement issues 
European case law suggests that the key question to ask is: has the 
dominant firm ‘made use of the opportunities arising out of its 
dominant position in such a way as to reap trading benefits which it 
would not have reaped if there had been normal and sufficiently 
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effective competition[?] In this case charging a price which is 
excessive because it has no reasonable relation to the economic value 
of the product supplied would be such an abuse. This excess could, 
inter alia, be determined objectively if it were possible for it to be 
calculated by making a comparison between the selling price of the 
product in question and its cost of production, which would disclose 
the amount of the profit margin’ (United Brands, 19, #249-251).11 
There are many reasons why cost measurement is easier said 
than done. Most of these are well known, so I only sketch them here. 
Identifying costs and attaching them to a particular product is highly 
complex in most businesses. Firms normally record costs in a way 
that is most useful for financial purposes, and this can lead to 
substantial differences between accounting costs and economic cost. 
Purchase costs often depend on volume or have multiple 
components, for example, depending on additional services or 
demand growth. Capital costs require an assumed cost of capital to 
convert into annual costs, and the cost of capital may depend on the 
market power of the firm. Many costs are common across a product 
range, and allocating these costs to specific products is highly 
controversial. Sunk costs, for example for a facility built years ago, 
create further problems: either they are ignored as bygones (which 
would lead to dynamic problems as discussed below) or they need 
revaluing (and if valued in terms of their economic rents, this means 
they depend on achievable price and so this does not provide an 
independent benchmark against which to judge price). The valuation 
of intangible assets, such as brands, suffers from the same circularity 
problem. Business is risky and some inevitably fail having incurred 
                                                     
11 United Brands v Commission of the European Communities, Court of Justice of 
the European Communities, Case 27/76 [1978] ECR 207. More recently, the 
meaning of ‘economic value’ has been interpreted more widely, both by the 
Commission in Swedish Ports and by the UK Court of Appeal in Attheraces 
vs. BHB, to include value to the purchaser. See PwC (2007). The cases are 
Scandlines Sverige AB v Port of Helsingborg COMP/A.36.568.D3 and Attheraces 
vs. BHB, 2007, EHCA civ38. 
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unrecoverable costs. In this context, a competitive ex ante return will 
turn out to be much higher ex post for those firms lucky or efficient 
enough to survive – this is sometimes known as the survivor bias. It 
is a particularly important issue for R&D intensive industries where 
only a few lines of research pay off and some turn out to be 
blockbuster successes.12 
This is a dauntingly long and undoubtedly incomplete list of 
problems. It suggests we should be extremely careful if trying to 
measure how high a particular price is in relation to cost. 
Nevertheless, these problems should not be over-exaggerated. 
Regulatory agencies have great experience at measuring costs and 
reasonable approximations can be made. Also for licensing 
remedies< It is, of course, important that cost estimates should be 
sensitivity tested in the light of whichever of the measurement 
problems are thought to be most important in the case in question. 
Furthermore, cost measurement is an important element to 
understanding some important types of exclusionary abuse (e.g. 
predatory pricing). Perhaps more importantly, it is crucial to 
developing appropriate remedies for many exclusionary practices. 
For example: compulsory licensing will only be effective if supported 
by an appropriate analysis of a suitable royalty fee; and access 
agreements need to identify a suitable access price. Put another way, 
excessively high royalties or access prices can be seen as either 
upstream exploitative or downstream exclusionary. The Commission 
needs to understand exploitative abuse in order to remedy 
exclusionary abuse. 
An alternative to using cost as the benchmark for forming a 
judgement as to whether a price is too high, it may be possible to 
compare prices in different markets. In this method, it is important to 
find reasonably competitive comparator markets. These might be 
found in the form of similar products sold in different geographic 
                                                     
12 For a large, say, pharmaceuticals company with numerous lines of 
research, the failed lines may stay within its cost base, albeit in a lumpy 
fashion over time, but for a specialist company this will not hold. 
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markets, where the market structure is not dominated by a particular 
firm (careful adjustment may be needed for tax or other differences); 
or it could be in the form of a comparison with other products which 
have similar cost structures.  
A particular example of the former approach is where the 
dominant firm itself price discriminates between markets according 
to local conditions. There is no space here to go into details on the 
pros and cons of price discrimination.13 Suffice it to say that there are 
many occasions where price discrimination enhances consumer 
welfare because it results in more consumers being able to buy the 
product, while in other situations it may distort the market. The 
point at issue here is whether the existence of price discrimination 
should be seen as evidence that there is an exploitative abuse in the 
high price market. This is dangerous territory because a common 
price in the absence of discrimination is likely to be much higher 
than in the low price market under discrimination. In particular, the 
lowest discriminatory price may well be below average cost. 
4.3.2 Market dynamics 
There are two types of dynamic issue. First, there is the role of high 
prices in the entry process. Second, there is the role of high prices in 
the investment incentive for a dominant firm (or a potentially 
dominant firm). 
Suppose we have been able to identify a suitable yardstick for 
comparing prices, either with good cost data or a suitable 
comparison across markets. When can we say that a price is 
exploitative? For example, is a margin of 10%, 20%, 50%, 100% or 
500% an abuse? Of course, the question is not well posed because it 
has no element of time. For example, short-term fluctuations in 
demand when production is relatively fixed leads to large price 
                                                     
13 See previous volume in this series on the ‘Pros and Cons of Price 
Discrimination’. 
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fluctuations (or rationing or substantial swings in inventories). In 
fact, periods of high prices alongside periods of low prices are 
perfectly consistent with a well-oiled competitive market. So we 
should focus on persistence: how long must a high price continue in 
order for it to be called an abuse? 
In the context of a dominant firm, the answer depends on how 
long it might take a small rival to expand or a new entrant to enter 
the market. The height of current prices has a more limited role. In 
fact, an entrant may have his attention drawn to a potential 
opportunity by a very high price, so in this sense high prices act as a 
powerful signal – the higher the better if they advertise opportunities 
(Hayek, 1968). Once the opportunity is understood, it is more 
important for the potential entrant to focus on what price would be 
post-entry. This means that the dominant firm’s expected response 
must be worked out. If he is expected to respond aggressively, then 
even a very high current price will not attract entry. Of course, this 
brings us back to exclusionary behaviour. If the dominant firm has a 
reputation for predatory responses to entry, or if it is expected to 
adopt a strategy to limit an entrant’s options (e.g. exclusivity 
agreements or inefficient bundling), then this becomes an issue of 
expected exclusionary effects, which may be difficult to prove (i.e. 
before the persistence of high prices and lack of entry are observed). 
Potential entrants will be particularly concerned about ex post 
competition if they have to invest in assets that will be at least part 
sunk (i.e. non-recoverable). 
Turning to the incentive for the dominant firm, it is the 
expectation of high profits that provides the incentive to invest in a 
whole range of activities, including capacity, process innovation, 
product innovation, design, branding, marketing activities, 
distribution network and supply chain. Some of these investments 
have outputs that would be easily copied if they were not protected 
by intellectual property rights (including patent, trademark, 
copyright and database rights). It is long accepted that property 
rights, including IPRs, are necessary in a market system to create an 
incentive to invest. In their absence, many easily-copied ideas which 
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are nonetheless valuable would not be developed. Consequently, 
consumers would be worse off. The effort and inspiration of 
invention is not usually picked up in cost data, and there is a very 
large survivor bias, so the price-cost margin on intellectual property 
can appear to be very high. If the inventor goes on to produce a 
product on which he holds an IPR, this can make the product price 
seem extremely high, and if he licenses the right to produce, the 
royalty payment might seem ‘too high’. 
4.3.3 Multi-sided markets 
Economists have become increasingly aware in recent years of the 
importance of multi-sided platforms, more often known as two-
sided markets. These are intermediate platforms that provide benefit 
to more than one distinct group of customers, and where there are 
significant externalities (often positive) between these groups. A 
surprising number of markets seem to share some key features.14 For 
example, both advertisers and readers derive benefits from a 
newspaper, and each group derives a benefit from the other (e.g. 
advertisers benefit from more readers to be influenced by their 
adverts, and readers may or may not enjoy reading adverts). 
Payment card systems have similar properties, with shoppers 
enjoying a convenient means of payment which is more beneficial 
the more merchants there are who accept a card under that system 
(e.g. Visa). A port provides its services to a range of different 
customer groups, including freight and passenger ferries (though it 
is not obvious that there are externalities between groups of 
consumers in this case). In some markets, the two types of customer 
may include the same people in different guises; for example, mobile 
phone calls benefit both callers and those who receive calls. A final 
example is horseracing, in which owners, spectators and punters 
                                                     
14 Many emerging markets in the ‘new economy’ seem to have similar 
attributes of network and other positive externalities. 
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each derive pleasure from participating in their different ways (i.e. 
entering, watching and betting on races). 
In each of these cases, the different groups of consumers 
contribute financially to support investment in the platform in 
different ways. The quality of the platform is enhanced by 
investment, and such endogenous investments tend to create highly 
concentrated market structures (Sutton, 1991 and 1998). This makes 
them disproportionately important in antitrust cases. Much recent 
theoretical work has enhanced our understanding of pricing 
practices in multisided markets. Outcomes depend on factors such as 
which group conveys more positive externalities on the other – the 
former group is naturally subsidised relative to the latter, who may 
appear to pay disproportionately high prices even when the market 
is perfectly efficient.  
This has resulted in some high profile ‘exploitation’ cases in 
recent years, including: the European Commission on Visa and 
Swedish Ports; the UK OFT on the price BHB charged bookmakers 
for the pre-race data necessary for bets to be taken; and the UK 
Competition Commission on mobile phone termination charges.15 
These cases often waver between Articles 81 and 82 because a joint 
venture is set up (e.g. Visa for card payments with member banks 
collectively setting interchange fees) or an entity controls the sport as 
its governing body (e.g. the British Horseracing Board, BHB, in the 
horseracing case). The legal issues in relation to Articles 81 and 82 
may be different, but the economic analysis is similar. These are 
often complex cases and competition authorities take some time to 
come to grips with them. The Visa, BHB and mobile phone cases are 
analysed in depth in Lyons (2008).16 Close examination of such 
markets shows that a competition agency’s first thoughts about the 
exploitation are often wrong, and apparently very high prices about 
                                                     
15 Mobile termination charges was a market inquiry, unusual to the UK 
competition policy system, so no one firm was considered dominant. 
16 See chapters by Rochet on Visa, Lyons on BHB and Armstrong & Wright 
on mobile phones. 
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which some customers complain very loudly may be part of a 
reasonably optimal payments package when all groups of consumers 
and investment incentives are properly taken into account. 
4.3.4 Remedies and punishments 
It is important not to confuse the identification of an abuse with the 
choice of remedy. The natural remedy for high prices might seem to 
be to regulate them, but this is not the ideal option. The fundament 
source of market power is some form of entry barrier, and the basic 
principle of intervention should be to remedy the problem at source. 
In large industries subject to large economies of scale, price 
regulation may still be the best option. The classic examples are in 
the utilities such as gas and electricity. The problems of price 
regulation are well understood. Once again, problems of cost 
attribution and incentives to invest are important issues. 17 Access 
price regulation requires a subtle balancing of long term incentives 
against short term rip-offs. Another issue is the cost of establishing a 
specialist bureaucracy. This is necessary because a generalist 
competition agency is unlikely to have the skills and resources to do 
an effective job – it would do more harm than good by setting 
inappropriate prices (either too low or too high) and encourage 
regulated firms to waste resources trying to manipulate a weak 
regulator. Nevertheless, for a limited number of markets, all this is 
worthwhile because otherwise consumers would indeed get 
exploited. Specialist regulators are fully justifiable in key areas of 
large markets, but they would be disproportionate if set up for all 
corners of the economy whenever a dominant firm emerges.  
Sometimes it is possible to limit the amount of price regulation 
by vertical restructuring, separating the key stages of production at 
which scale economies are most marked. This means that large parts 
                                                     
17 I do not dwell on the subtle differences between rate of return regulation 
and RPI-X, etc. 
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of most industries can be left to market forces while core distribution 
networks, which would be massively inefficient to duplicate, can be 
subject to price regulation. This form of vertical restructuring can be 
effective, especially when the firms were created away from the 
market as in the privatised utilities. Where vertical integration has 
been created in a relatively competitive market, however, much 
greater caution is necessary because important efficiencies may be 
lost. An alternative form of restructuring is horizontal, breaking up a 
dominant firm, as the US did most famously with Standard Oil in 
1911 and AT&T into the ‘Baby Bells’ in 1984 (and attempted to do 
with Microsoft in 2000 before it was overturned on appeal). This is a 
rare and dramatic remedy, and enormous caution is necessary 
because the efficiency consequences are so hard to predict.18 Quite 
generally, it would be far better to facilitate expansion by a small 
rival or entry by a new firm, preferably one with a track record in a 
neighbouring market so it has the appropriate experience, financial 
resources and skills to succeed. This requires a deep analysis of the 
source of current entry barriers. 
It is possible to be more creative in thinking about alternative 
remedies. In particular, many markets have several alternative 
suppliers, yet one long-standing incumbent remains dominant 
despite charging higher prices. This is common in gas and electricity 
distribution in the UK (see Waddams and Wilson, 2006). Customer 
switching would soon encourage a dominant firm to reduce its 
prices, but domestic customers are remarkably slow to save even 
substantial sums of money for relatively little switching effort. The 
reasons for this consumer inertia are only just beginning to be 
understood, but inasmuch as it is a matter of lack of credible 
information, this can be remedied in various ways. For example, a 
                                                     
18 Some of these problems are apparent in divestiture remedies applied in 
EU merger cases. See Davies and Lyons (2007). Note that there is an 
important difference between a merger prohibition, where integration has 
not yet taken place, and a divestiture or break-up where some previously 
integrated functions have to be replaced. 
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utility might be required to print on its customers’ quarterly bills the 
potential cost savings that could be achieved by switching to a lower 
price supplier. Indeed, a similar remedy was imposed by the UK 
Competition Commission on store cards, where credit terms are 
much higher than for other forms of credit. Similar messages 
advertising the prices available at a dominant firm’s rivals might be 
required at the point of sale.19 Of course, such remedies are not 
possible if a firm is so dominant that there is no serious alternative 
supplier. 
We next turn to punishment for exploitative abuse. A breach of 
Article 82 is subject to a maximum fine of 10% of turnover of the 
entire firm, not just the abused market. The turnover base means 
that, although 10% seems small in relation to the sort of margins that 
might be found to be exploitative, the fine could be very significant 
for a non-specialist firm. If the threat of a fine is seen as significant, 
then it may have a deterrent effect on high prices. In some 
circumstances this may be beneficial, though there is a danger of 
adverse dynamic effects for the reasons discussed above. More 
importantly, it would make everyday business life horribly 
complicated if firms have to consult competition lawyers every time 
they raise price. This makes it inappropriate to punish high prices 
with a fine, though private action for compensation would not be 
inappropriate but only if there has been a prior finding of abuse. The 
primary sanction should be remedies to limit future exploitation. 
Finally, we mention a potential hazard of not tackling 
exploitative effects under Article 82. If the Commission says that it 
will not bring cases of exploitative abuse, and if private enforcement 
continues to be encouraged, there is a serious danger that 
exploitation cases may end up in the non-specialist courts, where 
none of the subtle difficulties discussed above are likely to be 
                                                     
19 Great care needs to be taken that such practices do not result on 
coordinated behaviour between firms. 
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appreciated and bad decisions will be made. A good example is the 
UK ATR vs. BHB case which was rightly overturned on appeal.20 
4.4 Comparison with the Application of Article 82 in 
Relation to Exclusionary Effects 
We can now bring together some themes that underlie the paradox 
of the exclusion of exploitative effects. Exploitative effects are< 
 
a) Naturally shorter lived and more dangerous to remedy (Type 
1 error) 
 
The fundamental process of competition is that smaller firms 
expand and new firms are attracted by profitable opportunities. As 
these minnows grow, a slack incumbent will see its dominant 
position erode unless it responds positively with a better product 
offering (including price, quality and variety). In a well functioning 
market, exploitative dominance is naturally self-limiting. In contrast, 
price regulation interferes with this process and has the unfortunate 
side effect of discouraging entry. Furthermore, there are ever-present 
dangers of regulators getting it wrong due to asymmetric 
information and distorted incentives. 
By comparison, the remedies for exclusionary abuse tend to be 
less dangerous to the competitive process. For example, a dominant 
firm may be required to provide access agreements or not to sign 
exclusive contracts. Although these remedies might undermine 
investment incentives if they are wrongly imposed, at least they do 
not undercut the profitability of entry.  
 
b) Possibly mainly due to strategic entry barriers 
 
                                                     
20 See footnote 9. 
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It is possible to distinguish two generic types of entry barrier: 
structural and strategic. A structural barrier is created by natural 
supply and demand conditions in the market; for example, where the 
technology dictates large economies of scale. A strategic barrier is 
created by a dominant firm, which deviates from short-term profit 
maximising behaviour in order to exclude an existing or potential 
rival; for example, signing exclusive contracts that do not 
significantly improve investment incentives. If all barriers to entry 
were strategic and readily prohibited by a focus on exclusionary 
effects, then exploitative behaviour could not last long. Of course, the 
existence of structural barriers in some markets (or unremedied 
strategic barriers in place now or having established current market 
structure in the past) means that exploitation may persist. 
 
c) Harder to prove to the standard required by the Court 
 
For reasons discussed above, it is very difficult to prove that 
prices are excessive, let alone that a dominant firm is falling short in 
terms of quality, variety or innovation. There is an almost complete 
lack of easily observable benchmarks for most dimensions of 
competition, though there may be some loose comparisons to be 
made with related products, internationally or over time. For price, 
at least cost or margin benchmarks can be collected, but there is 
always a problem in deciding what is a reasonable price in relation to 
costs. This is why it is often argued that price negotiations should be 
a matter of freedom of contract between buyer and seller. 
In contrast, it may be easier to prove that rivals or potential rivals 
are being harmed by some exclusionary practice and to identify the 
expected direction of effect on customers (and so eventually on 
consumers). A similar argument can be used in relation to merger 
appraisal, where the direction of effect is also what is primarily at 
stake. Furthermore, in seeking evidence for exclusionary effects, DG 
Comp can rely on the very active help of injured third parties who 
will normally have much more at stake than individuals from a more 
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dispersed customer base at the wrong end of a directly exploitative 
abuse. 
 
d) Politically more difficult to deal with 
 
Two examples illustrate this general point. First, US practice has 
evolved very much in terms of exclusionary effects, which may also 
reflect section 2 of the Sherman Act which prohibits monopolisation. 
It might be argued that, with the emergence of global corporations, it 
would be good to harmonise what competition agencies do. Apart 
from political benefits of avoiding trans-Atlantic disputes, 
harmonisation also provides a clearer signal to firms and so may 
encourage compliance. Second, competition agencies have an 
important advocacy role: competition is good for both consumers 
and firms. If they get this message across, they gain valuable allies, 
creating status and enhancing funding. Firms find it difficult to 
understand why they should not maximise profits, and an 
exploitative abuse by one firm is an opportunity for others. Thus, 
while the business sector gains broadly by ‘exploitation’, rival firms 
are hurt by exclusionary abuses and so support their prohibition. 
Although these are important issues for the most senior 
practitioners, it would be unwise to allow these political side-effects 
to be an agency’s prime concern. 
4.5 The Appropriate Treatment of Exploitative 
Effects under Article 82 
Where does this leave us? Overall, the arguments set out in sections 
4.3 and 4.4 support the view that there is justification for a 
continuing focus on exclusionary abuses. However, it would be 
unwise to dismiss the core paradox I have identified. In the absence 
of a prospective sanction, there are likely to be some cases of 
exploitative abuse that can be remedied without fundamentally 
harming market dynamics. Proof may be difficult, but it is not 
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impossible. Most importantly, some barriers are structural, or the 
result of a history of unnoticed, unprosecuted or ineffectively 
prosecuted exclusionary practices. It is for these cases that provision 
under Article 82 for exploitative abuse should be maintained. 
A similar conclusion has recently been articulated independently 
by Lars-Hendrik Röller (2007) who calls these ‘gap cases’.21 He goes 
on to argue that the key analysis should therefore not be on the high 
prices per se, but on how dominance was achieved. Exploitative 
cases ‘should be based on acquiring a dominant position through 
exclusionary conduct. In this way, exploitative abuse cases are back 
to investigating exclusionary conduct, which is in fact the proper 
way to identify anticompetitive conduct’ (p.9-10). We part company 
on this point, because I do not think it is feasible to focus entirely on 
how a dominant position was attained – this is likely to be lost in the 
mists of history. It would be a substantial distraction, to say the least, 
if guidelines and case law developed such that the main focus of the 
competition inquiry was on past history rather than current and 
continuing exploitation. If the source of dominance could not be 
proved to be past exclusionary behaviour, the Commission would not 
be able to find an abuse that would allow remedies to be put in 
place, for example by imposing conditions to facilitate entry. The 
finding of abuse and the choice of remedy should be kept separate. 
Another advantage of maintaining exploitative effects under 
Article 82 is that it is far better to keep the analysis of economic 
exploitation where it belongs, in a specialist competition agency and 
not in the hands of private actions in non-specialist courts. Specialist 
regulators are not the answer because they are not efficient for areas 
of the economy other than for a few natural monopoly infrastructure 
industries.22 Wherever possible, the remedy should be in the form of 
encouraging expansion or entry to undermine the incumbent 
dominant. The key idea is to use the market to undermine a 
                                                     
21 See also Motta and De Streel in this volume and Vickers (2005). 
22 In this, I disagree with some colleagues on the EAGCP (see earlier quote 
from EAGCP, footnote 7). 
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dominant firm’s incentive to exploit customers. The encouragement 
of customer switching by providing appropriate information may be 
a helpful part of a remedy package. Only as a last resort should price 
regulation be considered. Fines and other punishments should not 
have a role in relation to high prices (except where they are linked to 
exclusionary abuse, which is beyond the current topic).  
Finally, having established this important niche role, it is then 
entirely appropriate for exploitative abuses to be included in any 
Article 82 guidelines. Nevertheless, it must be conceded that the 
prohibition of exploitative high prices should be undertaken only 
with great caution. Ms Kroes is broadly right that the 
implementation of Article 82 to prioritise abuses that affect the 
fundamental process of competition. 
4.6 Wider Consistency of Competition Policy 
This paper has been about a paradox relating to consistency within 
Article 82. While I have highlighted some of the problems of 
punishing high prices, I have stressed the importance of maintaining 
the principle that high prices can be an abuse. Only if an abuse has 
been found can a remedy be applied, and that remedy need not be 
clumsy regulation. It is not unusual to hear the argument that high 
prices should not be considered under Article 82, but should be left 
to specialist regulatory agencies. But on what grounds should sectors 
be selected for price control?  For some sectors, there may be strong 
ex ante grounds for regulation, but other cases will be marginal. It 
will be less restrictive if the latter are given the benefit of the doubt 
with the knowledge that they can be picked up ex post if prices 
become exploitative. The alternative might be to set up regulators 
whenever there is doubt or in response to political pressure.  
This issue of consistency goes wider still. The ECMR revisions 
and guidelines include a more positive attitude to efficiencies. 
Merger analysis now focuses quite rightly on prohibiting (or 
remedying) any merger for which there is an expectation of future 
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high prices and other customer detriment. Article 81(3) includes 
consumer benefit, for example through lower prices, as a necessary 
condition for the exemption of restrictive agreements. There is an 
increasing appreciation that state aid rules should be interpreted by 
the Commission in terms of economic effect. Overall, there is much 
at stake in maintaining the sound principle that exploitative high 
prices are an abuse of dominance under Article 82. They are integral 
to an economic effects based competition policy. 
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5 Should Innovation Rationalize 
Supra-Competitive Prices?  
A Skeptical Speculation 
Timothy J. Brennan* 
Around the world, the core motivation for competition and antitrust 
policy has been to prevent of the creation of monopoly power that 
would lead to higher prices. Laws against price fixing, market 
allocation, and other forms of collusive agreements among 
competitors prevent sellers from subverting the competitive process, 
reducing output, and raising price.1 From market definition through 
assessment of effects, merger policy is designed to prevent a ‚small 
but significant non-transitory increase in price,‛ either through 
increasing unilateral incentives to raise price (as each merged firm 
captures sales that would have been diverted to its partner) or 
facilitating coordinated conduct, i.e., collusion (U.S. Department of 
                                                     
* Professor, Public Policy and Economics, University of Maryland Baltimore 
County; Senior Fellow, Resources for the Future. Email: 
brennan@umbc.edu. I am very grateful for comments and suggestions from 
Mats Bergman, Arvid Fredenberg, Alan Gunderson, Jonas Häckner, Damin 
Neven, Niklas Strand, and especially seminar commenter Tommy Staahl 
Gabrielsen. Opinions and errors remain my sole responsibility. 
1 Not all jurisdictions apply the same tests to whether collusion is 
anticompetitive. The U.S. treats some forms of collusion as per se illegal, 
although practices that may have countervailing benefits are subject to a 
‚rule of reason‛ test. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 
212-14 (1940); NCAA v. Board of Regents of the University of Oklahoma, 
468 U.S. 85, 100-104 (1984). In Canada, illegality requires a showing that 
collusion ‚unduly‛ limits production, enhances price, or otherwise restrains 
competition. Competition Act (R.S., 1985, c. C-34) Sec. 45(1), available at 
http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/showdoc/cs/C-34/bo-ga:l_VI//en#anchorbo-
ga:l_VI. 
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Justice, 1997). Somewhat more controversially, law dealing with 
abuse of dominance or monopolization is also guided by effects on 
consumer welfare, although in addressing those effects by 
preventing harm to rivals, it is often subject to the criticism that it 
serves the interests of competitors rather than competition (Brennan, 
2007). 
As the title of the symposium suggests, the objective is not 
always to minimize price without limit. Most fundamentally, if 
prices are below the competitive equilibrium price, output and total 
welfare fall.2 In the regulatory context, policies to hold prices down 
the regulated firm’s average costs reduce incentives for efficiency 
and increase incentives to provide false information on costs to the 
regulator (Lewis and Sappington, 1988; Brennan, 1989). More 
generally, policies focusing exclusively on holding down price can 
reduce product quality or services. The recent decision in the U.S. to 
remove the century-old per se illegality of resale price agreements 
between wholesalers and retailers was motivated largely by 
economic models showing that maintaining high retail prices can 
provide dealers with incentives to provide point of sale service 
(Telser, 1960) or invest in ensuring product reputation (Marvel and 
McCafferty, 1984).3 
More recently, the focus of competition policy on price has been 
criticized as being shortsighted. The Schumpeterian perspective, 
named after early 20th century economist Joseph Schumpeter, is that 
the important dimension of competition is not in the market at any 
one time, but in providing innovations that replace products (Ellig 
and Lin, 2001; Katz and Shelanski, 2005). Monopoly profits are the 
incentive and reward for this innovation. A common way of 
                                                     
2 Heyer (2006) discusses the merits of the total welfare standard; Werden 
(2007) shows the problems with a consumer welfare standard in 
monopsony cases. 
3 Externalities are not necessarily intrabrand, suggesting that price 
agreements among retailers could have similar motivations, questioning per 
se illegality of ‚naked‛ price fixing (Brennan, 2000). 
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discussing this enforcement myopia is as a contrast between ‚static 
efficiency‛—maximizing surplus by having prices close to marginal 
production costs—and ‚dynamic efficiency‛—promoting economic 
welfare through developing new products and improving the 
quality and reducing the production costs of the products currently 
available. As Audretsch, Baumol and Burke (2001 at 623) put it, 
 
The evolution of industrial economics from its static base to its current 
dynamic form, that recognizes the competition can sometimes be destructive 
and that firm capability plays a major role in determining market performance, 
raises doubts about the efficacy of current competition laws. These concerns 
are exacerbated by the foundation of these laws in the policy implications of 
static analysis. 
 
The very terms imply a contrast being a ‚static‛ stick in the mud 
and a ‚dynamic‛ visionary of the future. It is as if competition law 
enforcers were obsessing with the prices of telegrams, not noticing 
that the world has moved from telephones and email to WiFi and 
iPhones. Moreover, the welfare effects of short-run static harms 
must, almost by definition, pale beside the virtually eternal benefits 
of technological progress through Schumpeterian ‚creative 
destruction.‛ Antitrust may protect present competitors against that 
destruction, but at the expense of future benefits to the economy. In 
this light, even agreements from competitors should be viewed 
benignly (Jorde and Teece, 1992; Lorentzen and Møllgaard, 2006). 
This vision is a powerful one, suggesting a non-interventionist 
approach to antitrust (Hahn, 2001). Gilbert and Tom (2001 at 3) find 
that the U.S. agencies are voicing more concern about the effects of 
innovation, and such concern ‚has been decisive in several merger 
and non-merger enforcement actions that have potentially very 
significant impacts for consumer welfare.‛ In a recent speech, 
Assistant Attorney General Thomas Barnett, the chief U.S. antitrust 
enforcer, emphasized the importance of innovation in contemporary 
competition policy. 
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Competition is important, but a simple model of competition — driving 
price down toward marginal cost — is not enough. If antitrust policy is to 
achieve its long-term goal of increasing consumer welfare, it also needs to 
foster the conditions that shift the supply curve "out." Antitrust policy must 
embrace a more sophisticated model of competition, one that recognizes the 
importance of innovation and other factors that increase efficiency .... 
[A]antitrust enforcers care about efficiency, but should we also care about 
what type of efficiency? The answer is yes, because it turns out that dynamic 
efficiency — particularly leapfrog dynamic efficiency — accounts for the lion's 
share of efficiency/welfare gains<. 
[A]ntitrust enforcers must be careful not to pursue immediate, static 
efficiency gains at the expense of long-term, dynamic efficiency improvements, 
since the latter are likely to create more consumer welfare than the former. 
Accordingly, U.S. enforcers approach practices that bear on innovation 
incentives with something close to the medical principle of ‚first, do no harm.‛ 
(Barnett, 2007 at 6, 8, 16)4 
 
Whether a new view of antitrust policy is required is the subject 
of this paper. Our purpose is to suggest that antitrust policy ought 
not be affected by these arguments about the primacy of dynamic 
efficiency. It is important to note that what the basis for this 
suggestion is not. It is not (necessarily) that creating structural and 
behavioral market conditions that reduce prices in the short run 
promote innovation in the long run, or in short, that competition is 
inevitably good for innovation and the tension is illusory. Short-run 
competition and longer-run innovation may well be complementary 
in some circumstances, but we do not presume that always to be so. 
Nor is it that, conversely, the engine of innovation is so powerful that 
public policy cannot affect its performance. Policy, antitrust or 
otherwise, can matter. 
A speculation that the recent focus on innovation and the concern 
that antitrust may stand in its way may be exaggerated, rests on a 
simple intuition. One need not weaken antitrust to promote 
                                                     
4 I thank David Balto for distributing AAG Barnett’s speech to the ABA 
Antitrust Section email list. 
92 
innovation; policy makers could turn multiple instruments available 
to influence the rate of innovation. The most notable tool is the 
length and breadth of intellectual property (IP) rights. The 
government may also turn to other incentive systems, such as prizes 
(Scotchmer, 2004 at 41-46; Macauley, 2005) to induce innovation. 
Moreover, if the dynamic rationale is correct, it should not be 
employed by accident, i.e., in only those sectors where firms happen 
to collude or merge, or where a single firm engages in potentially 
illegal monopolization or abuse of dominance. Finding that 
competition and static efficiency is the culprit suggests not only that 
antitrust enforcement should be weakened, but that industries 
should be made less competitive, sacrificing static efficiency to 
promote innovation as well. 
This suggestion is not derived from a model with 
unchallengeable assumptions. Rather, it is a suggestion to counter 
any rush to judge conventional antitrust enforcement as trivial or 
passé. To elaborate on this theme, we begin by first investigating 
reasons why dynamic efficiencies are thought to dwarf static effects. 
We then turn to three leading arguments for why nominally 
conventional competition law enforcement neglects or undervalues 
dynamic considerations. Looking at the Microsoft case helps to 
examine two claims regarding the relationship between antitrust and 
innovation. First, it exemplifies that difficult dynamic cases about the 
path of future innovation ought not be reduced to or recast as static 
monopolization cases regarding competition in markets for current 
products. In addition, the broader context of the case illustrates the 
proposition that innovation considerations need not weaken 
enforcement; they could rationalize cases that static considerations 
might not warrant. 
The penultimate section invokes a number of arguments, most 
but not all originating outside the intellectual property context, for 
suggesting that antitrust enforcement ought not be weakened in 
order to promote innovative activity. We conclude with a reminder 
that competition enforcement should take future markets into 
account when theory and evidence warrant. How best to do that 
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(e.g., whether to define ‚innovation market‛) and what 
concentration standards to use fittingly remain as uncertain as the 
outcome of research and development activity in a modern economy. 
Present practice, which places on defendants the burden to show that 
efficiencies outweigh harms from anticompetitive conduct, provides 
a reasonable guide for practice even when those efficiencies are 
dynamic rather than static. Making that showing will be empirically 
difficult and, because it entails conceding the static allegations, 
unlikely. 
5.1 Arguments for the triviality of static concerns  
5.1.1 Going back to Williamson 
Recent attention to a tradeoff between static and dynamic 
considerations seems to be an outgrowth of the ascendance in recent 
decades of high technology in the economy, particularly digital 
computing and telecommunications, its supporting technologies 
(e.g., large scale semiconductors), and in other fields, advances in 
pharmaceuticals (Audretsch et. al., 2001, Evans and Schmalensee, 
2001; Hahn, 2001; López, 2001; Katz and Shelanski, 2005; Gual, 2007). 
However, the notion of such a tradeoff goes back nearly forty years 
in the antitrust literature. Williamson (1968) first showed that a 
relatively small reduction in costs created by a merger could produce 
welfare gains exceeding the losses from an increase in price 
associated with that merger. 
To see his result, approximate the percentage loss in output Q, 
ΔQ/Q, as ε*ΔP/P+, where ε is the absolute value of the elasticity of 
demand and P is the price. Let C be marginal cost and ΔC the cost 
saving. If c = ΔC/C and p = ΔP/P, then welfare rises from a merger 
that reduces cost and competition if and only if 
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For example, if the price increase p is 10% and the demand elasticity 
is 1 in absolute value, then it takes a marginal cost reduction of only 
about .56% to enhance welfare overall. The aphorism among 
antitrust economists is that ‚triangles are smaller than rectangles.‛ 
The welfare ‚triangle‛ loss from an increase in price results only 
from the output lost from the price increase, and that the welfare loss 
is only on average half of the lost surplus. On the ‚rectangle‛ side, 
the gains from a cost reduction are reaped over all of the output still 
being produced.  
The tradeoff is not quite as favorable if the market was not 
competitive before the merger. If PCM is the pre-merger price-cost 
margin [P – C]/P, then a merger with cost reductions increases 
welfare only if  
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If the pre-merger PCM were 20% and the other parameters the same 
as in the text, costs would have to fall 2.56% for the merger to 
increase welfare 
One gets a similar result if the benefit of the merger—or collusion 
or other anticompetitive conduct5—is an increase in product quality. 
To see this, hold production cost constant. Define P, Q, and ΔQ as 
above, and let q = ΔQ/Q. With an increase in product quality, 
reflected in value by an increase in willingness to pay (WTP), prices 
can be rise as a result of the nominally anticompetitive activity, but 
ΔQ, the reduction in output from the activity, could be negative, i.e., 
                                                     
5 How best to characterize other anticompetitive conduct, particularly 
exclusionary conduct classified as ‚monopolization‛ under U.S. antitrust 
law and ‚abuse of dominance‛ elsewhere, is controversial (Brennan, 2007). 
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output could increase. If so, welfare unambiguously rises. If not, the 
condition for whether welfare falls depends on the average increase 
in WTP for the quality increase over the sales that take place after the 
merger or other antitrust event. Define that average WTP as S, and 
let s = S/P be that increase as a fraction of the original price.  
Welfare increases, even if output falls, if 
   s > ½
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This expression is identical to the condition for a cost reduction, 
since in that setting q = p.6 Thus, the likelihood that the benefit from 
a dynamic effect—here product quality—exceeds the static welfare 
loss from the output reduction, if there even is one. 
5.1.2 Static as short-run; dynamic as long-run 
The position of the proponents of the relative triviality of static 
concerns likely has to do explicitly with the short-run nature of an 
anticompetitive welfare loss versus the long-run nature of the gains 
from innovation. However one models the comparison, the 
fundamental argument regarding the static/dynamic tradeoff would, 
at its core, resemble the following: Let WL be the welfare loss from 
allowing anticompetitive conduct, which could be prevented with 
antitrust enforcement.7 Let IG be the net innovation gain that might 
accrue if that welfare loss is allowed to take.8 Define r > 0 as the 
                                                     
6 Here, the change in price is not a shift along a demand curve, because the 
demand curve itself changes with the change in willingness to pay.  
7 Enforcement is here assumed costless both administratively and in other 
side effects to the economy; with enforcement, the gross benefit is 0, and the 
net benefit is avoidance of WL. 
8 For ease of exposition, I do not model R&D expenses explicitly. 
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discount rate, in that a dollar worth of benefits in year t is worth e-rt 
dollars today. Finally, let be the probability that an innovation 
generating benefits IG at time T would take place if competition 
enforcement allowed the welfare loss to take place. In this scenario, 
until time T, the economy suffers the welfare loss WL. With 
probability 1 – , WL exists in perpetuity. 
The risk of a welfare loss from not enforcing competition laws in 
order to achieve a possible future innovation gain is worth taking if 
the gains exceed the losses.  
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This inequality holds if and only if 
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This relationship supports a number of intuitions. The size of the 
innovation gain relative to the welfare loss necessary to warrant non-
enforcement increases with the discount rate r and the time T until 
the innovation takes place (the present value of the innovation gain 
falls), and also as the likelihood of the innovation () falls. If 
innovation is certain and immediate ( = 1, T = 0), any positive 
innovation gain justifies non-enforcement. If r = 0 (no discounting), 
the minimum IG/WL is 1/ – 1, which with  = .25 would be 3. 
A more significant gain dynamic efficiency proponents could 
invoke is that the innovation gain itself would grow exponentially 
while the welfare loss would not. Let s be the rate of growth in the 
innovation gain over time, once IG is achieved at time T with 
probability  after incurring constant welfare loss WL. The condition 
for expected dynamic efficiencies to outweigh static costs becomes 
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The effect of growth in the innovation gain is to reduce the size of 
the innovation gain IG necessary to justify non-enforcement, 
incurring the welfare loss WL, by the factor [r - s]/r. This effect could 
be dramatic, in that as s approaches r, IG/WL could become less than 
1. IG at any time could initially be below WL, but the prospect of its 
growth justifies non-enforcement. If s > r, the present value of the 
gains from innovation would be infinite, eliminating any justification 
for antitrust for any finite welfare loss. 
This is clearly a simplistic and extreme case, in that the 
representation is biased in favor of dynamic benefits simply by 
applying a growth rate to innovation gains that is not applied to 
welfare losses. Even with that, however, these arguments require an 
implicit causation—that for the innovation gain to be realized, the 
welfare loss has to occur. We consider three such (non-mutually 
exclusive) hypotheses below.  
5.2 “Static” perfection as the enemy of the 
“dynamic” good: Three hypotheses  
5.2.1 Innovation requires monopoly profit 
One hypothesis is that it is the monopoly profit that secures the 
incentive and ability to innovate. This is not a special argument; it is 
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largely the rationale for granting exclusive patent rights. However, 
as noted recently in a U.S. Supreme Court decision,9 a patent in and 
of itself does not convey the market power necessary for monopoly 
profits; for example, there may be patented or non-patented 
substitutes. A second is that the profits are necessary not just as an 
inducement but as an input, because of imperfections in capital 
markets due to asymmetric information between the borrowers (who 
know the prospects for success) and lenders (who do not).10  
The question is whether antitrust enforcement itself could 
constrain profits that might otherwise stimulate innovation. Segal 
and Whinston (2007) offer a recent model addressing just this 
question. They posit an incumbent and an entrant. At any given 
period, the entrant (but not the incumbent) decides how much R&D 
to undertake, with the probability of success a concave function of 
the expenditure. If the entrant succeeds, it first gets to compete with 
the monopolist in the present period, and gets to be the monopolist 
in the next period, with the game starting over, retaining the same 
parameters for R&D cost and monopoly profit.  
Antitrust enforcement determines the degree to which the 
incumbent can otherwise deter an entrant with successful with R&D 
from entering. (How that determination is made is outside the 
model.) This has two effects on the incentive to undertake R&D. 
Enforcement can increase the profitability to the entrant of first 
period competition with the incumbent if the entrant’s R&D is 
successful, increasing the incentive for R&D. In the other direction, 
enforcement reduces the profitability of being an incumbent, 
reducing the reward for successful R&D.  
                                                     
9 Illinois Tool Works Inc. et. al. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. ___ (2006), 
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/04-1329.pdf. 
10 This is akin to arguments for failures in the market for student loans and, 
in the competition context, as arguments for why a prior deep pocket may 
be necessary to fund short-term losses from predatory pricing (e.g., Bolton 
and Sharfstein, 1990). 
99 
With these as the two effects, it is not surprising that antitrust 
enforcement can promote or discourage innovation. The model 
presumes that the present value of the increase in profits to an 
entrant in the first period exceeds the expected losses in profits if that 
entrant’s innovation were to succeed and it became the incumbent 
monopolist in the second period. The model at least suggests, if not 
directly implies, that one would get maximum innovation if the 
firms were allowed to maximize their discounted profits together, 
e.g., collude. 
The model suffers from a number of limitations. It is highly 
stylized, with innovation doing little more than switch the identity of 
the incumbent and entrant. Product pricing and consumer welfare 
are not modeled, so the model provides no insight as to whether 
additional innovation is worth the cost or is more akin to a wasteful 
patent race.11 Only the entrant undertakes R&D in the model, so the 
possibility of defensive innovation by an incumbent to pre-empt 
competition from an entrant either by beating the entrant to the next 
innovation (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982) or filling up the space of 
products (Schmalensee, 1978) is not included.12  
5.2.2 Innovation requires monopoly structure 
A hypothesis with longer standing in economics is that a monopoly 
market structure is necessary to promote innovation. Monopoly 
structure creates monopoly profits, necessary for providing an 
incentive for investment, as just noted. A second argument, more on 
efficiency of innovation rather than output itself, is that multiple 
                                                     
11 It is for this reason that the optimal outcome is collusion, since only the 
rate of innovation matters. 
12 Gilbert (2007) looks at claims that innovation is itself anticompetitive, e.g., 
predatory, and concludes that the high costs of deterring beneficial 
innovation suggest that innovation should be legal unless a ‚sham,‛ i.e., has 
no plausible efficiencies. 
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seekers of R&D will dissipate the benefits of R&D through wasteful 
patent races (Scotchmer, 2004 at 112-14); the prospect of being the 
loser in such a race may lead (particularly risk averse) firms from 
participating in the game.  
Likely most important is that a monopoly structure may facilitate 
the appropriation of returns for investment in innovation (Levin et. 
al., 1987).13 Fences around intellectual property have holes, some of 
which are intentional features of the design. For example, to obtain a 
patent in the U.S., an applicant must make available to the public the 
details of the design of the product or process for which one is 
staking a claim. Hence, others may be able to make use of the ideas 
to come up with non-infringing designs. Perhaps the most important 
by-product of disclosure is the simple removal of the barrier of 
imagining that a product or process doing the claimed task could be 
developed. Moreover, the validity of the claim is itself uncertain 
(Lemley and Shapiro, 2005), even if granted by the patent office, 
leading to potential leakage. Efforts to respond to that uncertainty by 
settling suits by X that Y infringed X’s patent or from Y that X’s 
patent is invalid are controversial, viewed by their opponents as 
extending patent rights through collusion (Shapiro, 2003) and by 
their supporters as reducing litigation (McDonald, 2003).14  
Katz and Shelanski (2006) provide a useful review of the research 
in the context of merger enforcement. The theoretical controversy 
                                                     
13 This underlies the argument that R&D requires scale economies, which 
may be inconsistent with a competitive market structure. While the 
outcome of R&D may be scale economies because the intellectual property 
is a fixed input into a production process, scale economies are not 
necessarily a precursor for innovation absent the inability to appropriate 
returns or one of the other causes listed in the text.  
14 The courts in the U.S. have ruled against the antitrust enforcement 
agencies and in favor of those advocating a permissive stance toward 
settlements. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056 (11th Cir. 2005), 
cert denied; In Re Tamoxifen Citrate Antitrust Litigation, 429 F.3d. 370 (2d 
Cir. 2005). 
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arises because competition can also be a spur to innovation (Baker, 
2007). Arrow (1962) noted that competitive industries might be more 
innovative as far as cost reductions are concerned because they have 
a greater level of output over which cost reductions may be realized. 
In addition, all else equal, the marginal profit to a monopolist from 
innovating in its own market will be less than that of a firm in a 
competitive market, since the former loses its monopoly profit while 
the latter suffers no such loss. On the other hand, if the monopolist 
retains a monopoly if it innovates while an entrant faces duopolistic 
competition with the monopolist if it succeeds, the monopolist has a 
greater incentive to innovate since monopoly profits exceed duopoly 
profits, and may in fact spend too much on innovation simply to 
protect its monopoly (Gilbert and Newbery, 1982).  
Because of theoretical controversies, this is an empirical question. 
As Katz and Shelanski’s recent review points out—see also Gual 
(2007)—the dominant empirical finding has been that innovation as 
least likely with atomistic and monopolistic market structures, and 
more likely with some oligopolistic concentration in-between, taking 
an ‚inverted U‛ shape. However, reverse causation (innovation 
potential determines concentration levels) or mutual causation 
(factors such as technological opportunity may be correlated with 
concentration and innovation) render empirical findings a poor 
guide. One should infer cautiously, if at all, that as a general rule 
allowing concentration would promote innovation.  
Caution is also warranted for at least a second reason. Most 
discussions of innovation proceed from the presumption that more 
innovation is always better than less. These need not be the case; the 
economic question should be whether at the margin the benefits 
from increased innovation exceed the costs. The answer could be 
negative for at least three reasons. Two, patent races and preemptive 
patenting to deter entry, have been noted. A third is that the rewards 
for entry, through innovation or any other expenditure of fixed costs, 
may come from transferring profits from incumbents, without any 
gain in social welfare (Mankiw and Whinston, 1986). It is possible 
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that even if otherwise anticompetitive market structures promote 
innovation, they may not promote efficiency.15 
5.2.3 Innovation is promoted by higher prices for 
substitutes  
A third possibility is that when two products are partial but not 
necessarily close substitutes, the low prices produced by competition 
in one market can impede innovation in a market for a relatively 
distant substitute.16 The idea is that competition for X, by reducing 
the price of X, reduces demand for Y. This reduced demand for Y in 
turn reduces incentives to innovate in the market for Y. Hence, if one 
wants more innovation in Y, one should resist competition policies 
or other policies that would lead to lower prices for X. A recent 
specific argument along these lines, trading off low prices against 
innovation, has arisen in policy contexts, particularly with regard to 
Canadian telecommunications. Quigley and Sanderson (2005) argued 
that a cost of strict regulation of voice telephone pricing in Canada 
was responsible for a failure of innovation in wireless telephony. The 
evidence for the proposition was that Canada ranked third from the 
bottom among 24 OECD countries in the rate of innovation in 
wireless telecommunications. 
This study may be faulted on a number of grounds. One could 
interpret a finding that Canada was third from the bottom in 
telecommunications as a statement about how much more efficient 
Canada provides wire-based telephone service compared to other 
                                                     
15 I thank Tommy Staahl Gabrielsen for making this observation at the Pros 
and Cons seminar. 
16 I am being somewhat imprecise with the term ‚market‛ here. The idea is 
that a lower price of A may reduce the returns to innovation in B. It need 
not imply that providers of A would be in the same relevant antitrust 
market as set out in merger guidelines (e.g., U.S. Department of Justice, 
1997), were two firms in B to merge.  
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OECD countries. The lack of market penetration in Canada may have 
something to do with a less competitive market structure in wireless, 
with two firms dominating the Canadian market verses the four or 
more active participants in many U.S. cities. Finally, in a market with 
innovators around the world, the likelihood that Canadian 
telecommunications policy affects rate of innovation is unlikely, 
perhaps for anything beyond specifically clever ways to market 
wireless service to Canadians.17  
Although the specifics of this claim may be questioned, the 
proposition that low prices in one market may be stifle innovation in 
another cannot be dismissed as a matter of theory. However, note 
that it contradicts the above two arguments for suggesting that 
competition is opposed to innovation. The ‚theory of the second 
best‛ says that if the price in one market is too low, prices of 
substitutes should be too low as well. Applied here, if the price of X 
is too low because it depresses innovation in Y, then because Y is a 
substitute, the ‚second best‛ (or perhaps ‚first best‛) policy to 
eliminate a distortion leading to inefficiently low innovation would 
be to reduce the price of Y. Note that this is in direct opposition to the 
other arguments, which are that increasing the price of Y increases the 
incentive to innovate, by increasing either present profits that could 
fund innovation or prospective profits that would induce it. This 
suggests that the advocates of weakening policies designed to ensure 
that markets are more competitive, either in action or outcome, may 
not be taking consistent positions. One would want innovation to be 
a substantive justification for weakening competition enforcement, 
not a rhetorical excuse.  
                                                     
17 For an example of innovative marketing with specifically Canadian 
appeal, see the Bell Canada ‚Frank and Gordon‛ beavers advertising 
campaign. Videos of the television advertisements are not available, but 
images are on the Bell Canada website, http://www.bell.ca/home/.  
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5.3 Implementation lessons from Microsoft cases 
One reason to be more cautious regarding conventional antitrust 
enforcement when the rate of innovation may be at stake is that 
dealing directly with innovation in antitrust is not easy. The U.S. 
antitrust case against Microsoft offers some useful guidance. It 
provides some insight into the pitfalls of reducing a case about 
future innovation to an essentially static framework regarding 
exclusion of rivals from present software markets. It also provides a 
hypothetical framework to illustrate that when innovation is taken 
into account, some mergers that might seem innocent may be 
problematic. The prospects for innovation could make parties 
competitors in the future even if they appear to be in separate 
markets at present.  
5.3.1 Monopolization: Hard dynamic cases cannot be 
disguised as easy static cases  
Evans and Schmalensee (2001 at 4) have described the U.S. Microsoft 
monopolization case as ‚the leading antitrust case involving a new-
economy industry,‛ where ‚the defining feature of a new-economy 
industries is a competitive process dominated by efforts to create 
intellectual property through R&D, which often results in rapid and 
disruptive technological change.‛ They (2001 at 2) contrast these 
with ‚old-economy industries,‛ in which ‚competition takes place 
primarily through traditional price/output competition in the market 
and through incremental innovation, not through efforts to create 
drastic—market-destroying—innovations *emphasis in original+.‛ In 
their view, the Microsoft case was a mistaken attempt to interfere in 
a Schumpeterian process of competition through successive 
innovation, driven by the monopoly profits that would be temporary 
at best.  
The government plaintiffs in the U.S. case portrayed Microsoft as 
engaged in a practice to stifle this kind of successive innovation 
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(Brennan, 2001). The threat to Microsoft’s monopoly in personal 
computer operating systems came from Netscape’s web browser. 
Combined with the Java applications support software, Netscape 
could, on this account, provide an alternative to Microsoft as a 
platform on which applications would be run. The applications 
would not be stored on the user’s computer; rather, they would be 
accessed as needed through an Internet connection to the servers on 
which they resided.  
A monopolization case along these lines would have been a 
valuable contribution, not just to the specifics of antitrust law, but in 
clarifying how the complex issues surrounding dynamic competition 
can usefully be incorporated into competition policy. Such a case, 
however, would have required evidence to establish a number of 
propositions, each inherently difficult because of its dynamic nature 
(Brennan, 2004). A first would be to define and identify competitive 
circumstances in the future relevant market for application platforms 
in which successors of Microsoft and Netscape would compete in the 
future, as they were not presently direct competitors in operating 
systems. Perhaps other technologies, such as smart phones or 
broadband access devices, might offer services consumers would 
view as similar.  
If that were established, one would then need to define the chain 
of events in which presence in the market at the time the case was 
litigated would create a competitive advantage in participating in the 
market. Depending on how that market would function, this 
competitive advantage could be in a Schumpeterian competition for 
the market or by developing simultaneous competitive presences in 
that market. With that route established, one would then need to 
show that the then Microsoft and Netscape offerings were 
sufficiently important routes to that presence that joint control over 
both, or elimination of one, would lead to monopolization of that 
future application platform market.  
The phrase ‚would have‛ is appropriate because the case did not 
follow that path. Instead, the plaintiffs opted for a static case based 
narrowly on Microsoft’s alleged efforts to impede Netscape’s ability 
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to distribute its browser (Brennan, 2007, 442-44). An indication of the 
static nature of this approach is that the market in which Microsoft 
held a monopoly was defined by the plaintiffs to be ‚Intel-based PC 
operating systems,‛ a product that Netscape did not provide and, on 
a dynamic account, was never going to provide.18 In effect, the 
plaintiffs showed at most that Microsoft monopolized the market for 
distributing browsers, impeding Netscape’s market presence to the 
benefit of Microsoft’s Internet Explorer browser. 
This reduction of a difficult dynamic case to an easy static case 
had at least three consequences. First is the foregone opportunity to 
clarify how monopolization or abuse of dominance law should work 
in dynamic or ‚new-economy‛ industries characterized by 
Schumpeterian competition. Second, avoiding the hard work of a 
dynamic case undercut the basis for consequential relief, e.g., forcing 
Microsoft to divest or grant independent development control over 
its browser. Instead, the plaintiffs had no basis for relief beyond 
elimination of the contracts that gave Microsoft control over the 
market for browser distribution outlets. Third is that allegations 
involving control over distribution of other forms of software, e.g., 
media players, are held (by some commentators)19 to an 
inappropriate dynamic standard, when they should be brought only 
as straightforward static exclusion cases.20  
                                                     
18 A separate question outside the scope of this paper is the degree to which 
it is helpful in a monopolization case to prove that the alleged monopolizer 
already possessed market power prior to undertaking the alleged 
anticompetitive conduct (Brennan, 2001; 2007). 
19 Evans and Schmalensee (2001) fall on one side, Ayres and Nalebuff (2005) 
on the other.  
20 This is not to pass judgment on the factual support for such cases and the 
weight of countervailing efficiency arguments. The observation concerns 
only the nature of the case, not its merits. 
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5.3.2 Mergers: Innovation need not reduce the 
justification for intervention 
The intuition behind the view that dynamic innovation reduces the 
need for concern with static market power in monopolization cases 
would presumably extend to mergers. The models sketched above, 
which elicited some conditions when a long-run gain from 
innovation would outweigh a short-run loss, was derived from 
analyses of the tradeoffs between efficiencies and welfare losses in 
merger cases. Together, these suggest that innovation may justify 
less attention to mergers in two related ways.21 First, the potential for 
innovation may mean that the process of defining and identifying 
participants in a relevant market may be but a snapshot neglecting 
the possibility that other firms are likely to come up with goods and 
services that compete with those offered by present providers. 
Second, even if the snapshot is accurate, the competitive effects of the 
merger may be limited because innovation will accelerate entry in 
response to any attempt to significantly increase price. 
These intuitions that innovation makes mergers less troublesome 
need not hold in general. An initial consideration is that innovation 
may lead to gross substitutes—new goods and services that lead 
many consumers to drop old ones—but not marginal substitutes, 
where the degree of shifting depends upon the prices of the old 
products. The former may change the size of the market, by shifting 
demand to the new product. It need not change the degree to which 
a merger among providers of the old product, which is essentially a 
function of the (in)elasticity of demand, not its magnitude.22  
                                                     
21 The following discussion comes from informal work done for the 
Canadian Competition Bureau during 2006, while I served as the T.D. 
MacDonald Chair in Industrial Economics. These views do not necessarily 
reflect those of the Bureau, the Commissioner of Competition, or any of her 
staff. 
22 Formally, let q(p, z) be the demand for product q at price p, where z 
represents a demand shift parameter reflecting the attractiveness of 
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Television and radio provide a useful illustration. The innovation 
that created the former undoubtedly depressed demand for the 
latter, but those who still demand radios are probably sufficient 
resistance to price changes to make collusion or monopolization of 
that market profitable. A merger that would create a monopolist 
over radios would be unlikely to pass the scrutiny of competition 
law enforcers simply because there are televisions.23  
Aside from care regarding the difference between gross and 
marginal substitutes, taking innovation into account could make 
mergers more problematic rather than less. The arguments are 
                                                                                                                           
substitutes, implying both qp and qz are negative. The elasticity of demand at 
price p, e(p, z), is qpp/q. Demand becomes less elastic at p with an increase in 
z, the attractiveness of substitutes, if ez > 0 (elasticity falls in absolute value). 
This holds if, holding p constant,  
  
q
q
q
q z
p
pz
 , 
i.e., the slope of the demand curve falls in percentage terms more than the 
change in demand from the entry of the gross substitute. An example where 
this holds equality, i.e., ez = 0, is when 
  
bz
pa
q

 , 
where entry of a gross substitute rotates the demand curve around the 
intercept on the price axis. Intuitively, if gross substitutes take a greater 
share of demand from those with low reservation prices for the product 
than from those with higher reservation prices, a gross substitute would 
make demand less elastic despite demand falling overall, and thus could 
make a merger more problematic, not less.  
23 It remains to be seen whether at a small scale the proposed merger of the 
two North American satellite radio providers, XM Radio and Sirius, will 
escape opposition because of the presence of competition from both old 
technology (conventional radio) and new (Internet radio, iPods and music 
downloads). For contrasting perspectives, see Sidak (2007) opposing the 
merger and Hazlett (2007) in favor of allowing it to proceed. Both authors 
note that their work was financially supported by parties to the merger or 
interested in its outcome. 
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parallel to those supplying the intuition that innovation may make 
otherwise troublesome mergers benign. With regard to market 
definition, innovation may put firms that presently do not offer 
substitutes into the same market, converting an apparently non-
horizontal merger into one where competition may be suppressed. 
With regard to the effect on competition, innovation may be a 
dimension beyond other than raising prices or reducing output 
where competition may be suppressed.24 
The Microsoft case provides an indirect example of these 
possibilities. Assume that the theoretical basis for the plaintiffs’ case 
was sound, i.e., that Microsoft and Netscape would be competing 
against each other either in a future application platform market, 
either simultaneously or to become the dominant platform as 
Windows had been up to the time the case was filed. However, 
instead of Microsoft allegedly trying to drive Netscape out of the 
market in the late 1990s, suppose that Microsoft and Netscape had 
proposed a merger in the mid 1990s.25 To make the example cleaner, 
suppose that Microsoft had not developed Internet Explorer, so there 
was no issue of an existing horizontal merger among browsers.  
                                                     
24 We do not here address the controversy of whether the best way to 
analyze effects on innovation is through the use of ‚innovation markets‛ 
(Gilbert and Sunshine, 1995). U.S. enforcement agencies take this approach, 
while the Canadian Competition Bureau has explicitly rejected it, stating 
that any effects on innovation will show up as reduced output or higher 
prices in specified product markets (Canadian Competition Bureau, 2000 at 
11). The underlying economics are not in dispute; the question is primarily 
which approach will lead to the least error from false positives (blocked 
mergers that are benign) and false negatives (allowed mergers that are 
harmful) in the legal and administrative process for determining which 
mergers can proceed. López (2001) offers a stronger critique of ‚innovation 
markets‛ based on a view that industry dynamism renders antitrust 
inefficient.  
25 A recent report on mergers and innovation prepared for the Canadian 
Competition Bureau employed this hypothetical (Tupperman and 
Sanderson, 2007, n. 48 and accompanying text.). 
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From a static perspective, this merger presents no apparent 
problems, as it would be vertical (operating systems and browsers), 
and given scale economies and network externalities in both 
markets, likely would mitigate double marginalization (Tirole, 1988 
at 174-76). From a dynamic perspective, according to the case, things 
appear much different. The prospect of innovation in browsers and 
application support software, along with complementary 
developments in higher speed Internet connections, would make 
these two enterprises future participants in the application program 
market. Despite static appearances, they may well have been in the 
same (future) relevant antitrust market, and the merger could have 
created a monopoly in that market. On the effects side, the merger 
might have slowed down independent innovation efforts on the part 
of Netscape to establish a server-based application sector and on 
Microsoft’s part to improve its operating systems to keep customers 
using desktop-resident programs.  
In either case, if the concerns motivating the monopolization case 
were justified, potential software innovation would have turned a 
seemingly benign and perhaps efficient vertical merger into a 
problematic horizontal merger. Innovation, thus, is a two-way street. 
It may render static concerns trivial, but it may establish dynamic 
concerns that a static analysis may miss. 
5.4 Looking outside antitrust non-enforcement to 
promote innovation 
The Microsoft-based examples concern how antitrust practice might 
need to be adjusted to take innovation into account. They do not 
address the core claim that antitrust impedes innovation by 
restricting profits, preventing market concentration, or inhibiting 
high prices. One cannot disprove the contention on its face, 
especially in light of results suggesting that market-wide cost saving 
or long-term innovation gains can significantly outweigh direct or 
short-run welfare losses from higher prices. These arguments do not 
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in and of themselves prove that weakening antitrust is a desirable 
tactic for addressing putative shortages in innovation. To understand 
why one might think otherwise, one can turn to insights from 
macroeconomics and the economics of law, as well as intellectual 
property and industrial organization.  
5.4.1 Multiple objectives; multiple tools 
One of the fundamental lessons of macroeconomics, derived from 
basic linear algebra, is that addressing N policy objectives requires N 
policy instruments. From textbook examples, if all one wants to do is 
reduce unemployment, one could rely solely on fiscal policy, e.g., 
increasing government spending to boost demand. On the other 
hand, if one is concerned also with inflation, one needs to tend to the 
money supply. Concerns with exchange rates or foreign borrowing 
introduce provide reasons for treating the size of the deficit as a 
separate objective from the size of public spending. Yet another 
policy goal, the provision of public goods requires attention to how 
that spending is allocated. 
The argument that competition law enforcement fails to take 
innovation seriously, suffers from a failure to learn this lesson. It 
neglects the possibility that there are multiple policy objectives. One 
is to maximize short-run economic welfare through protecting 
against anticompetitive collusion, mergers, exclusion, or predation. 
A second is to promote the efficient level of innovation. The 
analytical failure of the ‚new economy‛ critics is to neglect the 
possibility of applying a separate, second instrument to achieve this 
objective without necessarily impeding the goals of antitrust 
enforcement. 
The obvious such instrument is intellectual property policy itself. 
Patent law in particular has at least third dimensions on which it 
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might be strengthened (Scotchmer, 2004).26 One is the duration of the 
protection afforded by the patent, presently in the U.S. generally 
twenty years from the time of first filing. A second is the breadth of 
the patent in the metaphorical ‚product space,‛ increasing the 
degree of differentiation necessary for a succeeding invention to not 
infringe the prior patent. A third would be to extend coverage of 
patents, reducing the standard for novelty and non-obviousness 
necessary to obtain a monopoly over production.  
Extending patent protection is not a perfect remedy. To the extent 
that subsequent innovations require access to prior ones, policies to 
increase the scope of patents today could reduce the supply of 
patents tomorrow (Scotchmer, 2004 at ch. 5). In addition, in many 
sectors of the economy, patent protection is a relatively unimportant 
device for engendering innovative activity; as first mover 
advantages, trademarks, and difficulty in reverse engineering all 
may play more important roles (Levin, et. al., 1987). In addition, 
other instruments for promoting innovative activity exist, including 
investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation and, as noted above, 
prizes. Before one decides to weaken antitrust to secure innovation, 
one might examine IP laws or other policy tools to see if they are 
systematically providing too little incentive consistent with 
protecting competition.  
5.4.2 Buchanan and Stubblebine, following Coase 
If patent law and other IP laws are providing optimal incentives to 
innovate, or to the extent that one is unable to make a plausible case 
that they provide too little protection on a systematic basis, 
distorting competition enforcement will not only produce static 
inefficiency, but will over-reward innovation. Ideally, IP laws 
provide incentives so that the expected marginal social benefit from 
                                                     
26 For a general discussion of why intellectual property is an attenuated 
rather than expansive form of property protection, see Brennan (1993). 
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more innovation just equals its marginal cost. If antitrust is 
weakened to stimulate more innovation, an economy will end up 
with too much of its resources devoted to innovative activity. 
This insight arises from one of the earliest observations in the 
modern study of the economics of law. Coase (1960) showed that, 
contrary to the then standard view that externalities required 
ameliorating taxes, agents in an economy could achieve efficient 
outcomes as long as there were no costs to undertaking the 
transactions necessary to get to those outcomes. Buchanan and 
Stubblebine (1962) subsequently showed that if transaction costs are 
sufficiently low for parties to achieve efficient outcomes, a tax on the 
putative externality would distort the costs and benefits facing the 
Coasian negotiators, distorting the outcome.27 The lesson is for 
competition policy in the innovation context is the opposite of the 
‚theory of the second best‛: If one market is not distorted, one 
should not distort another in an effort to compensate.  
5.4.3 IP analytical practicality 
A third consideration, albeit perhaps more methodological than 
empirical, arises in how to undertake theoretical assessments of 
changes to IP rules. Suppose, for example, that one wanted to look at 
the effects of changes to fair use policies. A relevant exercise would 
be to look in a static way at changes in the behavior of buyers and 
                                                     
27 In their analysis of compulsory copyright licenses, Besen, Manning, and 
Mitchell (1978) showed that if the ‚tax‛ is paid directly to one of the 
negotiators, Coasian negotiators could negate the effects of the tax and 
achieve an efficient solution. Economic harm of an extraneous compulsory 
license requires high transaction costs. Such transaction costs, however, 
could justify having legislatures or courts set prices. ‚Fair use‛ policies that 
allow free uses of intellectual property in specific contexts may be viewed 
as responses to transaction costs exceeding the benefit of setting a positive 
price (Gordon, 1982; Brennan, 1986). 
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sellers in the market for intellectual property when one moves from 
positive to zero prices (Brennan, 2005). That exercise may be difficult 
enough. But one could, in principle, extend the analysis to the entire 
IP enterprise. One could look at fair use rules or other policies not 
just in terms of their effect on the market at hand, but also in terms of 
the overall rate of innovation. 
This is analytically impractical and likely to lead to poor policy 
making. To look at specific aspects of IP policy, one should as a 
methodological matter treat the overall scheme of IP as efficient, and 
focus on first-best adjustments in the policy context at hand. The 
matter is not just one of analytical convenience, but of efficient policy 
making. To do otherwise is, in effect, to use some relatively specific 
policy—fair use, taxing recording media (Brennan, 1988)—as a 
means to change the overall structure of IP. If one thinks that IP 
rights are insufficient or excessive, one could address that problem 
directly by extending or reducing the duration of the patent or its 
coverage in product space.  
Recall Adam Smith’s famous observation that ‚the division of 
labor is limited by the extent of the market.‛ The ‚extent of the 
market‛ for analyzing IP is large enough to allow a division of labor, 
addressing each problem on its own, and leaving the ‚big picture‛ to 
direct fixes. This ‚division of labor‛ principle applies to competition 
policy.28 Better to have competition agencies worry about 
                                                     
28 A related concern is that with productivity. As one who has spent a career 
working from a microeconomic, industrial organization perspective, my 
presumption regarding productivity is that once market failures are 
addressed, including those having to do with both competition and 
intellectual property rights, the rate of productivity is whatever it is. 
Innovation itself is intrinsically unpredictable; the best we can do is fix 
microeconomic impediments to efficient investment. That perspective 
contrasts with the macroeconomic concern that productivity is ‚too low‛ in 
historical terms, and merits concern apart from fixing underlying 
microeconomic problems.  
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competition—and IP agencies focus on innovation—rather than to 
have the former engaged in the latter as well.29 
5.4.4 Distorting presently competitive markets 
Although in some sectors innovative activity may be correlated to 
some degree with scale economies that might motivate mergers or 
justify collusive arrangements, the literature surveyed above does 
not confirm a sufficiently strong causal connection between 
concentration and innovation to allow an inference that violating 
competition law signals a propensity to innovate. Consequently, a 
final observation is that if dynamic considerations trump static 
efficiency, then the principle need not hold only in those contexts 
that happen to be the subject of an antitrust investigation. The 
tension between static competition and dynamic efficiency is a 
general, economy-wide proposition.  
If so, we have two policy options. On the one hand, policy 
makers could distort all markets, e.g., make them less competitive, 
perhaps by mandating and enforcing collusive agreements, in order 
to restore appropriate incentives for innovating. Quigley and 
                                                     
29 It may be helpful to consider a similar ‚division of labor‛ example, 
involving externalities. One might argue that an anti-competitive merger of 
oil or electric companies would, by reducing output, reduce carbon 
emissions and expected costs from global warming. However, it is likely to 
harm both competition and the environmental if competition authorities 
attempt to incorporate greenhouse gas emissions into their legal 
assessments, and if environmental policy makers are relying on competition 
law rather than more direct policies, such as emissions taxes or tradable 
permits, to achieve desired objectives. 
In light of other presentations at this seminar, a similar point may apply to 
having antitrust or competition agencies specialize in enforcing laws and 
policies to make markets more competitive, and have regulatory agencies 
(sector-based or general) specialize in policies to impose and manage price 
controls to prevent exploitative high pricing. 
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Sanderson’s (2005) contention that regulation should allow higher 
than efficient prices for telephone service, in order to encourage 
innovation in wireless, would apply equally if the telephone market 
were competitive and not regulated. On that account, those who 
believe dynamic benefits trump harms to competition should not just 
tolerate otherwise anticompetitive collusion, mergers, or 
monopolization. They should encourage such practices even if the 
sector were not so inclined to engage in them, to support innovation 
goals. 
On the other hand, IP laws could be designed to encourage 
innovation as if the underlying markets are competitive, leaving 
competition enforcement to its traditional range of activity. Since 
those laws have evolved over more than a century in a context in 
which most markets are reasonably competitive most of the time, 
one might conclude with appropriate caution that IP rules are 
appropriately designed instruments for innovation when markets 
are competitive. If so, we could presume that those laws and 
regulations would be roughly optimal for those industries where 
deviations from competitive performance are reversed or deterred 
through competition law. IP law is thus the instrument to 
accompany ever-evolving antitrust law, which remains the 
appropriate policy instrument for achieving the goals of 
competition.30 
5.5 What should we do? Follow existing practice 
In the terms of the title of this volume, a suggested ‚pro‛ of high 
prices is that efforts to toward them by making markets more 
competitive in a static sense stand in the way of innovations that 
                                                     
30 Such goals, of course, can vary across jurisdictions, in terms of whether 
the objective is consumer welfare, total welfare, distributive justice (another 
policy better addressed through straightforward tax and welfare policies), 
protectionism, and small enterprise promotion. 
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would bring substantial dynamic efficiencies. Very simple models 
illustrate that the benefits of innovations that cover an entire market 
(e.g., by reducing costs) or generate long-run gains can outweigh 
welfare losses from output reductions that may last only a short 
time. Arguments that dynamic benefits trump static harms imply 
that an anticompetitive market structure is necessary to generate 
profits to encourage innovation, facilitate appropriation of benefits, 
or by stimulating demand for substitutes.  
As actual and hypothetical examples based on the Microsoft 
litigation point out, however, incorporating innovation into 
competition cases should not be reduced to static cases, but may also 
raise concerns that a purely static approach may miss. Innovation 
need not render antitrust less necessary, but more. Most important, 
advocates of the view that antitrust should be weakened to reflect 
‚new economy‛ concerns miss the point that intellectual property 
law exists as an instrument for that purpose. It may well have 
evolved to best balance costs and benefits of encouraging innovation 
when industries are competitive. To suggest otherwise implies that 
anticompetitive conduct should be encouraged in competitive 
markets, not just tolerated where it happens to arise.  
Where should competition agencies go from here? A ‚one size 
fits all‛ presumption regarding dynamic ‚trumping‛ static appears 
inappropriate. If dynamic concerns are the direct focus, the 
authorities should proceed as they do when concerned with 
reductions in output. Evidence will typically be more difficult to 
come by, as innovation by its very nature involves products and 
processes that have yet to take place. Policy makers and adjudicators 
are likely to lack direct present market information regarding the 
magnitude of potential costs and benefits. If an enforcement agency 
is predicating a case on a relevant market that depends on 
innovation, it should bear the burden of persuading a court that its 
market definitions and (unilateral or coordinated) effects stories are 
plausible. Courts, in turn, need to recognize that direct empirical 
evidence will be inherently difficult to obtain. In addition, as the 
Microsoft case in the US shows, reducing such cases to static ones, to 
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avoid having to meet these difficult evidentiary burdens, will lead to 
static-based remedies that may not address relevant dynamic 
concerns.  
All that said, as the arguments motivating this discussion point 
out, there might be ‚pros‛ in higher prices or anticompetitive 
structures, in terms of inducing additional innovation. Although this 
seems to be a novel concern, it is in essence no different than any 
other efficiency defense for an antitrust practice. Under the U.S. 
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission’s Horizontal 
Merger Guidelines (1997, Sec. 4),  
 
The Agency will consider only those efficiencies likely to be accomplished 
with the proposed merger and unlikely to be accomplished in the absence of 
either the proposed merger or another means having comparable 
anticompetitive effects. 
[T]he merging firms must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency 
can verify by reasonable means the likelihood and magnitude of each asserted 
efficiency, how and when each would be achieved (and any costs of doing so), 
how each would enhance the merged firm's ability and incentive to compete, 
and why each would be merger-specific. Efficiency claims will not be 
considered if they are vague or speculative or otherwise cannot be verified by 
reasonable means.31  
 
The same may be said for dynamic efficiency claims. Defendants 
in a competition case should be allowed to invoke those claims, but 
also be required to show that the dynamic effects are ‚unlikely to be 
accomplished‛ but for the practice and ‚substantiate‛ those claims so 
they are not ‚vague or speculative.‛ In particular, this would rule 
out simple assertions that ‚dynamic trumps static.‛ 
These Guidelines also say that 
 
                                                     
31 The Guidelines go on to discuss when efficiencies would be counted, 
based on a consumer welfare rather than total welfare standard. We do not 
address practices based on those different standards here. 
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In the Agency's experience, efficiencies are most likely to make a difference 
in merger analysis when the likely adverse competitive effects, absent the 
efficiencies, are not great. 
For innovation effects, this optimistic view is not likely to be 
justified. For defendants to show that a merger, collusive agreement, 
or abuse of dominance is outweighed by context-specific efficiencies, 
they essentially would have to show that absent the higher profits 
they would reap or the monopolistic structure they would create, 
innovation would not take place.32 This would run counter to claims 
that there are other potential innovators out there, or that this merger 
or agreement would prevent appropriability leaks that otherwise 
discourage innovation.  
This suggests that to support a defense based on a uniquely 
effective ability to innovate, the defendants would, in effect, have to 
show that the merger, collusion, or practice leads to dominance if not 
monopoly in some relevant market, unless they can somehow show 
that other short-run competitors are not also reasonably effective 
long-run innovators.33 They would then have to hope to be able to 
persuade authorities and courts that dynamic efficiencies outweigh 
the short-term static inefficiencies from the suppression of 
competition needed to substantiate the claimed dynamic benefits. 
The demand for a general rule that ‚dynamic trumps static‛ thus 
may be little more than a rhetorical strategy to make life easier for 
                                                     
32 For these purposes, an innovation market may be the better approach. 
33 Not only is this qualification unlikely, but in the US, it can go the other 
way. US competition authorities approved Boeing’s acquisition of 
McDonnell-Douglas in the mid-1990s largely on the grounds that MD was 
not going to be making the R&D investments necessary to remain a viable 
large scale commercial aircraft manufacturer. Federal Trade Commission, 
‚Statement of Chairman Robert Pitofsky and Commissioners Janet D. 
Steiger, Roscoe B. Starek III and Christine A. Varney in the Matter of The 
Boeing Company/McDonnell Douglas Corporation‛ (July 1, 1997), 
http://www.ftc.gov/opa/1997/07/boeingsta.shtm, accessed Oct. 11, 2007. 
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defendants. If, instead, defendants are forced to make such a 
showing in a specific merger, collusion, or monopolization case, the 
need to concede static anticompetitive effects will likely make such 
defenses rare. Any speculation, skeptical or otherwise, regarding the 
relationship between static and dynamic efficiencies, including those 
presented here, may remain more a matter for the ivory towers of 
academia than for the competition law enforcer.  
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6 Excessive Pricing 
Mark Williams 
6.1 Introduction 
The concept of abuse in European antitrust policy can be divided 
into exploitative abuses and exclusionary abuses. Exploitative abuses 
are those where a firm with market power sets prices and conditions 
that take advantage of the strong position of the seller (and the 
correspondingly weak position of the buyer) to ensure that an undue 
share of the gains from trade accrue to the seller. Exclusionary 
abuses are those where a firm seeks to engage in conduct to evict a 
rival from its market (or deter a rival from entering its market or 
expanding in the market), by engaging in pricing and/or non-price 
strategies that induce the rival to cease competing as effectively or at 
all. 
Exploitative and exclusionary abuses are not necessarily 
mutually exclusive. Specifically, when a vertically-integrated firm 
sets an excessive input price to a downstream competitor, and 
implements a margin squeeze, the excessive price is exclusionary.  
Equally, price discrimination will often include elements of 
excessive pricing – to those customers who are asked to pay a high 
price – and may also be a means of implementing predatory pricing, 
in which some customers are ‚targeted‛ with low prices. 
In this paper we focus on excessive pricing as a stand-alone issue, 
separate from other antitrust questions such as price discrimination, 
margin squeeze or bundling with which it is often associated.  
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6.2 The Theoretical Foundations of Excessive 
Pricing Analysis in Competition Policy 
Competition policy is motivated by the benefits to an economy of 
preventing the creation and exercise of market power, of which the 
extreme manifestation is monopoly power. The justification of 
competition policy as an instrument of economic policy must, 
therefore, somehow be grounded in the disadvantages and 
detriments that arise from monopoly power. 
Economic theory shows that a textbook monopolist will increase 
its price above the level that would obtain in a competitive market, 
and allow output to fall to below the level that would be supplied by 
a competitive market. Indeed, in markets with a linear demand curve 
and where marginal cost is constant, monopoly output will be 
exactly half of the level that would be produced by a competitive 
market. This situation is illustrated in Figure 1. 
The loss of surplus to all those consumers who would have 
bought at the competitive price but whose valuation of the good lies 
below the monopoly price is the ‚deadweight welfare loss‛ of 
monopoly, and this can be represented graphically by the shaded 
triangle that lies below the demand curve and above the marginal 
cost curve, between the monopoly output level and the competitive 
output level. The loss of surplus to those consumers that continue to 
buy, but at the higher price, is given by economic profit. This is 
represented by the shaded rectangle in Figure 1, and is not lost to the 
economy, but amounts to a transfer of surplus from customers to the 
monopolist. 
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Figure 1 
Pricing Under Monopoly and Under Competition 
 
The problems with monopoly pricing are therefore: 
 the monopoly price (pmonopoly) is excessive compared to the 
competitive level (pcompetition); 
 some consumer surplus is transferred to the monopolist as 
producer surplus; and 
 some loss of consumer surplus (the deadweight welfare loss) 
is not transferred to the monopolist but lost entirely, to 
society. 
In this light, the prosecution of excessive pricing might be viewed 
as the ‚purest‛ of competition policy offences. Indeed, the 
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prevention of monopoly pricing is one of the key features of 
competition policy. For example, apart from very minor exceptions, 
horizontal price fixing by (supposed) competitors is universally 
condemned, presumably because its effects – the creation of a 
monopoly situation when a more competitive outcome would 
otherwise have occurred – are unambiguously against the consumer 
interest. 
Equally, merger control seeks to prevent the creation by merger of 
market power. In short, a substantial part of competition policy as 
implemented in the real world is motivated by preventing the 
creation and exercise of market power, which would ultimately 
manifest itself by excessive prices. 
Given the apparently fundamental role played by excessive 
pricing in motivating competition policy, it is perhaps surprising that 
the ex-post prosecution of excessive pricing – as opposed to 
deterring its occurrence via cartel or merger policy – remains a 
neglected area of competition policy. Indeed, the reality is that the 
pursuit of excessive pricing cases is quite rare, and the number of 
convictions of pure excessive pricing abuses – as opposed to a hybrid 
offence of which excessive pricing is a component – is modest.  
Our focus on excessive pricing is, therefore, motivated by its 
fundamental conceptual position as the intellectual cornerstone of 
competition policy, rather than the frequency with which (pure) 
excessive pricing matters occur in the everyday practice of 
competition policy.  
6.3 The Relevant Benchmark for Excessive Prices 
The ECJ, in its United Brands judgment, held that the question in 
excessive pricing investigations is ‚whether the difference between 
the costs actually incurred and the price actually charged is 
excessive, and, if the answer to this question is in the affirmative, to 
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consider whether a price has been charged which is either unfair in 
itself or when compared to other competing products‛.1 
In theory, such an assessment of excessive pricing might appear 
to be straightforward. The obvious approach is to compare price 
with some relevant cost measure, and if the gap between price and 
cost exceeds some level, the price in question can be deemed 
excessive. However, in practice, seeking to determine whether prices 
are excessive, and returns excessive, raises a large number of 
problems, both conceptual and of implementation. 
In forming a judgment that a price is excessive, it is first 
necessary to set a benchmark against which the actual price can be 
compared. In addition, a methodology is required for assessing 
whether the gap between the actual price and the benchmark price is 
sufficiently great to be excessive. 
From an economic point of view, a reasonable starting point is 
the premise that a price can be deemed excessive if, and only if, it 
allows the firm in question to make a profit that is excessive.2 Price 
can normally only be thought of as excessive when compared to cost: 
a Rolls Royce may be rather expensive at £150,000, but if its cost of 
production is also very high, it is not meaningful to say that a Rolls 
Royce is excessively priced because it is dearer than a Ford Fiesta at 
£10,000. 
However, there are various concepts of cost, and consequently 
also various concepts of profitability, including: 
 the marginal cost of producing the unit in question 
(corresponding roughly to the profitability concept of a gross 
margin); but also 
                                                     
1 Case 27/76 United Brands v Commission, paragraph 252. 
2 We note that in the presence of inefficiency, excessive prices would not 
necessarily lead to excessive profits. 
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 the overheads or fixed costs associated with production 
(which would be taken into account for calculating a net 
margin). 
In the presence of fixed costs of production, it is not meaningful 
to describe a price as excessive because it exceeds marginal cost. By 
contrast, net profitability (which is essentially equal to total revenue 
minus marginal costs minus fixed costs) corresponds relatively 
precisely to the question at hand in an excessive pricing case. 
That said, profitability is not entirely straightforward, for 
multiple reasons: 
 First, accounting profit is often sensitive to the precise 
approaches of how to deal with depreciation. 
 Second, many businesses are multiple-product businesses 
and data is only presented at an aggregate level in company 
accounts. 
 Third, company accounts of international companies depend 
on transfer pricing arrangements. 
In addition to these ‚practical‛ issues, there is also a fundamental 
conceptual issue. The profits as described in accounts are essentially 
the excess of revenues over cost, but where costs are typically 
defined to exclude capital costs. Of course, profits are often 
calculated both before and after interest, but even if the profits are 
post-interest, that only takes into account the debt element of capital 
structure, not the equity element. 
Any business employs capital. At the time of a business start-up, 
this capital will constitute cash that has been invested in the shell of 
the business and which takes the form of equity capital (the purchase 
of newly issued shares in exchange for cash paid by investors to the 
company’s bank account) or debt capital (the purchase of newly 
issued bonds for cash by investors, where the cash is also paid into 
the company’s bank account). Thus, before the business commences 
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trading it will have a bank account containing a certain amount of 
cash equal to the capital base of the firm. 
However, the firm is owned by its equity holders. These seek to 
obtain a return on the capital they have invested, and would hence 
eventually seek to withdraw their funds if there was no, or 
insufficient, reward. Therefore, a firm has a cost of equity, this being 
the return that the market needs to promise investors to induce them 
to hold equity. More generally, a firm that is financed by debt and 
equity has a weighted average cost of capital (‚WACC‛) which is the 
return it needs to promise to debt and equity holders to induce their 
investment. 
From an economic point of view (as opposed to an accounting 
viewpoint), a firm with a WACC of 10% that makes a profit equal to 
10% of its capital base is defined as making ‚zero profits‛. That is, 
economists take the cost of capital as just another cost of the business 
(like rent and wages) and economic profits are only defined as 
existing if accounting profits exceed the cost of capital. 
In what follows, we pursue the implications of this methodology. 
However, the resulting complications in determining profitability are 
not insignificant, and it will be seen that in practice a variety of 
measures and indicators for excessive pricing are used, and these 
often do not use profitability as the underlying criterion. We will also 
discuss these other criteria, although we will also argue that – 
notwithstanding decisional practice – few if any of these criteria can 
provide proof of excessive pricing, as opposed to providing 
preliminary indicators consistent with but not proof of excessive 
pricing. 
6.4 The Cost of Capital 
Assume a firm with an initial capital investment of £100 million of 
which £80 million is equity and £20 million is debt on a 10% interest 
rate. Suppose the company makes a profit in its first year of £12 
million (and assume, for simplicity, the absence of corporate 
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taxation). As the company has issued £20 million of bonds bearing 
an interest rate of 10%, the firm has an obligation to make an interest 
payment of £2 million on those bonds. As a result of that payment, 
profit falls from £12 million to £10 million. The company can then 
decide how much of its £10 million profit to retain for future 
investment, and how much to pay out to shareholders as a dividend. 
Assume for simplicity’s sake that it pays out all of the post-interest 
profit of £10 million as a dividend. The shareholders then receive a 
dividend totalling £10 million, where the total equity invested by 
shareholders was £80 million. In this first year, the return on equity 
capital employed of the shareholders is £10 million/£80 million, 
which amounts to 12.5%. 
Note, however, that if the profit had only been £8 million, the 
bondholders would still have had to been paid the full £2 million of 
interest to which they were entitled, and that post-interest profits 
would then have been only £6 million, which gives a return on 
equity capital of £6 million/£80 million, which amounts only to 7.5%. 
Thus, bondholders receive a steady pre-determined interest rate 
(unless the firm falls into sufficient distress that it defaults), whereas 
shareholders are the residual claimants on profit and, therefore, 
receive a dividend income that is more volatile with respect to 
changes in profit.3 
A common intuition is that shares whose returns are volatile 
require a higher rate of return to encourage investors to hold them, 
compared to shares whose returns are relatively stable. For example, 
a share that guaranteed a return of 10% is more attractive than one 
that will return either 15% or 5%, with 50% probability each. 
However, this intuition is incorrect. The reason lies in the recognition 
                                                     
3 It is also possible to calculate the weighted return on capital employed of debt 
and equity. If profit is £10 million, the overall weighted ROCE is 10% (£10m 
on a combined equity and debt base of £100 million). If profit is only £8 
million, ROCE is 8%, but where bondholders receive 10% and equity 
holders receive only 7.5%, it can be seen that (0.2*10% + 0.8*7.5%) comes out 
at 8%, the overall return. 
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that shares should be held in a portfolio, and that in a portfolio of 
shares it is possible to diversify risk. Within such a portfolio, some 
shares will do better than average and others worse than average, so 
that the volatility of many of the projects will tend to average out. 
Specifically, some stocks in a portfolio may be negatively 
correlated. An ice cream company will find that its profits increase in 
a hot summer whilst an umbrella company will find that its profits 
fall. Accordingly, a portfolio holding both stocks, i.e. shares in the ice 
cream firm and also in the umbrella firm, will generate a more stable 
return than either stock individually. Since investors can insure 
against volatility of individual stocks simply by holding a diversified 
portfolio, it is clear that no extra return is required to compensate for 
the diversifiable risk. 
However, after combining assets in a portfolio, that portfolio will 
still move up and down with the stock market. That movement 
corresponds to undiversifiable risk and has to be compensated for. 
However, different stocks will move up and down with the market 
to a greater or lesser extent. 
The standard model for analysing the return required by 
investors to invest in a share is the capital asset pricing model (‚CAP-
M‛). The key result of this model is that the required rate of return 
(‚ROR‛) for a particular project is given by the equation: 
 
ROR = Risk-Free Interest Rate + β * (Market Return – Risk-Free 
Rate) 
 
The risk-free interest rate is normally taken as the government 
bond rate. The term β is a technical parameter known as the beta 
coefficient that measures the non-diversifiable risk of the company 
relative to the risk of equities in general. The beta coefficient of a 
share is 1 if the share price in question moves one-for-one with the 
overall stock market, whilst a beta coefficient above 1 shows that the 
share in question ‚over-reacts‛ to movements in the overall stock 
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market. A beta coefficient less than 1 meanwhile shows that the share 
in question ‚under-reacts‛ to general stock market movements. 
To give an example, it is generally believed that shares in food 
companies have low betas because people still eat food in a 
recession, whereas shares in a luxury good company will exceed 1 
because their return falls more than proportionately in a recession 
and rises more than proportionately in a boom. For a business that is 
highly cyclical, this would lead to a beta coefficient higher than 1 
which would justify a higher return on capital than might otherwise 
be expected by the difference between the market return4 and the risk-
free interest rate. This difference is often referred to as the equity risk 
premium (ERP). The calculation of the ERP is itself hotly debated and 
there are many complications beyond the scope of this paper.5 
In summary, CAP-M shows that the rate of return that is 
required to induce investors to finance a particular project is equal to 
the risk-free interest rate (approximated by the government bond 
rate) plus the ERP multiplied by the β of the project in question. In 
short, investments whose returns move perfectly together with the 
overall stock market have a β of 1, and a cost of equity capital equal 
to the risk-free interest rate and the ERP. Investments with a β above 
1 are more volatile than the stock market and, therefore, require a 
higher expected return to induce investors to provide finance, 
whereas projects with a β of less than 1 are less volatile than the 
market and, therefore, require a somewhat lower return to induce 
investment. 
                                                     
4 We note that ‚market return‛ refers to the stock market as a whole and not 
to a market in the competition policy sense. 
5 The arithmetic average of a and b is (a + b)/2. The geometric average of a 
and b is the square root of a times b. 
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6.5 The Return on Capital 
Having discussed the appropriate cost measure for profitability 
analysis, we now need to turn to the next step in identifying whether 
a firm is charging excessive prices. However, the cost of (equity) 
capital cannot be readily compared with the price of the product that 
is being investigated as being excessively priced. In this section, we 
set out the concept of return on capital employed (‚ROCE‛), which can 
be compared to the cost of capital. 
The approach of comparing cost-of-capital with ROCE in order to 
determine the appropriate price level is related to a long tradition of 
rate-of-return regulation for utilities. Regulators in the UK and the 
USA have for many years sought to measure the capital base of a 
regulated utility and then to estimate its weighted average cost of 
capital. The utility’s price cap (i.e. the price the utility is allowed to 
charge customers) is then set so as to seek to generate for the firm an 
actual ROCE equal to its cost of capital. 
There are, however, appreciable differences between excessive 
pricing in competition policy and rate-of-return regulation in a 
utility context. This is because in a utility context the initial 
investment was typically made in a protected market and/or as a 
state company, facing relatively little ex ante risk of failure. For 
example, many utility businesses were actually granted legal 
monopolies. In addition, the products they supply are often 
essentials for which demand is certain. By contrast, businesses in 
competitive marketplaces face significant ex ante risk of failure, and 
this needs to be rewarded ex post in the cases where the firm is 
successful. 
The cost of capital estimated for a major stock market index (e.g. 
the UK FTSE 100) shows the required return for investors to induce 
them to hold these stocks. However, this return is calculated as a 
percentage of the stock market value of the company, not the assets 
invested in the company. The return on stock market value will 
always equal the cost of capital: if a company comprising £100 
million of assets immediately achieved £20 million (i.e. 20%) per 
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annum profitability when the cost of capital is only 10%, its stock 
market value will rise from £100 million to £200 million so that the 
return on investment is back equal to £20 million/£200 million = 10%. 
Essentially, the stock market ‚capitalises‛ the excess return which is 
then reflected in the value of the company. 
Given this automatic mechanism whereby efficient arbitrage 
ensures that return on stock market value equals the cost of capital, it 
is important to emphasise that the relevant measure for assessing 
excess profitability is the return on the asset base invested in the 
company, not the return on its current stock market value. For 
example, suppose that a change in local authority planning rules 
leads to restrictions on entry by new pubs, so that a given pub 
(which has a value of £5 million if it is not used as a pub) can make 
profits of £1 million per annum as a pub. Then, on the assumption of 
a cost of capital of 10%, and ‚capitalising‛ the profit of £1 million per 
annum, the revised valuation of the pub amounts to £10 million. 
Then, when assessing the return on capital generated by a profit of 
£1 million per annum on an asset worth £10 million, the return is 
simply the cost of capital of 10%. Yet, when compared to the £5 
million valuation, the return on capital employed would be 20%. 
The point of focussing on the original assets’ valuation is also 
important in the context of businesses that have recently changed 
hands. When an acquisition price exceeds the asset value of a 
company, the additional payment might reflect the value of a brand 
which has been built up over time as a result of significant spending 
on advertising, but it could also reflect rent from market power. If 
profitability analysis did not go back to the assets of a business, then 
it would effectively be possible to engage in ‚laundering‛ of 
excessive prices: a firm with excessive prices could simply sell its 
market power, and the acquirer could no longer be accused of 
making excess profits, since it had to ‚pay‛ for the capitalised value 
of the market power. Yet, customers would still be faced with 
excessive prices. 
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6.6 Ex Ante Risk and Survivorship Bias 
When assessing the cost of capital, there are complex questions over 
ex ante risk and ex post ‚survivorship‛ bias. Suppose initial 
investments are made by venture capitalists, who know from 
experience that 50% of new investments go out of business.6  Then 
they would invest £100 million by investing £1 million in each of 100 
different projects, in the expectation that 50 of these projects would 
go out of business and thus yield zero, and that 50 would generate a 
20% return on capital. The total return would equal £10 million but 
this would arise from 50 projects yielding £200,000, not 100 projects 
yielding £100,000. 
In this world, the 50 successful projects would be floated on the 
stock market and would yield 20% return on the invested asset and 
10% on stock market value. According to the criteria discussed so far, 
each of these companies would be making an excess return. But it is 
easily seen that the set of companies floated on the stock market is a 
sample that is heavily biased towards companies that have been 
successful and that the failures never reach the stock market to 
feature in the sample.7 
More generally, suppose that the mean of the distribution of 
returns is considered a ‚normal‛ return and there is a wide spread of 
possible returns around this level. If a competition authority then 
acts to curtail those returns in excess of ‚normal‛ or mean profit 
then: 
                                                     
6 In fact the success rate of new investments is even lower. 
7 This argument can be seen by reference to assessing the profitability of a 
lottery ticket. A lottery ticket bought for £1 may have a return given by £1 
million, but only with, say, a 1-in-2-million chance and otherwise it pays 
nothing. For the lottery-winner, the ex post realised rate of return is a million 
times the initial investment yielding a return that is, on any measure, clearly 
excessive. However, the expected ex ante return on this ‚investment‛ is 
negative: -50%. This is because on average every £100 invested in lottery 
tickets pays back only £50. 
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 the new distribution of realised returns, after regulatory 
intervention, is cut off at this level: no higher profit can be 
earned; 
 since the competition authority is unlikely to act to 
compensate firms that have below average ex post returns, the 
mean of the post-intervention distribution will be lower than 
the original (pre-intervention) level; and 
 since the pre-intervention level was the normal profit level, 
the expected return on investment is now less than normal 
profit and no-one will invest. 
Accordingly, attempts to identify excess profitability are fraught 
with the difficulty that a high ex post return on capital has to be 
compared with the ex ante risk of the investment. In many high tech 
areas, it is known that the failure rate of investment is very high and 
accordingly that very high returns for successful businesses may be 
entirely reasonable when judged on the basis of an ex ante portfolio 
approach. Thus, in a business facing a 1-in-10 chance of success, ex 
post returns of 100% per annum on the 1-in-10 successful projects 
would in fact be a fair return on the project and the prices set by the 
successful firm should not be regarded as excessive. 
It is, therefore, apparent that assessing ex post profitability for 
whether it is excessive requires information about the ex ante risks 
faced by the project. For example, mobile phone operators are, and 
have been, routinely subject to scrutiny by regulators (e.g. 
termination charge disputes in a number of EU countries, roaming 
charge investigation by the European Commission). However, at an 
earlier stage of the product life cycle, (potential) rivals to these firms 
– such as Ionica and Iridium – lost very substantial sums of money 
seeking to produce services that competed in the same wireless 
product space. This strongly suggests that ex ante the risks faced even 
by those who are now self-evidently successful were non-trivial. 
The 1996 Director General’s Review of BSkyB by the UK Office of 
Fair Trading provides an instructive case study. The review 
employed a novel (at least at the time) but intellectually important 
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analytic device. By way of history, the UK satellite broadcasting 
market, launched in the late 1980s and early 1990s, involved 
competition between two rival firms: 
 
 British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB); and 
 Sky Television (Sky). 
The potential for this market was ex ante highly uncertain, and 
both firms made significant losses in their early years of operation. In 
1990, the two firms merged to form BSkyB, which subsequently 
became a highly profitable company. In assessing the profitability of 
BSkyB, it was clear that it was relevant to take into account the ex 
ante risks and losses, and the approach adopted was to take into 
account the losses of the merged firms. 
In this case, where the company under investigation consists of 
both firms in the provision of satellite broadcasting, the sum of their 
cumulative losses is clearly an intuitive measure of the capital 
invested by the companies in creating their market position. 
However, what would have been even more interesting is the 
question that would have arisen if one firm (say Sky) had survived 
and the rival (say BSB) had gone into liquidation, without it being 
able to merge with Sky. In that case, the surviving firm Sky would 
clearly include its own cumulative losses, but a case for including the 
BSB losses would remain. This is that, if in a market two firms 
compete for the market and only one firm survives, this suggests that 
each firm was faced with an ex ante risk of failure of 0.5. Accordingly, 
since the winner incurred an ex ante 50% risk of failure even if it was 
certain that the product in question (satellite television) would 
succeed, this should be reflected in the appropriate return. A very 
simple way to take this into account is to include the capital 
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investments of all investors in the market in the capital base of the 
winner.8 
6.7 Intangible Assets 
The analysis so far has assumed that the only capital employed in the 
business is the working capital invested. However, most businesses 
have a brand name that is a significant asset. Indeed, the set of 
intangible assets is even wider and includes know how, distribution 
arrangements, internal organisation and business architecture. These 
are assets that would have been built up over time, usually at a real 
resource cost, or by accepting interim profits below the cost of 
capital. Accordingly, the cost of building these intangibles is a 
legitimate factor in the capital base, indeed as legitimate as any 
investment in physical assets. 
In principle one should go back to the origin of the company and 
examine all prior sub-market returns. By contrast, using an 
acquisition price risks capitalising market power.  
6.8 Skill, Foresight and Industry 
Consider a firm that has secured a market position where it is able to 
make widgets at £10 and sell them for £50, making an 80% margin, 
and also, let us suppose, making a very high ROCE. As such, it 
appears to satisfy the criteria for engaging in excessive pricing. 
However, the view that such a firm should be accused of 
excessive pricing is not uncontroversial. It is a mantra of competition 
policy – and particularly of US antitrust policy – that it is not the 
purpose of competition policy to punish businesses who achieve 
their market position by means of ‚skill, foresight and industry‛. 
                                                     
8 To the extent that there was ex ante risk of the product as a whole failing, 
this should be factored in, to gross up the capital base further. 
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That is, if a firm had the skill to create a new product that 
outperformed existing products in the market (whether or not it was 
able to benefit from IP protection), or the firm had the foresight to 
recognise the trends in a market and take action that in time gave it a 
powerful market position, or if the firm worked very hard to achieve 
low costs of production that gave it competitive advantage, this 
arguably provides a defence against excessive pricing. 
The case for not prosecuting excess profits can also be supported 
by consideration of the dynamics of an economy. A firm making 
high profits is a beacon that inevitably attracts entry, and as such the 
market mechanism contains the basis of the correction of the excess 
profits. Equally, the prospect of high supernormal profits creates 
incentives for entrepreneurship and entry that is the guarantor of 
dynamically competitive markets. 
Such an approach seems in its own terms reasonable enough. The 
merits of the free market system are in essence that entrepreneurs 
take risks to innovate, and the ones who make good judgments 
should be allowed to flourish (and those who make bad judgments 
to exit the market). A very high proportion of the cases where a firm 
is able to make high returns on capital may well be a consequence of 
skill, foresight or industry in some guise or other. If in addition we 
consider all those cases where firms have taken significant ex ante 
risks to build their position, and this risk should be factored into the 
cost of capital, the number of cases where there is excessive pricing 
that should be attacked may shrink quite dramatically. That said, 
many markets where firms have strong market positions are 
characterised by ‚artificial‛ barriers to entry and such cases may well 
be suitable targets for policy interventions such as the UK market 
investigation regime.  
145 
6.9 Practical Indicators of Excessive Pricing 
In the previous sections, we have set out the economic approach to 
excessive pricing, and this has shown the conceptual difficulties that 
underpin a rigorous approach. The difficulties of establishing 
excessive pricing in terms of a coherent conceptual framework might 
be taken to imply that attempts to prosecute excessive pricing would 
be very rare, and even then generally unsuccessful. The practical 
response from regulators wishing to pursue such a case has been to 
rely on a series of proxies for excessive pricing. 
In this section, we set out the sort of indicators that authorities 
have tended to use. However, at the outset we should also state that 
– in our view – these approaches are by and large unsatisfactory, and 
rarely meet the required evidential standard. There is sometimes a 
tendency to think that by using a large number of unsatisfactory 
measures, the fundamental deficiencies can be ignored. Our view is 
that this ‚don’t check the quality, feel the width‛ approach is not 
justified. 
In our opinion, these proxies frequently only provide a one-way 
test. If merely a few or none of these indicators are satisfied then it is 
unlikely that the firm could be engaging in excessive pricing. 
However, we do not regard the fact that any of these tests are 
satisfied as necessarily proving the excessiveness of pricing. They are 
perhaps, at best, seen as a screen for whether a full analysis should 
be undertaken. 
In very broad terms, four different indicators of excessive pricing 
have been proposed: 
 
 Price-cost margins. 
 Competitors’ prices. 
 International price comparisons. 
 Earlier prices of the dominant firm. 
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6.9.1 Price-Cost Margins 
One of the ways in which a price might be found to be excessive is 
by comparison of the selling price with the cost of production. The 
price-cost margin for a good is defined as: 
 
(price – cost)/price 
 
Thus, if the price is £120 and cost is £100, the price-cost margin is 
(£120 -£100)/£120 which equals £20/£120 or 16.67%. Equally, if the 
price is £200 and cost is £100 the price-cost margin is (£200 -
£100)/£200 which is 50%. The price-cost margin is, therefore, a simple 
measure of the ‚mark-up‛ that the firm is able to achieve over its 
cost of production. 
Of course, as already discussed in Section 2.3 above, there are 
various different measures of cost. Of those, the two most relevant 
measures are: 
 
 the marginal cost (MC) of production, this being the increase 
in total cost when output is increased by one unit; and 
 the average total cost (ATC) of production, this being the total 
costs of production (including overheads) divided by total 
output. 
 
ATC in turn is equal to average variable cost (AVC) (which equals 
marginal cost if marginal cost is constant at all output levels), plus 
average fixed cost of production. 
Analysing the price-cost margin has a clear motivation in 
economic theory: it is a property of a market characterised by the 
textbook model of perfect competition that price equals marginal cost.9  
                                                     
9 It should be noted that price can equal marginal cost also under other 
theories or market structures. For example, price equals marginal cost in a 
Bertrand equilibrium of a one-shot game for a homogenous good where 
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Accordingly, in a perfectly competitive market, the price-cost margin 
should be equal to zero, computed on a MC basis. A positive price-
cost margin on a MC basis indicates a market that is less competitive 
than a perfectly competitive market. 
However, if a firm has constant marginal costs but also fixed 
costs of production, then pricing at marginal cost means that 
revenues will only cover the variable costs of production and the 
firm will make a loss equal to its fixed cost. Accordingly, marginal 
cost pricing would not be viable in a world with fixed costs.10  For 
that reason, a price-cost margin calculated on an ATC basis (i.e. a net 
margin instead of a gross margin) is often seen as more reliable. This is 
the margin above the average cost of production per unit, so if price 
is £10 and average total cost is £9, the firm is making a profit of £1 
per unit, or 10%. That is, when the price-cost margin is calculated on 
an ATC basis, a positive price-cost margin is equivalent to positive 
profits. By contrast, if a firm had a price of £10 and marginal cost of 
£9, it would make a gross margin of £1 per unit, but if it had fixed 
costs of £1m per annum and only sold 900,000 units it would make a 
loss of £100,000 per annum. That is, a positive price-cost margin on a 
MC basis (i.e. a positive gross margin) does not necessarily imply 
positive profits. 
Accordingly, given that the fixed costs of businesses typically 
differ by product or line of business, gross margins (i.e. price-cost 
margins on a MC basis) are not easily comparable across markets, 
                                                                                                                           
firms face no capacity constraints. In a perfectly contestable market, price 
can equal marginal cost even when a firm has 100% market share. 
10 This is critically dependent on the assumption of constant marginal cost. 
If demand is variable and the marginal cost curve is steep, firms may make 
very high infra-marginal profits when demand is high, because although 
marginal cost is high and hence price is high, the production cost of all but 
the last unit of production is lower, allowing positive price cost margins 
that can contribute to fixed costs. However, these occasional high prices are 
themselves sometimes (inappropriately) challenged as excessive.  
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whereas net margins (i.e. price-cost margins on a ATC basis) relate to 
whether positive profits are being made. 
However, even net margins are unsatisfactory in that although 
they correspond to whether profits are made, and total profit can be 
calculated by multiplying the gross margin by output, different 
businesses employ different amounts of capital. Accordingly, two 
businesses could make total profit of £1 million, but the first firm 
might employ £1 million of capital, giving a ROCE of 100%, while 
the second firm might employ capital of £10 million, giving a ROCE 
of 10%. That is, gross margins may show the level of profits, but they 
are not fully informative on the ultimately relevant question of 
ROCE. 
Given this obvious limitation, it might be asked why price-cost 
margins are ever used when it is clear that analysis of ROCE will still 
be necessary. There are two main arguments. First, given that within 
a particular industry the capital intensity is typically relatively 
constant, comparison of price-cost margins within a market can 
provide insights into which firms have higher and which firms have 
lower than average ROCE – without saying anything about the level 
of the ROCE. Yet, this is still unsatisfactory. Given that profits earned 
from skill, foresight and industry are not normally seen as a 
legitimate target for excessive pricing investigations, above-average 
profitability cannot reasonably be an indicator of excessive pricing as 
this would be targeting efficiency. Second, some industries employ 
very little financial capital, and as such, profit divided by capital 
employed would give a high ROCE. For example, many service 
businesses employ labour and sell it out, but employ little capital. If 
the firm is able to invoice for its services rapidly, it may be able to 
operate with very little working capital as the received revenues 
‚finance‛ the staff wages. Accordingly, ROCE is often regarded as a 
not very meaningful measure. However, this too is unsatisfactory. 
Such firms do possess significant intangible assets which would have 
required building, and if these are included in the capital base, the 
ROCE would be substantially lower. With valuation difficulties for 
such intangibles calculating the ‚true‛ ROCE is difficult. Even so, in 
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our view such difficulties are not a basis for using a different, 
unreliable measure. 
6.9.2 Competitors’ Prices 
Comparison of the prices charged by the firm under investigation 
with those of its competitors that supply the same product was used 
by the European Commission in General Motors and United Brands 
and by the UK OFT in Napp. One problem with this approach is that 
if the firms used as a benchmark are genuinely competitors, and the 
products they supply are genuinely comparable in quality, it is then 
puzzling why consumers do not substitute away from the allegedly 
overpriced product. One would, therefore, expect that prices would 
equalise across the market (possibly at an excessive level), so that the 
comparison between the firm under investigation and its competitors 
would not be very informative. 
6.9.3 International Price Comparisons 
Different industries have different levels of fixed costs, so they will 
require different levels of price-cost (gross) margins to achieve 
breakeven profit. Also, different industries have different levels of 
capital intensity, and accordingly a given price-cost margin will 
correspond to a different ROCE in different industries. However, the 
level of fixed costs and capital intensity, though differing widely 
across industries, might be expected to be equal in the same 
industry. This might hold true even across different countries, to the 
extent that input costs do not vary dramatically.11 
                                                     
11 In very labour-intensive industries, an international price comparison 
may not make much sense, given that price differences might well be 
explained by different wage levels, and not be market power. 
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It would then be possible to compare prices in a given industry 
across countries, and the average price across countries could be 
taken as a proxy to the price in an averagely competitive market. At 
that point, if the prices in one country were (for example) 20% higher 
than the average, this might indicate a failure of competition in that 
country. 
Price differences between Member States were the main basis of 
the excessive pricing allegation in United Brands.12  This decision was 
quashed on the grounds that the costs of the dominant firm had not 
been carefully examined. However, in the cases against the French 
collecting society SACEM, the ECJ held that where there are very 
substantial price differences between Member States, this in itself 
could be evidence of excessive prices, unless the dominant firm 
could point to objective relevant differences between Member States 
which explained the disparities. On the facts, SACEM’s royalties in 
France were many times higher than those charged by collecting 
societies in other European countries. 
However, international price comparisons raise a series of 
complex questions which must be taken into account: 
 
 First, to compute comparisons it is necessary to construct 
appropriate price index numbers. Complex issues arise when 
the bundle of goods consumed by customers in the two 
countries to be compared differ: there is then a choice of 
whether to use an index based on consumption patterns in 
the home country or the foreign country, and indeed whether 
even then comparisons are legitimate if there are differences 
in consumer tastes between countries. 
 Second, to compare prices in different countries, it is 
necessary to convert prices at the appropriate exchange rate.13  
                                                     
12 Case IV/26699 Chiquita OJ [1976]. 
13 This complication has become somewhat less relevant within the EEA, 
where many countries now use the Euro. 
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However, the spot exchange rate at any moment in time is 
typically driven by macroeconomic policies and is thus not 
always a good guide to long run ‚fundamental‛ exchange 
rates; as economists often argue that exchange rates are 
overvalued or undervalued, the basis of comparisons is open 
to question. At the very least, there are arguments that prices 
should be compared over a longer run period, rather than at a 
snapshot in time. 
 International price comparisons are also very often 
complicated by differences in tax regimes. As it would be 
inappropriate to blame a company for its country’s high tax 
rates, pre-tax prices are generally preferred; however, this 
exercise then involves an analysis of whether firms would 
absorb some of the tax, or whether the tax would simply be 
passed on fully to customers. 
 
For these and other reasons, international price comparisons are 
a controversial measure of establishing whether prices in any one 
country are excessive.14 
                                                     
14 A related technique suggested by the case law is some form of ‚yardstick 
competition‛ in which prices in markets lacking competition are compared 
with otherwise similar markets in which there are a number of competing 
providers. This was suggested by the ECJ in Bodson. In some French towns 
funeral services were provided by a single firm granted a concession, while 
in others there was competition between rival providers. The ECJ suggested 
comparing the pattern of prices between the two types of town. This inter-
town price comparison is analytically similar to international price 
comparisons, but without some of the difficulties such as exchange rates 
and different tax regimes. Another form of benchmarking used by the 
European Commission in United Brands was to compare the price of 
branded and unbranded bananas. The price of unbranded consumer goods 
can be seen as an upper bound for the cost of production of branded goods. 
However, this is somewhat unsatisfactory as it ignores all the difficulties in 
valuing the intangible brand. 
152 
6.9.4 Earlier Prices of the Dominant Firm 
Comparison of the alleged excessive prices with the dominant firm’s 
earlier prices is sometimes used as a test. In General Motors, the car 
manufacturer had imposed a sharp increase in the price of type 
certificates.15  However, this assumes that the prior price was not 
below the competitive level,16 and also requires us (as admittedly we 
anyway would) to form a view about what increment above the 
competitive level counts as excessive. In reality, the application of 
this test implies that competition law is directed less at excessive 
price levels but at price increases. 
6.10 What Premium Is Excessive? 
Finally, the question over the appropriate threshold for regarding a 
price premium as excessive is an issue on which economics cannot 
give much guidance. Instead, the ‚allowed premium‛ is a policy 
choice, to which economics can contribute little.  
We note that previous cases provide a range of indicative 
thresholds, often in contradiction with each other. 
In United Brands,17 the Commission held that the prices of the 
dominant seller of bananas on the relevant geographic market were 
at least 15% too high.18 However, it reached this view on the basis of 
                                                     
15 In Napp, the argument was used that the price of the drug in question had 
not fallen since coming out of patent, and that since one could expect prices 
charged under patent to be at the monopoly level, this demonstrated that 
prices were excessive. 
16 The ECJ found in United Brands (paragraph 243) that the price quoted by 
the Commission, for bananas delivered in Ireland, produced a loss. 
17 Case IV/26699 Chiquita OJ [1976] 
18 At the Napp appeal, the OFT drew attention to this 15% figure, and said 
that it could conservatively be assumed that Napp’s prices were ‚at least 
15% higher than they would be under competitive conditions‛. The OFT 
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a finding that the prices charged to (most) customers in Germany, 
Denmark, the Netherlands and the BLEU were substantially higher, 
by up to 100%, than the prices charged to customers in Ireland. In 
addition, there was a 20% to 40% difference in price between the 
price of Chiquita and unbranded bananas.  
By contrast, in the context of monopoly enquiries under the UK 
Fair Trading Act 1973, a price differential of 7% to 9% between 
compact discs sold the UK and the USA was considered acceptable 
in The Supply of Recorded Music,19 while in New Cars20 a long-run 
differential of 3.5% to 7.1% between the UK and comparable Member 
States was not. 
However, even more fundamental than these inconsistent 
thresholds in previous cases is the fact that the ‚real‛ measure of 
profitability should be ROCE (adjusted for appropriate risk), not the 
price-cost margin. 
6.11 Conclusions 
Policy interventions in the field of excessive pricing have used a 
variety of ad hoc measures, and inconsistent standards. Our view is 
that a necessary condition for a price to be excessive is that, for the 
product in question, the firm has enjoyed a persistently high return 
on capital, and where this fully takes into account survivorship bias 
and the capital base genuinely reflects the cost of intangible assets. 
Even then, measures to improve competition and entry may still be 
more appropriate.  
                                                                                                                           
argued that the Advocate-General had accepted the 15% threshold when 
the United Brands decision was appealed. However, the ECJ itself in the 
United Brands case, while confirming the general principle that excessive 
pricing could be an abuse, quashed that part of the Commission’s decision 
which argued that United Brands’ banana prices were in fact excessive. 
19 Cm 2596 (1994). 
20 Cm 4660 (2000). 
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Other books in the same series 
2006: The Pros and Cons of Information Sharing 
This book focuses on information sharing between firms. Good 
information will allow firms to plan production and marketing 
activities, to invest in new capacity or in R&D and to price their 
products competitively. Similarly, consumers will be able to make 
rational choices if they are well informed about different products’ 
prices and characteristics. On the other hand, detailed information 
about rivals’ prices, production and sales can help stabilize cartels, 
by making it easier for the cartel members to monitor each other. In 
this volume some of the world’s leading researchers present their 
view of the use of information sharing and how it could and should 
be handled by the competition authorities. 
2005: The Pros and Cons of Price Discrimination 
This book investigates the different aspects of price discrimination 
and its relation to competition law. Firms in most markets, both 
competitive and more concentrated markets, tend to price 
discriminate, i.e. to charge consumers different prices for the same 
(or almost the same) product. In some instances, this is a problem 
because it hinders competition, in others it is not; in fact, it is 
beneficial for the consumers. In this volume some of the world’s 
leading researchers present their view of the use of price 
discrimination and how it is, could and should be handled by the 
competition authorities. 
2004: The Pros and Cons of Antitrust in Deregulated Markets 
This volume is about the intersection of competition law and sector 
specific regulation. When is competition law sufficient and when is 
sector-specific legislation necessary? What are the advantages of 
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relying only on competition law? And which are the drawbacks? 
Although the authors mainly discuss energy and telecom markets, 
the principles they base their discussions on are of a general nature. 
They all subscribe to the view that competition is desirable and that 
markets should be liberalised, rather than monopolised. Despite this, 
they hold different views on the necessity of complementing 
competition law with sector specific regulation. According to some, 
competition law is sufficient in deregulated markets; according to 
others, the special properties of certain markets makes it necessary to 
introduce specific regulatory measures. 
2003: The Pros and Cons of Low Prices 
The book is about predatory pricing; an issue that has intrigued and 
bewildered the competition policy community for a long time and 
where conflicting views are held. The problem and the challenge for 
competition policy are to draw the fine line between pro-competitive 
pricing behaviour on the one hand and predatory pricing as an 
instrument of abuse on the other.  
The purpose of this book is to assess predatory practices from a 
competition policy perspective and the implications of recent 
theoretical and empirical developments for a consistent treatment of 
such practices in competition policy. We have solicited contributions 
from experts in the field, covering the main streams of development 
and discussing policy issues related to predation in the light of these 
developments. 
2002: The Pros and Cons of Merger Control 
The book is intended to serve as a contribution to the debate on 
merger control and consists of four individual contributions from 
independent scholars and professionals with an expertise in 
economics. Naturally, the opinions expressed are those of the 
authors alone. 
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The pros and cons of merger control are high on the agenda of 
policy makers, competition authorities, academics, representatives of 
industry and labour organizations, and others. The need for merger 
control is widely supported - but the specific principles and tools by 
which it should be exercised are subject to discussion and debate, 
and also revision. The review of the Merger Regulation in the Green 
Paper by the European Commission has raised several fundamental 
questions. 
The pros and cons of changing the ‚substantive test‛ from the 
dominance standard to the SLC-test (‚Substantial Lessening of 
Competition‛) is an issue that needs careful scrutiny. The concept of 
collective dominance and other issues such as jurisdiction, 
efficiencies, and procedures are also of great importance. 
2000: Fighting Cartels – Why and How? 
The book takes up legal as well as economic aspects on why we 
should be concerned with cartels, how to detect and find sufficient 
evidence of cartel behaviour, and how to accomplish an effective 
prevention of cartel behaviour. 
The theme reflects the growing concern in Sweden as well as 
internationally for the detrimental effects of cartels on society. The 
book takes up various aspects of anti-cartel enforcement, and in 
particular, how competition authorities of today could be successful 
in the prevention of cartels. 
The books can be ordered from our website www.konkurrensverket.se 
